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MAP AID TO LAOS 1959 - 1972

25 JUNE 1973

HQ PACAF

Directorate, Tactical Evaluation

CHECO Division

Prepared by:

Capt. Peter A.W. Liebchen

Project CHECO 7th AF, DOAC

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14. ABSTRACT Project CHECO was established in 1962 to document and analyze air operations in Southeast Asia. Over the years the meaning of the acronym changed several times to reflect the escalation of operations: Current Historical Evaluation of Counterinsurgency Operations, Contemporary Historical Evaluation of Combat Operations and Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations. Project CHECO and other U. S. Air Force Historical study programs provided the Air Force with timely and lasting corporate insights into operational, conceptual and doctrinal lessons from the war in SEA.					
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PROJECT CHECO REPORTS

The counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare environment of Southeast Asia has resulted in USAF airpower being employed to meet a multitude of requirements. These varied applications have involved the full spectrum of USAF aerospace vehicles, support equipment, and manpower. As a result, operational data and experiences have accumulated which should be collected, documented, and analyzed for current and future impact upon USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine.

Fortunately, the value of collecting and documenting our SEA experiences was recognized at an early date. In 1962, Hq USAF directed CINCPACAF to establish an activity which would provide timely and analytical studies of USAF combat operations in SEA and would be primarily responsive to Air Staff requirements and direction.

Project CHECO, an acronym for Contemporary Historical Examination of Current Operations, was established to meet the Air Staff directive. Managed by Hq PACAF, with elements in Southeast Asia, Project CHECO provides a scholarly "on-going" historical examination, documentation, and reporting on USAF policies, concepts, and doctrine in PACOM. This CHECO report is part of the overall documentation and examination which is being accomplished. It is an authentic source for an assessment of the effectiveness of USAF airpower in PACOM when used in proper context. The reader must view the study in relation to the events and circumstances at the time of its preparation--recognizing that it was prepared on a contemporary basis which restricted perspective and that the author's research was limited to records available within his local headquarters area.

Robert E. Hiller

ROBERT E. HILLER
Director of Operations Analysis
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Captain Liebchen received his commission in the USAF upon graduation from Officer Training School at Lackland AFB, Texas, in December 1967. He had completed a Master's Degree in Modern European History at Rutgers University prior to entering the Air Force. Since his commissioning he has served as an Administrative Officer, a Squadron Commander, and as Chief of the Language Training Branch at Chanute AFB, Illinois. Immediately before becoming a CHECO writer, Captain Liebchen was an Instructor in German at the United States Air Force Academy. He is returning to the Academy upon the completion of his SEAsia assignment. Captain Liebchen previously wrote the CHECO study, Kontum: Battle for the Central Highlands.

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FOREWORD

Under our constitutional form of government, the United States military is subordinate and responsive to the decisions formulated by the elected civilian leadership. An understanding of American involvement in Laos requires some knowledge of the political considerations, both Laotian and American, which led to that involvement.

Prince Souphanouvong organized the Pathet Lao (PL) (or "Lao National" movement) in 1949, and with Viet Minh (VM) support vowed to fight until the last vestiges of French colonial rule were removed from Laos. In effect, the Pathet Lao also declared itself against the Lao Issara (or "Free Lao" movement), and against the pro-Western ruling circle in Vientiane which had agreed to a compromise solution with the French.^{1/}

In 1950, the United States joined with Cambodia, France, Vietnam, and Laos in a Pentalateral Agreement in an attempt to stabilize Southeast Asia against communist-inspired "national liberation" movements such as the Pathet Lao. American economic assistance to the Royal Laotian Government (RLG) in support of this Agreement further emphasized American interest in Laos. This study traces, chronologically, the role of United States aid to Laos from these beginnings through the end of Fiscal Year 1972.

The emphasis of the study is on American military aid to Laos 1959-1972. In view of the fact that the RLG has been battling for survival almost from its beginnings in 1954, the military focus of this study is hardly surprising. Beset at first by indigenous Pathet Lao foes, the RLG subsequently became involved in the ever-expanding war between North and

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South Vietnam when Laotian territory was used as a logistics pipeline for North Vietnamese Army (NVA) penetration of South Vietnam.

The signatures on the 1962 Geneva Agreements guaranteeing Laotian neutrality were hardly dry when superpower jockeying to protect national interests set the stage for intervention and involvement in Laos. While the United States withdrew its personnel under the terms of the Agreement, North Vietnam increased the size of its already large troop contingent within Laos.

In an effort to counter increasing Communist usurpation of what remained of Laotian neutrality, the United States expanded Military Assistance Program (MAP) aid to Laos in 1963. Logistically supported through the Bangkok-based Deputy Chief, Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand (DEPCH/JUSMAGTHAI), MAP aid was both overt and covert.

Unfortunately, most of the DEPCH documentation of MAP aid to Laos through 1966 was destroyed when the organization moved from Bangkok to Udorn RTAFB in November 1971; fortunately, much information from the earlier years could be reconstructed from the tri-service Journal of Military Assistance* (Journal of Mutual Security prior to 1960) which terminated publication in March 1972. From 1966 on, the quarterly reports from the Senior Air Force representative at DEPCH form the basis for the documentation.

While this study concentrates primarily on the great "success story"

*Prepared and published quarterly by the Evaluation Division, Directorate of Military Assistance and Sales, DCS/Systems and Logistics, Hq USAF.

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of MAP aid to Laos - that of the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF) - it does not wish to detract from the contributions made by the United States Army and the United States Navy. Both services have borne financial and advisory burdens along with the United States Air Force.

The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the following individuals: Colonel Ray W. Bauman and Colonel Joseph W. Mejaski, the senior Air Force representatives at DEPCH, who granted incisive interviews; Major General James D. Hughes, then Deputy Commander, 7/13AF, and Lt Col John Garrity, Jr., then of Hq 7/13AF Current Intelligence, for the penetrating insights they provided.

This is not an operational study. However, several CHECO and CORONA HARVEST reports have touched on the subject of MAP aid to Laos in the operational context. For the benefit of those wishing to delve further into the subject, a short list of pertinent studies is provided:

Project CHECO Reports

(S/AFE0/LD) Air Operations in Northern Laos (a continuing series of studies from 1969 to the present)

(S) The Royal Laotian Air Force 1954-1970

(S/AFE0) Air Support of Counterinsurgency in Laos, July 1968 to November 1969

(TS/NF) USAF Control of Air Strikes in Support of Indigenous Lao Ground Forces

CORONA HARVEST Report

(S/NF) Waterpump 1964-1965 (Tells the story of the first USAF detachment at Udorn, RTAFB. The detachment trained RLAF pilots.)

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


FIGURE 1

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK, 1954-1959

Following the defeat of French forces by the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu in 1954, the various components of the crumbling Cochin China colonial empire began to assert their new national identities. The Lao group, ethnically a part of the Thai people, was the culturally and politically dominant force in the new nation of Laos. The Lao, who dwell in the plains and valley, looked with disdain upon the Meo and Yao mountain tribes who had migrated from southwestern China in the 19th century, and on the aboriginal Kha tribes of Indonesian stock who inhabited the upland areas of southern Laos. In Vientiane, the ruling group, basically composed of the Thai Lao, continually denied the minorities in Laos the chance for upward social mobility. Ethnic rivalries led time and time again to military and political coups, which have kept internal Laotian affairs from stabilizing to this day. Although the 1954 Paris Conference granted Laos complete control over its military, political, diplomatic, judicial, and economic affairs, it would take more than a treaty to organize the diverse elements of Laotian society into a cohesive nation. Internal rivalries and injustices led to an increasing popularization of the Pathet Lao, which in turn led to increasing United States concern about Laos.^{2/}

The 1954 Geneva Convention

The 1954 Geneva Convention on Indochina, insofar as it concerned Laos, called for a coalition government in which the Pathet Lao were

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to participate. It was against a background of the cold war and fervent anti-communism in American political circles that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles refused to sign any accord with the People's Republic of China and other communist nations. Symbolic of the 1954 Geneva Convention was the famous "handshake incident" when Dulles refused to shake Chou En Lai's outstretched hand. Although unwilling to sign the agreements, American diplomats stated that the United States would respect them and "refrain from the threat or use of force to disturb them."^{3/}

All parties agreed to respect the articles of the July 20, 1954, Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos. Among the more significant provisions:^{4/}

- Article 6 prohibited introduction of foreign military troops, although 1,500 French officers and NCOs were permitted.

- Article 7 prohibited establishment of any new military bases.

- Article 8 permitted two French military establishments, not to exceed 3,500 men.

- Article 9 prohibited the introduction of armaments, munitions or military equipment (except a specified amount necessary for Laotian defense).

- Article 13 called for the withdrawal of French and Viet Minh forces from Laos (except those French forces permitted under Articles 6 and 8).

- Article 14 called for the withdrawal of Pathet Lao forces to the provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua pending a final political settlement among all Laotian parties.

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- Article 25 created the International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos.* Canada, India, and Poland were to station observers in Vientiane, the political capital of Laos.

Early United States Assistance to Laos 1955-1959

In December, 1955, the United States established a Program Evaluation Office (PEO) to advise the American Ambassador to Laos on requirements for and use of military equipment. Staffed by Department of Defense (DOD) civilians, the small group reported directly to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC). The 1954 Geneva Accords, and a further clarification of them in 1956, stated that only the French were to provide military advice and training to the Laotians. However, an apparent lack of interest and progress on the part of the French led to an increased importance for the PEO in 1957, and its manning was increased from 10 to 60 authorized spaces.^{5/}

Laotian politics were subject to often-strange eccentricities, such as the agreements growing out of the relationship of the half-brothers Prince Souvanna Phouma and Prince Souphanouvong. Souvanna Phouma headed the neutralist faction in the Laotian political spectrum, while Souphanouvong led the communist Pathet Lao. An agreement between the two in November 1957 called for placing the two Pathet Lao-occupied northern provinces under Royal Laotian Government (RLG) administration, and for integrating the two existing PL battalions into the Royal Laotian Armed Forces (RLAF), locally known as the Forces Armees' Royales (FAR). As an adjunct to this internal agreement, elections were to be

*This body was later known as the International Control Commission (ICC).

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held in which the Neo Lao Hak Zat (NLHZ)--the "Lao Patriotic Front," the political arm of the Pathet Lao--could compete as a legal political party.^{6/}

In the ensuing election, the PL and its sympathizers gained only 14 out of 59 seats in the legislative assembly. Souphanouvong, who had a degree in public works engineering, took charge of the Ministry of Planning in the new government.^{7/} American foreign aid officials, who now had to deal with the newly-legalized indigenous communists, began to report in 1958 that the "country appeared to be headed for a communist takeover." Accordingly, the PEO staff was augmented once more, this time by active-duty U.S. military personnel posing as civilians. By the end of 1959 PEO strength had increased from 60 authorizations to 531, including:^{8/}

<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	<u>Lao Civilian</u>	<u>Philippino Civilian</u>	<u>Total</u>
239	33	69	190	531

Of the 239 military personnel, 17 were assigned as advisors to the fledgling Army Aviation Branch of the FAR.^{9/}

The integration of the two PL battalions became the stumbling block in internal Laotian politics. Souphanouvong wanted them integrated as cohesive units, while the other political factions demanded that they be scattered throughout the FAR. In the absence of subsequent agreement, the first PL battalion remained intact at Xieng Ngeun (near the royal residence city of Luang Prabang), and the second PL battalion remained at Xieng Khouang on the Plaine des Jarres (PDJ) plateau (some 150 miles northeast of Vientiane). The PL forces refused diffusion into the FAR,

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which would have negated their military and political power, and chose instead to remain intact and in control of those regions they had held since 1954.^{10/}

Unable or unwilling to resolve their differences, Souphanouvong and Souvanna Phouma went their separate ways and were replaced in August 1958 by a new cabinet under Phoui Sananikone. The new government scrapped neutralist policies and embarked on a solidly pro-Western course, and Phoui Sananikone stated:^{11/}

As far as peaceful coexistence is concerned, we shall clearly inform neighboring countries and the world that we shall coexist with the Free World only. We trust only those countries that really and sincerely support us.

American planners apparently feared a Czechoslovak-type infiltration if communist factions were allowed to be in the government; the accession and actions of the self-proclaimed anti-communist Sananikone were therefore initially welcomed. United States interest in Laos was best summarized by a December, 1960, New York Times article, which discussed the strategic importance of the small and backward state:^{12/}

Its loss to the communists would open up long borders of friendly powers such as Thailand and South Vietnam to infiltration by the communists. It was also felt here that the loss of Laos to the communists would be an irreparable blow to United States and Western prestige throughout Asia.

Perhaps emboldened by American expressions of support, Sananikone embarked on a program to eradicate the Pathet Lao, many of whom were Kha tribesmen and therefore considered "inferior" in an ethnic sense by the ruling Thai Lao group to which he belonged. As a result, one of the two

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PL battalions nominally integrated into the FAR dispersed itself throughout Laos, and the second battalion sought refuge in North Vietnam.^{13/}

On 4 September 1959 the Sananikone government appealed to the United Nations (UN) for an emergency force to counter what it charged were attacks by communist-led rebels supported by North Vietnam. The United States supported this Laotian request in the UN, which appointed a special sub-committee to investigate the allegations.^{14/} Its findings were (1) that North Vietnamese arms and soldiers had been used by the PL rebels, but (2) the evidence was inconclusive as to whether or not NVA units had participated in the attacks.^{15/}

Status of the Laotian Army Air Force in 1959

In 1959 the Laotian Army Air Force (LAAF) was a very modest one. By 1959, MAP aid had provided a total of 16 aircraft to the LAAF, including six C-47, six L-19, and four L-20 aircraft (two from French Expeditionary Forces excess). The LAAF personnel strength in March 1959 was as follows:^{16/}

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
	<u>721</u>	<u>567</u>
Pilots	62	17
Other Aircrew	21	7
Non-Aircrew	638	543

Eighty-eight students included in the above totals were in training in France, and 85 French Mission Advisors were on duty with the LAAF Composite Squadron.^{17/} This Composite Squadron, based at Vientiane, was

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comprised of three flights: the transport flight equipped with C-47s, a liaison and training flight equipped with L-19s, and an observation and reconnaissance flight utilizing the L-20s. The mission of this squadron was primarily that of logistical support, and none of the aircraft were armed.^{18/}

The Laotians began to indicate dissatisfaction with the support furnished by the French Military Mission in 1959, and, consequently, established closer ties with the United States. The French, sensitive to their diminishing role and influence in Southeast Asia, were finally persuaded to agree to Franco-American "joint-teams" to conduct training. To preserve the letter of the 1954 Geneva Agreement, only French Officers were responsible for supervising the joint training. Each French officer had an American deputy, however, and agreement was reached that 65 of the French Military Mission advisors were to be replaced by U.S. or Philippino personnel.^{19/}

During FY 1959, the LAAF received \$524,000 under the MAP, primarily in the form of consumables and spare parts. The total value of the assistance provided the LAAF from 1950-1959 was approximately \$1.5 million. An additional \$935,000 remained to complete the 1959 MAP for the LAAF; this amount was programmed primarily for two additional C-47s and five L-20s. These aircraft had been funded but not delivered at the end of FY 1959.^{20/} (For details of the FY 1959 LAAF program see page 145.)

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Financial Aspects of United States MAP Aid Provided to Laos 1955-1959

MAP aid to Laos was at the modest figure of approximately 1.5 million dollars in 1955, but jumped drastically to some 26 million dollars in 1956 after the PEO was established in-country. During the trial period of accommodation between Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong, aid decreased to some \$4.2 million in 1957, but increased to \$5 million in 1958 when the two factions could not resolve their differences and were replaced by the Sananikone ^{21/} government.

Total United States foreign aid to Laos during 1959 amounted to some \$28.5 million of which \$6.8 million was in the form of military assistance, \$20 million in defense support, and \$1.7 million in technical cooperation. Although direct MAP aid accounted for only about 25 percent of the total American aid to Laos, it had helped the Laotian government to maintain internal security and protect its frontiers from external communist incursions. By facilitating the establishment of a stable environment, MAP aid also helped to create a favorable environment for economic progress. From the Pentalateral Agreement of 1950 to 1959, total U.S. military assistance to Laos amounted to \$54,792,000. U.S. economic assistance during the same period totaled \$187,781,000. ^{22/}

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CHAPTER II

EVENTS LEADING TO THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1962

Disunity and Revolution

Increasing world interest in Laos resulted in a lessening of authority of the Laotian government. For example, Royal influence, as well as Soviet, British, and UN pressure, dissuaded Prime Minister Sananikone from prosecuting his scheduled trials of the top pro-communist leaders, including Prince Souphanouvong. Feeling stripped of power, Sananikone resigned on 31 December, and was replaced on 3 January 1960 by a government composed of Laotian military commanders who appointed Prince Somsanith as Prime Minister.^{23/}

Some eight months later, an unexpected revolution, led by Kong Le, a 26-year-old paratroop captain of mixed Laotian and tribal parentage, put an end to the government of Prince Somsanith. On 9 August 1960 Kong Le captured the administrative capital of Vientiane, and returned Souvanna Phouma to power as the interim Prime Minister. Kong Le's actions were ascribed to conflicting motivations: some contended that a growing dissatisfaction with subsistence-level pay in the armed forces had caused the revolt, while others said that Kong Le wanted to end the ordeal of internecine strife among Laotians, and hoped for a reconciliation between the government forces and the Pathet Lao.^{24/}

An orderly transition from a pro-western to a "neutralist" government seemed within the realm of possibility. At this juncture, however, General Nosavan, aided by Prince Boun Oum, pulled out of the provisional government

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and announced a rightist counter-rebellion. Because the hoped-for reconciliation among all factions now seemed remote, this action forced Souvanna Phouma to suspend negotiations with the Pathet Lao. An American assessment of this state of affairs concluded that: ^{25/}

The current status is, in effect, a three-way struggle for power, with the legal government of Prince Phouma, backed by the paratroopers of Captain Kong Le, holding forth in Vientiane, and expecting an attack from General Nosavan's force. At Savannakhet, in the south, General Phoumi Nosavan, who is still a staunch advocate of pro-Western alignment, claims the loyalty of the Laotian Army and has reportedly sent an expedition against Vientiane. . . . In the north, around Sam Neua where troops loyal to General Nosavan are in defense positions, Pathet Lao elements have resumed activity designed to force Prince Phouma into a pro-communist position.

The United States attempted to discourage a conflict between Nosavan and government forces, pointing out that only the Pathet Lao and the Communists would benefit from such a development. ^{26/} Due to the great instability in Laos, U.S. MAP aid, at a trickle since the August coup, was officially suspended by October 1960. ^{27/}

In November, Soviet intervention on behalf of leftist elements caused the U.S. to look at Laos again. The initiation of a Soviet airlift to leftist/neutralist forces on November 23, 1960, caused the U.S. to openly support the Nosavan-Boun Oum group. Souvanna Phouma--unable to control the now leftward-leaning Kong Le, as well as other dissident factions in Vientiane--fled to Cambodia on December 9, 1960. ^{28/} The Soviets then delivered artillery and heavy mortars to Kong Le and airlifted weapons and other military supplies to the Pathet Lao. ^{29/} By the end of December, a counter-offensive by the rightist forces brought both the

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royal capital of Luang Prabang and the administrative capital of Vientiane under their control. On December 17, 1960, the U.S. State Department made public a note to the Soviet Union which charged that nation with violating the 1954 Geneva Accords by airlifting arms and ammunition to the Pathet Lao and Kong Le's rebel forces. The Soviet Union in turn accused the U.S. of similar transgressions in aiding the Nosavan-Boun Oum group. Meanwhile, in Laos, both sides began to consolidate their positions, with the Pathet Lao and Kong Le's forces capturing Xieng Khouang and the PDJ.^{30/}

Having installed itself in Vientiane, the Boun Oum government called on the UN for aid at the end of December 1960. It alleged a full-scale foreign invasion of its territory. In many ways the charge was similar to that which the Sananikone government had made a year earlier, and, as before, UN findings were inconclusive and UN action was generally lacking.^{31/}

MAP Aid to the LAAF - 1960

During 1960 the U.S. continued MAP aid to build up the LAAF. (See page 147 for the total 1960 program.) Runway improvements, particularly at Vientiane (Wattay), the LAAF's main base of operations, were extensive. Some \$910,000 in MAP funds were made available to provide a C-124 landing and handling capability at Vientiane. The United States government loaned four SH-19A aircraft to Air America under the operating and maintenance contract it had with that firm. These aircraft provided helicopter support to the LAAF which was at that time incapable of operating and supporting

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this type of aircraft.^{32/} One additional C-47 was programmed for the LAAF as a replacement for an aircraft lost in March 1960.

Attempts were made to increase the manpower and training status of the Laotian forces. Combined French-U.S. training began on 1 September 1959 with 12 U.S. Field Training Teams participating. By March 1960, some 3,761 Laotian troops had gone through short training courses taught by the joint team and by the Royal Thai Army. The latter training was conducted under a Thai-Laotian agreement signed in September 1959.^{33/} Personnel strength of the Laotian Army was approximately 29,000 men who were organized into 28 battalions (24 infantry, one artillery, two parachute, and one armored cavalry). These were augmented by some 2,999 National Police and 20,000 Auto Defense (home guard/militia) troops.^{34/} LAAF personnel strength (the LAAF was a part of the Army) in March 1960 was as follows:^{35/}

	<u>Authorized</u>	<u>Assigned</u>
	<u>721</u>	<u>567</u>
Pilots	62	25
Jet	--	--
Conventional	62	25
Other Flying	29	8
Technical	630	519
Conscripts	--	--
Miscellaneous	--	15

The 519 "assigned" figure included 59 attending training in France, while the 15 "miscellaneous" attended a French-operated training school in Vientiane. The clandestine U.S. Military Advisory Group (MAG) considered LAAF personnel authorizations--if kept filled--adequate to support the

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mission. Due to such factors as low pay and limited resources of qualified manpower, however, manning was only at 70 percent of the authorized figure.

1961 - Year of Super-Power Involvement

The year 1961 saw the Soviet Union and the United States continuing to support the opposing factions. Aircraft with Soviet markings were repeatedly observed and photographed on supply runs to the Pathet Lao and leftists who had launched an offensive from the PDJ and succeeded in cutting the road linking Vientiane and Luang Prabang. Truck and air support from North Vietnam aided the rebels, even though the Soviets and the North Vietnamese denied their presence in Laos. They accused the U.S. of interference instead.^{36/}

The United States responded quickly to increased Soviet aid. It gave the LAAF six T-6 aircraft, and replaced many PEO staff members with 400 Special Forces personnel known as White Star Mobile Training Teams.^{37/} Some four months later, on 19 April 1961, the clandestine MAG surfaced with a U.S. Government announcement of its establishment. Inasmuch as the Soviet Union and North Vietnam had violated the 1954 Accords by providing assistance to the Pathet Lao/leftist rebels, the Laotian Government of Boun Oum felt justified in making the request for a uniformed Joint United States Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) to Laos. The Laotian Government no longer felt itself bound by those provisions of the accords which the Soviets had breached. By the same token, this position enabled the U.S. to establish a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) under the provisions of the 1950 Pentilateral Agreement.^{38/}

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Personnel strength of the JUSMAG, including civilians, soon reached 1,220 advisors. While the military contingent concerned itself primarily with the training of Lao units (some in Thailand), other U.S. agencies initiated their own programs. In May, the Central Intelligence Agency--known as Controlled American Source (CAS)--began training Meo hill tribesmen in Military Region (MR) II (see Figure 2) under the leadership of Vang Pao. CAS soon supervised the guerrilla operations of these irregular, but highly effective, units.^{39/}

Although the Soviets and their allies claimed that only the government of the self-exiled Souvanna Phouma was legitimate, they were ready to negotiate following this American display of determination. At western insistence, and with cautious Soviet acquiescence, the ICC (which had been adjourned in July 1958 at Laotian government request) reconvened on 28 April to arrange a cease-fire in the Laotian conflict. The western powers, in turn, agreed to a Soviet proposal for a 14-nation conference to settle all aspects of the Laotian question. This conference convened in Geneva on 12 May 1961.^{40/}

The conferees in Geneva agreed to deal with three Laotian delegations: representatives of the Boun Oum Government, the Souvanna Phouma neutralists, and the Pathet Lao leftists. These factions had concluded a tenuous "truce" prior to the arrival of the ICC, but sporadic fighting continued among their forces on the home front. All attempts to form a single "coalition government" for Laos failed. Old antagonisms between Boun Oum and Souvanna Phouma flared up, and the Pathet Lao seemed in no hurry to conclude an agreement. Indeed, the Pathet Lao preferred instead to stall negotiations in order to

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CHINA

BRMA

*Ban Houei Sai
MR I

Luang Prabang*

Sam Neua*

MR II PDJ

*Long
Tiang

NORTH
VIETNAM

MR V

Vientiane*

Udon*

NKP*

*Thakhek

MR III

*Savannakhet

DMZ

THAILAND

*Saravane

*Inksa Bolovens
Plateau
MR IV

LAOS MILITARY REGIONS

FIGURE 2

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extend and consolidate its area of control in Laos.^{41/} By the end of the

year, the 14-nation Geneva talks had progressed to virtual agreement on

all points. If a single Laotian government had existed, these nations

would probably have been able to guarantee Laotian freedom and neutrality.^{42/}

MAP Aid During 1961

During 1961 the United States strengthened its program with tribal guerrilla units. For example, the CAS Meo guerrillas harassed Pathet Lao forces in the PDJ region of Central Laos. In addition to the CAS-trained and supervised Meo guerrillas in MR II, MAAG Laos began to equip and train similar units composed of Kha tribesmen, who lived in the Bolovens Plateau region in southeastern Laos. General Nosavan agreed to support the Kha guerrilla units as part of the Auto Defense Corps (Home Guard) program.

The Pathet Lao also had made overtures to the Khas, but were unwilling or unable to deliver the promised economic aid. The Khas, while not particularly pro-Laotian, were well-disposed toward any group which gave them economic and military aid. When MAP-equipped, these forces proved to be among the most effective troops available to the Royal Laotian Government, even though their loyalty was more to their tribe than to Laos.^{43/}

(For details of the FY 1961 MAP program see p. 149.)

MAP Aid to the Laotian Air Force (LAF) - 1961

In 1961, MAP aid to the LAF strengthened the Composite Squadron and supplemented it with Air America. Twelve pilots were trained in Thailand, and became regularly assigned pilots for the MAP-supported Composite Squadron, supplementing the five pilots already assigned to the T-6 flight.

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They were to provide the nucleus of a trained pilot force for the planned MAP T-28 flight. Fourteen of these T-28 "Nomad" aircraft were approved and funded under the FY 1961 MAP for the LAF. These aircraft were modified to a ground support configuration (Nomad) and were to replace the T-6Gs in the LAF's Composite Squadron. Delivery of these aircraft was slated for late in FY 1962.^{44/} Seventeen more HUS-1 (H-34) helicopters were added to the FY 1961 program and were operated by Air America under a lease contract.^{45/}

The Year of New Accords - 1962

Agreement among the powers meeting at Geneva appeared imminent in early 1962, but mutual distrust among the three Laotian factions had to be allayed, and recriminations ended, for any satisfactory agreement to take place. General Nosavan's determination to not support any government headed by Souvanna Phouma was broken by U.S. aid program curtailments.^{46/} Thus, on 23 June 1962, a provisional coalition government headed by neutralist Souvanna Phouma was installed at Vientiane. The new coalition government appointed a delegation to represent it at the Geneva Conference, which resumed on 2 July. With only a single Laotian delegation to deal with, the Conference soon concluded its work. On 23 July 1962 the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos was concluded by the 14 nations meeting in Geneva. Basically, it reaffirmed the 1954 Accords, spelling out the following items in detail:

- (4) It [Laos] will not enter into any military alliance or into any agreement, whether military or otherwise, which is inconsistent with the neutrality of the Kingdom of Laos; it will not allow the establishment of any foreign military base on

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Laotian territory, nor allow any country to use Laotian territory for military purposes or for the purposes of interference in the internal affairs of other countries, nor recognize the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO;

* * * * *

(6) Subject to the provisions of Article 5 of the Protocol, it will require withdrawal from Laos of all foreign troops and military personnel, and will not allow any foreign troops or military personnel to be introduced into Laos. . . .

Article 1a of the Protocol clarified the latter provision when it explained that "the term 'foreign military personnel' shall include members of foreign military missions, foreign military advisors, experts, instructors, consultants, technicians, observers and any other foreign military persons, including those serving in any armed forces in Laos, and foreign civilians connected with the supply, maintenance, storing, and utilization of war materials." Article 5 of the Protocol permitted the French government, "as an exception," to "leave in Laos for a limited period of time a precisely limited number of French military instructors for the purpose of training the armed forces of Laos." However, this was to be done only on condition that "the Laotian Government considers it necessary."^{47/}

During 1962, the military situation in Laos remained generally quiet, and the only major action was the rout of government forces by the PL in the northern town of Nam Tha.^{48/} Pathet Lao/leftist troops continued to consolidate their holdings, and would not allow extension of government control over areas they dominated. It was not until December that the ICC, recently reinstated by the Geneva Conference, was allowed to

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investigate charges that Viet Minh (North Vietnamese) troops were present in PL-held territory. Naturally, under such controlled conditions and with the Polish member of the Commission supporting the Communist view, little of a substantive nature was accomplished.^{49/}

The new coalition government was composed of four groups: the Pathet Lao, the "Souvanna neutralists," the "Vientiane neutralists," and the former Royal Laotian Government of Boun Oum. A novel, but generally unworkable, plan called for unanimous agreement on actions of the Defense, Interior, and Foreign Ministries. The Government agreed to form a unified national army of 30,000 men comprised equally of Royal Laotian Army (General Nosavan), Neutralist, and PL forces. A national police force composed of 2,000 men from each of these factions was also envisioned. Comparative strengths of the forces controlled by each of the factions in December 1962 was as follows:^{50/}

Royal Laotian Army (RLA)	53,000
Pathet Lao army	19,000
Neutralist army	10,000

The desired integration progressed slowly. Later, due to mutual suspicion and distrust, it did not progress at all.

An interesting development at the close of the year was the falling-out between Kong Le's neutralists and Pathet Lao forces on the PDJ. Kong Le had not appeared sufficiently subservient to the PL, and was denounced as a bandit. The PL then set up a more pliant rival "neutralist" commander in the region, and Kong Le rapidly came to an accommodation with the Souvanna Phouma faction in Vientiane. At the Prime Minister's request, Air America

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instituted a supply airlift from Udorn, Thailand, to Kong Le's forces on the PDJ. One of the Air America aircraft was shot down by anti-aircraft (AA) fire, and the PL charged that Air America "supplied bandits and would be dealt with accordingly."^{51/}

MAP Aid During 1962

As of 12 March, \$44.9 million in equipment and supplies and \$11.1 million in training assistance had been approved and funded under the FY 1962 MAP for Laos. Army items accounted for \$19.1 million of the materiel funded, and Army training assistance amounted to an additional \$8.9 million. Equipment valued at \$25.8 million was earmarked for the LAF/RLAF, with \$0.9 million of the aforementioned training funds set aside for Air Force training. Some \$7.3 million of total Air Force funding defrayed the costs of Air America's airlift contractual services. Naval training accounted for \$1.3 million of the total funded amount.^{52/} (For details of the total FY 1962 MAP program see p. 151.)

MAP Aid to the LAF/RLAF - 1962

The unsettled conditions in Laos during 1962, and the lack of suitable facilities, led to the transfer of most MAP-provided training for LAF pilots to other countries. Neighboring Thailand became the main site of the third-country pilot training. By March, 24 pilots had graduated, raising the total number of LAF pilots to 39.^{53/}

By the end of the year, the LAF had been redesignated as the Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF), since it had no neutralist or Pathet Lao counterpart. Technically a part of the Army, the RLAF was to be integrated into

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the 30,000 man national force detailed earlier, if and when this concept reached fruition. A Pathet Lao attempt to dominate the RLAF failed due to the lack of rated officers in the PL ranks. The Soviet Union, desiring to make its presence felt, gave the coalition government nine aircraft and one helicopter and flew the aircraft until Laotian crews could be trained. The Russians may have intended this gesture to help the indigenous Lao Communists break the Air America monopoly. (Air America, as a "private" enterprise, was not prohibited by the 1962 Accords; in fact, it performed much of the internal airlift operations in Laos.) Air America was soon denied the use of many facilities which had been at its disposal at Wattay Airport in Vientiane, presumably since these facilities were needed to support the Soviet aircraft. This situation changed again when the Russians refused to supply Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants for their gift aircraft, for the U.S. controlled the only good supply of fuel on hand. The French, who were allowed a military mission under the Accords, agreed to turn over Seno Air Base (northeast of Savannakhet) to the Laotian Government. French withdrawal from Seno was in progress at year's end.^{54/}

Developments After the Accords

The only party which acted with dispatch to comply with Article 6 of the 1962 Geneva Accords (calling for the withdrawal of foreign military forces from Laos) was the United States. On 17 September JUSMAG Laos began its exit, and by 6 October the announcement was made that the last of 666 American military advisors had left.^{55/} On the other hand it soon became obvious that the North Vietnamese (Viet Minh) forces were not complying

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with the Accords. The single ICC check point in the PDJ logged only about 40 Viet Minh leaving Laos, although the estimates of VM presence there ran as high as 10,000. (Accurate counts were impossible since the PL refused to permit the ICC or the Phouma government free movement within the territory it controlled.)^{56/}

It soon became evident to the United States that the Phouma government would be unable to resist Communist pressure with French assistance alone. As early as 5 September 1962, CINCPAC declared that "U.S. objectives required continued support to the FAR as an autonomous anti-Communist fighting force until such time as it was consolidated into the forces of a truly neutral Laotian government."^{57/} To implement any required action, a portion of the withdrawn JUSMAG/MAAG Laos personnel remained in nearby Thailand to render any necessary aid. Many civic projects, formerly handled by MAAG Laos, were assumed by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). This was possible because civilians not engaged in military activities were not prohibited by the Geneva Accords.

Air America continued its subsistence airlifts to the Meo and Kha guerrillas, but now did so under USAID contracts. The assumption was that no violation of the Accords was involved as long as the airlifted cargoes were not munitions.^{58/} The PL vehemently protested these airlifts, however, as a violation of the Accords, and launched a series of attacks on Meo strongholds in reprisal. Pro-western Laotians contended that PL/VM attacks were a violation not only of the Accords, but of the internal cease-fire agreement. The PL responded that it was merely engaged

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in a "police action against bandit elements."^{59/} Thus the stage was set, not only for future internal Laotian developments, but for the implementation of a "MAAG in-exile" by the United States to aid the legal Laotian Government.

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CHAPTER III

EVOLUTION AND ESCALATION 1963-1965

Tripartite Composition of MAP Aid

After the withdrawal of JUSMAG/Laos in October 1962, its functions were assumed by three components which continue to exist at the time of this writing. The division was as follows:^{60/}

1. Requirements Office, United States Agency for International Development (RO/USAID). This office operated in-country as an integral part of USAID/Laos and was responsible to the Director, USAID/Laos.

2. Deputy Chief, JUSMAG, Thailand (DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, or, more simply, DEPCH), headquartered originally in the Capitol Hotel, Bangkok, and since 15 Nov 1971 at Udorn Royal Thai Air Force Base (RTAFB). This organization was directly responsible to CINCPAC for managing the MAP/MASF aid for Laos and was known as "MAAG-in-exile."

3. Augmented Air Attache (AIRA) and Army Attache (ARMA) staffs which provided intelligence data and assisted in operational requirements. (There was no Defense Attache.) These staffs were responsible to the U.S. Ambassador to Laos.

Objectives of the MAP for Laos

MAP (and later MASF) aid to Laos was designed to further the following objectives:^{61/}

1. To support the Armed forces of the Royal Lao Government (RLG), to defeat insurgency in areas that were, or could come under, RLG control.

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2. To disrupt the flow of North Vietnamese forces and materiel through Laos into the Republic of Vietnam.

3. To support the RLG, and to assist in maintaining its policy of non-alignment.

Mission of DEPCH/JUSMAGTHAI

Working through authorized channels, the DEPCH was to assist the Royal Laotian Government Armed Forces, neutralists, and paramilitary forces to attain and maintain the capability to insure internal security against communist-inspired subversion and insurgency and to provide maximum feasible resistance to communist-inspired external aggression. Specifically, this mission required:^{62/}

1. Planning, programming, requisitioning, receipt, and storage of MASF/MAP materiel in Thailand, and onward shipment of such materiel to Laos.
2. Representing CINCPAC in supervising the management of the Laos MASF/MAP (to include materiel and training).
3. Keeping CINCPAC informed of in-country use of MASF/MAP materiel with the implied requirement of keeping CINCPAC informed of the success and use of Laotian personnel trained under MASF/MAP.
4. Maintaining liaison with the RO/USAID staff and with the U.S. military attaches (ARMA/AIRA) in Laos.
5. Being prepared to establish all or part of the DEPCH organization in Laos, if and when so directed.

The Deputy Chief role and contribution was as an assist to the American Ambassador in Laos, and as a support and assistance agency designed to make the tasks of the lightly-manned in-country staff agencies easier.

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Mission of RO/USAID

In-country supervision and implementation of the MASF/MAP program was the responsibility of the Requirements Office, USAID, which was authorized 30 U.S. civilian personnel attached to USAID/Laos and approximately 172 civilian personnel (local and third country technicians). The RO/USAID was technical/service oriented and paralleled the DEPCH commodity manager organization. In accordance with the Terms of Reference (TOR), established jointly by the State and Defense departments, RO/USAID was directly responsible to the Ambassador to Laos for the determination of military logistical requirements. Such requirements were channeled through the Director, USAID, and were formulated in coordination with DEPCH. RO/USAID, as the in-country U.S. logistical organization, distributed all MASF/MAP materiel to, and monitored its use by, the Laotian Armed Forces.^{63/} In-country supervision of the MASF/MAP Training Program was exercised by the Office of the Assistant for Plans and Programs, RO/USAID. The RO/USAID training element proposed programs and forwarded them to FAR, ARMA, AIRA, Commodity Managers, and DEPCH for coordination. DEPCH monitored the program, and was the administrative procuring agency for the requested CONUS and overseas training.^{64/}

The In-Country Military Attaches

The Army Attache (ARMA) and his staff provided planning assistance to the RLG military, i.e., both FAR and Forces Armee Neutralistes (FAN). Each of the five Military Regions had a field ARMA, who performed two primary functions--operations and intelligence. The Operations Division

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assist in the training and operations of the FAR. All training matters were coordinated with RO/USAID and DEPCH. The Intelligence Division, located at Vientiane, prepared Laotian situation reports and defense intelligence summaries.^{65/}

The Air Attache (AIRA) was primarily engaged in targeting and controlling air strikes (mainly USAF),^{66/} and in operating five facilities located at Savannakhet, Long Tieng, Luang Prabang, Pakse, and Vientiane. The principal training mission of AIRA was to assist RLAF personnel in establishing and maintaining training programs in intelligence, aircraft operations, aircraft maintenance, and in associated communications fields. The majority of the AIRA advisory effort, however, appeared to be devoted to gathering intelligence, suggesting targets to be attacked by the RLAF, and recommending ordnance loads to be used in such attacks.^{67/}

The interrelationship of these three primary components of NASF/ MAP aid to Laos is best illustrated in the chronological narrative which follows. (Figure 3 shows the Ambassador and his "in-country" team. DEPCH was physically located at Bangkok until late 1971; thereafter, although located at Udorn RTAFB, he was still considered a part of the "in-country" team.)

A Year of Shifting Alliances - 1963


Pathet Lao obstructionism in the new "neutralist" government rendered Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's efforts at achieving unity ineffective.

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THE AMBASSADOR AND THE COUNTRY TEAM

FIGURE 3

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A repetition of the old communist pattern took place: destroy that which you cannot control.

Due to power shifts and changing alliances, the Laotian political situation continued to confuse observers. When PL influence over the erstwhile leftist/neutralist Kong Le slipped near the end of 1962, he was denounced as a bandit and an attempt had been made to replace him with the dissident neutralist, Colonel Deuane. This had led to several clashes among these rivals in the PDJ. As long as Kong Le controlled the bulk of the neutralist Army, Phouma's position as Prime Minister seemed secure; but had the PL succeeded in placing their puppet at the head of these forces, then a "neutralist" leader of definite leftist leanings would have emerged. It was already true that some of the ministers in Phouma's cabinet were anything but neutral, and many of them voted with Souphanouvong. Chief among these was Foreign Minister Quinim Pholsena, who actively fomented neutralist dissidence on the PDJ. Following the assassination of Pholsena in April, Souphanouvong and most of the leftist cabinet ministers departed Vientiane for PL headquarters at Khang Khay. No formal dissolution of the Phouma government took place, however, and Souphanouvong loudly proclaimed that no decision of the government was valid without his concurrence under the unanimity rule. Phouma and Souphanouvong agreed to meet on the PDJ during June to discuss reunification, but at year's end the PL faction had still not returned to Vientiane.

On the military scene, PL troops, aided by their allies, drove Kong Le's neutralist forces from the eastern part of the PDJ. Under the pressure of these events, Kong Le edged into closer cooperation

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with the pro-western rightist leader of the FAR, General Nosavan. As a result, the Soviets suddenly halted delivery of ammunition and spare parts for the weapons they had supplied to Kong Le during the previous two years. In order to keep Kong Le's forces in the field, the United States replaced the Soviet weapons and began furnishing his FAN with the necessary support. The PDJ was split among the royalist forces of the FAR, the neutralist forces of the FAN, and the pro-communist PL.

As if the existence of three separate armies were not enough to confuse the issue, 1963 saw the emergence of two air forces. The RLAF, part of the right-wing Royal Laotian Army of General Nosavan, had been receiving U.S. MAP support for several years; now it had a neutralist competitor. The Royal Laotian Government Air Force (RLGAF), built around a nucleus of the Russian "gift aircraft,"* set up headquarters at Vientiane. (The RLAF remained primarily at Savannakhet.) The seizure of Seno Air Base (near Savannakhet) from the already-withdrawing French Military Mission strengthened the RLAF position, and deprived the fledgling RLGAF of one of the best airfields in Laos.

Charges and countercharges continued to cloud the political situation in Laos at the end of 1963. Phouma made it clear that he was determined to continue working for a unified and neutral Laos, and that he considered the Pathet Lao a screen for activities by Peking and Hanoi Communists, who needed Laos as a supply base for Viet Cong operations in South Vietnam. The ICC was still attempting to obtain free movement and inspection rights in all of Laos, but its efforts were nullified by the continued intransigence

*Seven LI-2s, two AN-2s and one MI-4 helicopter.

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of the Polish Communist member and leftist Laotian obstructionism.^{68/}

MAP Aid to the RLAF - 1963

Some MAP aircraft deliveries were held in abeyance pending the clarification of the Laotian political situation. Five UH-34 helicopters, operated in behalf of the RLAF by Air America, were declared excess due to the reduction in scope of the Air America contract with Laos; but to help the RLAF maintain its airlift capability, the U.S. released a MAP programmed C-47.^{69/} Six of the 14 T-28s programmed under MAP were delivered to the RLAF. Concurrent with the delivery of the six T-28s, the RLAF's T-6 aircraft were returned. The addition of the T-28s bolstered RLAF capabilities to support government ground operations. Further, deliveries of four C-47 aircraft, three UH-34 helicopters, and three U-17 light aircraft augmented RLAF transport capability. Transition and refresher training in the new aircraft for RLAF pilots was provided in Thailand, since the Geneva Accords precluded the introduction of USAF Mobile Training Teams into Laos.^{70/} (For details of the FY 63 MAP see p. 153.)

Year of American Commitment - 1964

Political factionalism continued to plague Laos in 1964. Although Souvanna Phouma continued efforts to get them back, the Pathet Lao still refused to return and take an active part in the tripartite government. Militarily, the spirit and substance of the 1962 Accords were still flaunted; each side accused the other of instigating transgressions and claimed to have only been responding to these provocations. During mid-year, extensive clashes occurred between the Viet Minh/Pathet Lao

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forces and the FAR in the area between the PDJ and Paksane. Kong Le's neutralist FAN forces were forced off the PDJ, and were badly shaken by combined VM/PL offensives.

The decline in the effectiveness of the "neutralized" coalition government of Souvanna Phouma led to an abortive coup in April. General Kouprasith Abhay, representing the right-wing faction, seized power in Vientiane and announced that the Phouma government had been deposed for failure to achieve national peace and harmony. When the U.S. indicated a strong disapproval, along with a determination to deal only with the coalition government, the revolutionary committee settled for a "reorganization" of the Phouma Government rather than its overthrow. Backed by the United States, Phouma announced that the right-wing political element had been dissolved and merged with his own neutralist faction. This action was more a face-saving device for the errant rightists than a victory for the neutralists; right-wing elements outnumbered the neutralists five to one in the new coalition, and controlled most of the new Laotian Unified Military Command. This situation, coupled with Phouma's replacement of some of the absent PL ministers by his neutralists, led to PL charges that neither the merger nor the naming of new ministers was legal without PL concurrence. In reply, Souvanna Phouma stated that he could not allow all government operations to cease merely because some cabinet ministers would not return to Vientiane and perform their duties.

In an effort to resolve their differences, Phouma met his half-brother Souphanouvong in Paris during the summer, but no agreement was reached.

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Souphanouvong insisted that the fourteen "Geneva Powers" be reconvened to consider the new troubles in Laos; Souvanna Phouma insisted that a cease fire and return of recent military gains be a precondition for such talks. The U.S., while not opposed to another Geneva meeting, viewed the prospects of such a gathering as rather fruitless. That assessment was based on Communist violations of the 1962 Accords. The Soviet Union seemed lukewarm to the idea, feeling, perhaps, that any results would benefit the Red Chinese, who were eager for the meeting. As a consequence of pressure from the opposing factions, the meeting did not take place.

Responding to the repeated and flagrant Pathet Lao/Viet Minh violations of the cease-fire arrangements and the 1962 Accords, Phouma ordered his forces to counterattack. Additionally, he requested U.S. reconnaissance flights to keep track of the attacking Communist forces. This request was honored, and U.S. Navy aircraft responded to the task. After one of these aircraft was shot down over the PDJ, fighter cover was added, but one of these aircraft also fell prey to Communist gunners. The request for U.S. assistance by the legally constituted Laotian government was met in all Communist capitals by denunciation of Phouma as a "U.S. puppet." The Communists also pointed out that such U.S. flights violated the Accords, which forbade the intervention of foreign troops in Laos. All these charges were leveled at a time when North Vietnamese (Viet Minh) intervention in behalf of the Pathet Lao was increasing steadily. By year's end the situation remained largely unchanged, but RLA forces had regained some lost ground and had succeeded in clearing the road between Luang Prabang and Vientiane (Operation

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Triangle). RLG and beleaguered neutralist forces were immensely aided by tactical support missions flown by the RLAF with its newly-acquired T-28s. Interdiction raids by RLAF T-28s also hampered PL supply operations, and were beginning to affect PL morale.^{71/}

MAP Aid in 1964

Initial MAP support for Laotian troops was predicated upon a 46,500 man force level, which included 40,000 FAR and 6,500 FAN troops. By the end of 1964, MAP aid was programmed for some 67,200 men. These included not only the FAR/FAN, but the irregular Auto Defense Corps, which had been trained, in part, by CAS.

Pursuant to section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, President Johnson found it important to the security of the United States to continue to provide military assistance to Laos. Consequently, he authorized the expenditure of up to \$31.5 million for defense items for Laos for FY 65. By December 1964 some \$31.2 million had been funded under the FY 65 MAP, of which \$23.1 million was earmarked for the provision of equipment and supplies; training assistance and other support services accounted for the remaining \$8.1 million. The acceleration of combat operations in Laos was cited as the reason for increase over previous year levels, with the bulk of MAP monies going for consumable items such as ammunition, explosives, and POL.

Each service provided funds for the program. Funding under Department of the Army (DA) FY 65 MAP totaled \$12.6 million, with ammunition a key item (although two U-17As and one T-28 were also included). Navy MAP funding by the end of 1964 accounted for \$1.3 million, and was

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primarily in support of the provisioning for four UH-34D helicopters used chiefly for Search and Rescue (SAR) missions. In all, \$0.8 million was funded for training assistance, of which \$600,000 was funded under the Army program and \$200,000 by the Air Force. Of the remaining "other services" provided to Laos, the Air Force funded \$7.1 million of the total amount. Some 85 percent of Air Force funding was in support of the technical assistance program.

As a somewhat curious adjunct, the French - who were the only foreigners allowed to keep their military in Laos under the Accords - strengthened the French Military Mission (FMM). The arrival in October 1964 of Brigadier General Le Fort and Colonel Deleris, both men of unusual distinction and background, indicated a new French enthusiasm to render MAP aid of their own. The French indicated that they would import French technicians to work in Laotian service depots, particularly ordnance, radio, and engineering depots. They also proposed establishment of a school of basic tactics for battalion and company commanders, and a "light infantry" school specialized in small unit commando tactics.^{72/} (For details of the FY 64 MAP see p. 155.)

Year of Escalation - 1965

Coups continued to plague the Phouma government in 1965. In February, following an abortive coup by the followers of General Phoumi Nosavan and General Siho failed, Premier Souvanna Phouma reorganized and strengthened his government, citing the coup as a justification. He then took advantage of the relative stability to have the Laotian National Assembly pass a constitutional amendment changing electoral procedures in times of stress.

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To avoid the expiration of an old Assembly before a new one had been chosen, a new Assembly would be selected by an electoral college of "20,000 important people."

Since many sections of Laos were under PL control and could not participate in any elections, it seemed the most direct method of insuring the Phouma government's continued existence with its attendant claim to being the only legitimate constitutional government of all Laos. Prince Souphanouvong, speaking for the self-absented PL members of the government, denounced the constitutional changes as illegal. The ambivalent PL attitude toward the Vientiane government was best demonstrated by the fact that while denouncing it as illegal and unrepresentative on the one hand, it maintained low-level representation in the Government on the other. Phouma, for his part, continued to maintain that the PL were part of the 1963 coalition Government and could return to Vientiane at any time to resume their ministries and Assembly seats. Meanwhile, rather than have the Government immobilized by the PL walkout, he would continue to fill those vacancies on a temporary basis with right-wing and neutralist representatives. The election of a new Assembly under the "limited-suffrage" amendment caused little shift in the power structure, and underscored Phouma's control of the government.

The only visible challenge to Phouma's supremacy came from the "Jeunes," or "Young Nationalists," a political group who followed the leadership of Sisouk na Champassak, the Finance Minister in the Phouma government. Although a member of the Champassak clan of southern nobility, he was not subservient to the clan leader, Boun Oum. Rather, he led those

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who favored government by younger men, men who would root out corruption and inefficiency. In general, however, regional, family, and personal loyalties continued to prevail over ideological attachments or any sense of "nationality."^{73/}

On the military scene, scattered actions involving PL/VM forces against FAR/FAN units continued on a small scale, and usually involved nothing more than a few villages changing hands. FAR forces displayed an improvement in confidence and capability, defeating PL/VM forces at the battles of Dong Hene and Thakhek. (It should be noted, however, that the communist attack on Thakhek was most probably a diversionary move to cover up increased activity in the east along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, a Communist infiltration route leading from North Vietnam through southern Laos into South Vietnam.) The Meo irregulars, trained and financed by the CIA, continued to harass the enemy in the PDJ. The RLAF continued its airstrikes, largely over Route 7, the main supply route from North Vietnam. North Vietnam aggravated the controversy by claiming certain territories generally accepted as belonging to Laos. Phouma's immediate response was to condemn the Hanoi government's annexationist designs on Laotian territory, and its continued armed intervention in Laos. He called for a halt to the North Vietnamese use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and called upon the ICC to declare North Vietnam an aggressor. Hanoi, in turn, accused the Phouma government of complicity in the U.S. bombings of North Vietnam, and labeled Laotian evidence of Viet Minh presence in Laos as fabrications.^{74/}

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MAP Aid in 1965

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A ground handling accident at Wattay Airport in Vientiane set off a chain reaction of fire and explosions that destroyed nine T-28s and one U-17, and caused considerable damage to several buildings. These losses represented a blow to the RLAF, which had experienced several combat and operational losses as well. Temporarily unable to fulfill its support and interdiction missions, the RLAF became operational again with the receipt of T/RT-28s from Vietnam and expedited deliveries of programmed MAP T-28s from the United States. Twelve T-28s were delivered during December 1965, with an additional 10 scheduled for March 1966 delivery. The delivery of two C-47s and one U-17 in the summer of 1966 completed the FY 66 MAP funding (excluding Navy funds). U.S. Navy MAP programmed nineteen UH-34 helicopters, including twelve helicopters funded previously under the Navy FY 1964-1965 MAP. (Deliveries of these helicopters were to be spread out over several years.) The deliveries, especially of the additional T-28s, augmented the RLAF interdiction and close air support effort which involved as many as 200 sorties per week. This air domination by Government forces was an invaluable asset in the struggle against PL/VM forces.^{75/}

Due to the escalation of the conflict in South Vietnam, President Johnson authorized the use of up to \$50 million to furnish defense articles to Laos in FY 66. The dollar value of the FY 66 Laotian MAP aid was expected to approximate some \$63.3 million, but no Presidential determination was required for the \$13.3 million of the program that covered defense services. In addition to protecting the free areas of Laos, it was felt that the additional aid would allow extensive interdiction

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of communist lines of communication going through Laos and into South Vietnam. ^{76/} (For details of the FY 65 MAP see p. 157.)

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CHAPTER IV

COMMITMENT AND CONTROVERSY 1966-1970

Political and Military Events - 1966

Elections for the 59-member Laotian National Assembly resulted in the selection of some 40 candidates who supported Souvanna Phouma and the tripartite government he represented. Once again, the most successful candidates represented regional and family interests rather than ideological movements. Most candidates also owed their election successes to the open backing of the Military Region commanders. The candidates backed by General Ouane Rattikone of MR I in the north, and those of General Phasouk Somly of MR IV in the south, were very successful. Candidates supported by General Vang Pao in MR II and General Bounpone Maktheparak in MR III were moderately successful. Phouma was to remain Prime Minister, as he had since 1962, and he continued the fiction of the tripartite government which never truly functioned.^{77/}

Two command crises occurred in the Royalist/Neutralist forces during the year. During October Kong Le, who had risen to the rank of Major General, was removed from command of the FAN. This action had been brewing for some time, and subordinate commanders had at times defied Kong Le's orders in battlefield situations. Kong Le's sometimes domineering, sometimes vacillating leadership was largely responsible for his downfall, but cliques within the FAN had plotted for his removal as well. In addition, many leaders of the FAR welcomed this action as a further step in the eventual integration of FAR and FAN forces under a single command, preferably their own. For the time being, Souvanna continued to maintain that a

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separate neutralist command still existed.^{78/}

While the dismissal of Kong Le was handled without incident, the forced exit of the RLAF General Thao Ma was accompanied by armed rebellion. General Ma, the extremely effective leader of the RLAF, became increasingly annoyed and distraught at the restrictions placed on his conduct of the war by higher headquarters. His dissatisfaction reached such a degree that in October he threatened a coup which he claimed was directed not against the government, but against the corrupt military leaders. General Ma and his RLAF pilots turned their T-28s against targets in the Vientiane area, particularly the headquarters of Generals Kouprasith and Sananikone. RLAF support alone, however, proved insufficient against the forces opposing General Ma. Convinced that he was not gathering support from the ruling circles, he moved to Thailand with several supporters. RLAF fighting effectiveness, although temporarily impaired, did not suffer lasting consequences other than the loss of an effective and spirited leader.^{79/}

After the abortive coup in February 1965 by Generals Siho and Nosavan,* the Phouma Government decided to reform the Lao National Police (LNP), since Siho had used it in the attempted coup. As originally constituted and commanded by General Siho, the LNP was a paramilitary force organized into battalions. Following the Vientiane government's decision on a thorough reorganization of the police force, the basically military elements of the LNP were transferred to the Army, and USAID assistance was requested in rebuilding the LNP along conventional civil police force lines. The new police force was composed of two elements corresponding to the FAR/FAN

*See page 35.

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split of the Army. In a desire to maintain the facade of a Government of National Unity, Phouma authorized a Neutralist Police (NP) and a rightist/conservative LNP. Both the United States and the United Kingdom agreed to train the new force. Some NP/LNP members were trained by the British in Malaysia, while several were trained in the continental United States (CONUS). Some 220 were trained in Laos itself, primarily at the USAID-established and supported Police Academy, and a number of NP/LNP personnel underwent training in neighboring Thailand.^{80/}

A Presidential Determination

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1966, enacted on 19 September of that year, amended Section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The amendment made the \$50 million aid ceiling inapplicable to countries, such as Laos, "which were a victim of active Communist-supported aggression." Other amendments to the basic act allowed the President to disregard some of the previous conditions placed on extending aid to other nations. Using the new Act, President Johnson authorized the use of up to \$35.3 million beyond the original \$50 million limit of FY 67 funds.^{81/}

MAP Aid in 1966/Status of the RLAF

Although modest in size and capabilities in 1966, the RLAF had already proven itself the most capable fighting force on the Government side. It flew daily tactical air (TACAIR) strikes using T-28 aircraft, and deployed men and materiel using C-47s. All aircraft and training were provided

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under the MA Program, primarily from USAF resources. Training was conducted in CONUS, in-country, and at third-country sites such as Udorn, Thailand. RLAF support of FAR/FAN ground operations, strikes on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and C-47 transport capability had earned it a justifiably high prestige within Laos, and with the American personnel associated with its growth and development. The RLAF, despite a variety of problems, was and continued to be the great success story of USAF participation in the Laotian MA Program.^{82/} The March 1966 Journal of Military Assistance discussed the RLAF, noting:^{83/}

The present relative effectiveness of the RLAF is the result of years of patient MAP assistance. Generally speaking, the Lao are passive and unaggressive by nature, and such a high proportion of them are illiterate and uneducated that it is difficult to obtain recruits with suitable background for intensive training. Moreover, training is likely to be quite lengthy before a reasonable skill level is attained. Nevertheless, a nucleus of skilled pilot and maintenance personnel has emerged. Savannakhet Air Base has schools for pilot and aircrew training and for training mechanics, but these schools cover basics only, and the better graduates are often sent out of the country for further training, either at Udorn, Thailand, or in the CONUS. While field maintenance is performed in-country, more extensive overhaul work must still be accomplished out-of-country.

The primary RLAF operating base is at Savannakhet, although Vientiane (Wattay) is also important. Other operational fields are located at Pakse, Saravane, and Luang Prabang. Facilities at these fields are being improved to make them more nearly adequate to support the air effort in Laos.

USAF personnel manning in the joint Army/Air Force DEPCH organization headquartered in Bangkok consisted of four officers and nine airmen in the Air Force Division, and three officers and 14 airmen at the Air Force

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Liaison Office (AFLO), located at Udorn, RTAFB.* These two offices managed the USAF portion of the Laotian MA Program within the DEPOCH framework. While the Air Force Division concerned itself primarily with funding and materiel delivery, AFLO oversaw (1) the RLAF training given (among others) by Detachment 6 of the 1st Air Commando Wing (ACW) and (2) the logistics and maintenance services provided under contract by Air America.^{84/} Air America personnel and hired Thai nationals** also constituted the bulk of T-28 crews, with 12 of the former and 22 of the latter assigned on 31 December 1965. Of the 39 T-28s assigned to the Laotian MA Program, 36 remained under U.S. control at Udorn. These were used both in training and operational missions originating from that base.^{85/} Det. 6 of the 1st ACW trained T-28 pilots, mechanics, and supply specialists at Udorn. A U.S. Marine Corps Mobile Training Team continued to provide H-34 training under the aegis of the ACW. The AFLO at Udorn monitored the CONUS training of RLAF officers and enlisted men in diverse schooling, e.g., Squadron Officer School, aircraft mechanic, weather observer, and supply training.^{86/}

The proposed DEPOCH Air Force FY 67 program totaled \$54,621,891, with some \$12 million of that amount programmed for aircraft deliveries and over \$20 million allotted to air munitions. These two constituted the largest expenditures, but materiel, aviation POL, technical assistance,

*In mid-1966 the covert introduction of USAF and USA personnel, primarily in maintenance and supply specialties, began under the code name "Project 404." Nominally under DEPOCH, it was under the operational control of the DIA-sponsored ARMA and AIRA.

**The code name "Firefly" was applied to the Thai "volunteers" who flew T-28s in the service of the RLAF. It was also used to designate U.S. FACs, including some enlisted personnel, who flew out of Long Tieng (site 20 alternate).

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and maintenance services were also provided. Training expenditures ran a poor last with only \$553,000 programmed.^{87/}

Maintenance of the Laotian C-47s proved to be something of a problem. After undergoing Inspect and Repair As Necessary (IRAN) procedures at the China Airlines contractor facility on Taiwan, unnecessary delays were experienced in pick-up and delivery. CINCPAC levied a requirement on CINCPACAF to use USAF ferry crews to alleviate the situation. Air Vietnam performed T-28 IRAN in Saigon, again under contract from DEPCH. Due to the crowded facilities and increased influx of aircraft into Vietnam at that time, however, all T-28 aircraft arriving from North American Aviation were now assembled in Bangkok under the terms of a contractual arrangement with Thai Airways.^{88/}

Among the facility improvements programmed for the Udorn operation were the extension and blacktopping of the taxiway, and the erection of an aircraft maintenance building and a classroom building for use by Det 6. An aircraft hangar and a supply warehouse were also programmed for the immediate future.^{89/}

Status of the RLAF, and the MAP effort necessary to support it, was reflected in the following 31 December 1966 Aircraft Inventory and Utilization Report.^{90/}


<u>Item Description</u>	<u>Programmed FY 67</u>	<u>Quantity Received To 31 Dec</u>	<u>Total Active 31 Dec</u>	<u>Total Hours Flown 2nd Quarter FY 67*</u>
C-47	2	0	17	1330
T-28B/C/D	22	10	49	6036
O1-A	2	1	9	440
U6-A	0	0	3	168
U17-A	1	0	4	326
UH-34D	7	3	26	9306
U-4	0	0	1	N/A

*Estimated for in-country operations since RLAF had no established accounting system.

(For details of the total FY 66 MAP see p. 159.)

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Laotian T-28 at Wattay Airfield (Vientiane)

FIGURE 4

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Political and Military Events - 1967

The continuing escalation of military activity in South Vietnam had a direct impact on the tiny Kingdom of Laos. The North Vietnamese Army troops, who had come initially to advise indigenous PL forces, now controlled many mixed PL/NVA units or were organized into their own battalions. By mid-1967 the estimated 6,000 Viet Minh (now NVA) troops who had remained in Laos in violation of the 1962 Geneva Accords had swelled to some 33,000.^{91/} Of this number, some 16,000 were assigned a direct combat role in Laos, and NVA units were often used to spearhead attacks or shore up threatened positions. Most authorities concluded that left to their own devices the Pathet Lao would in all probability have collapsed both politically and militarily. As it was, NVA advisors and troops formed the backbone of the PL and used it to further the larger designs of Hanoi. Clearly the prime goal of NVA troops was to insure continued Communist control of the South Laos panhandle, particularly the portion known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. With increased NVA infiltration into South Vietnam via the trail, it had become a vital line of communication which Hanoi and its allies strove to control. Since U.S. interests in South Vietnam were involved, the U.S. responded with increased air sorties in Barrel Roll (northern Laos) and Steel Tiger (southern Laotian panhandle - Ho Chi Minh Trail), as well as a revitalized MA Program. Once again, Laotians of all political persuasions were affected by factors completely beyond their control -- in this instance the struggle between Hanoi and Washington.^{92/}

With the ICC unable, and in some cases unwilling, to investigate

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government charges of NVA infiltrations, Souvanna Phouma addressed the UN General Assembly, pleading for an end to outside interference in his nation. That august body sat and listened, but little more than sympathetic niceties emerged from the U.N. session.

MAP Becomes MASF

On 1 July 1967, the U.S. military services were assigned the responsibility for programming, budgeting, and funding for the support of the Laotian and Thai Armed Forces. Military department funding now included three Southeast Asian nations since South Vietnam had been transferred to the services as of 31 March 1966. The Military Assistance Program became Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF), and funding responsibility passed from the State Department-administered MA Program to the MASF Program administered by the various armed services.^{93/} The joint Army-Air Force DEPCH organization in Bangkok had been handling Laotian materiel requirements since 1963 as the "MAAG-in-Exile," so little change was experienced in going from MAP to MASF. The stringent security classifications regarding the scope of military aid to Laos, however, made it easier to obscure actual expenditures within the annual budgets of the services concerned. Generally, the U.S. Army programmed and funded those items pertaining to the equipping and training of the FAR/FAN, while the USAF did the same for RLAF-related training and materiel. The USN generally paid the housekeeping bills for the DEPCH organization. All services contributed to the maintenance of the CAS (State Department/CIA)-trained and supported Special Guerrilla Units of Major General Vang Pao in MR II. Although the services had no control over these units, it was incumbent

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upon them through DEPCH to furnish the supplies CAS requested through RO/USAID in Vientiane. The sensitivity of the MASF Program to Laos can be seen in an excerpt from a classified document of that period.^{94/}

Basically, the existence of a U.S. military assistance program for Laos is unclassified, but the scope, quantity and specific nature of this assistance must be classified at least Confidential. In fact, the existence of military assistance for Laos is not to be publicized.

The fact that military assistance for Laos is the mission of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAILAND is classified Secret and the organization handling military assistance is likewise classified Secret

Association of DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI Thailand with Laos is classified Confidential, e.g., message traffic to DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI referring in any manner to Laos...Furthermore, the fact that the U.S. Government and the Royal Thai Government are formally involved in the military training of Lao students in Thailand is classified Confidential. Third country participation in military assistance activities within Laos is also classified Secret-NOFORN, and limited distribution procedures must apply.

MASF For the RLAF - 1967

Two well-planned and well-executed Pathet Lao attacks on the airfield at Luang Prabang almost caused the destruction of the RLAF. The first, a PL mortar and small arms ground attack on 2 February 1967 resulted in the destruction of six parked T-28s and two UH-34s. The Air Operations Center was also badly damaged during the attack, but it and the runway were rapidly repaired through the use of undepleted FY 65 construction funds.^{95/*} Fortunately, thirty additional T-28s, two

*Initially, replacements for the aircraft lost in February came from planes normally available for the Thai "Firefly" pilots.

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C-47s, and one U-17 had been approved and funded for the RLAF under the USAF portion of the fiscal year 1967 MA Program. Delivery of the T-28s in the D-5 configuration from commercial sources helped to sustain the RLAF after the February disaster.^{96/} Just as RLAF was beginning to recover and sortie rates were beginning to climb following the loss, an enemy sapper team penetrated the perimeter defenses of Luang Prabang airfield on 16 July 1967. The team successfully placed satchel charges on aircraft readied for the following day's mission. Nine more T-28s and one UH-34 were destroyed.^{97/}

In addition to these catastrophies, the RLAF experienced other difficulties. For example, personnel management posed a continuing problem. In reference to recruiting skilled personnel for the RLAF, the Senior Air Force official at DEPCH stated that:^{98/}

A major point of consideration is the availability of candidates for future training. For example, a prerequisite for officer training is a degree from a Lycee. The Lycees in Laos produce a total of 240 graduates annually. These graduates provide skilled personnel resources to the entire country. The RLAF must compete for its share.

The scarcity of trained enlisted and officer manpower in the RLAF led to several abuses. Most widespread among these was the retraining of the same individual into many specialties without being used in any of them, merely because that individual spoke English well enough to pass the in-country, CONUS, or third-country training.

Maintenance, too, continued to be a major problem. This was directly related to the logistics and personnel difficulties experienced by the

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RLAF. The Chief of the Air Force Division within DEPCH reported that: ^{99/}

The logistics difficulties being experienced in Laos are a direct result of poor organization and control on the part of the RLAF, and the slow response inherent in the MAP logistics system. The logistics system in Laos has been forced to support both the expanding RLAF aircraft and support equipment fleets, as well as support the war effort. Command assistance and lateral support requests are frequently being used to overcome the long lead time required for items programmed through the MAP system. It has been impossible, in many instances, to foresee the changes in tactics and support requirements that in turn necessitate changes/additions to the Laos MASF program. The constant changes in the program and the resulting press to get the items as soon as possible have undoubtedly given other commands supporting the Laos program a distorted picture of the support being provided to Laos.

The RLAF currently operates a combined unit supply/base supply depot at Savannakhet. This facility presently supports all of the supply needs of the RLAF, and is the single source of Air Force supplies in Laos. All requirements generated by RLAF units at Pakse, Vientiane and Luang Prabang must be passed to Savannakhet, usually by personal contact or via the sporadic radio and telephone systems. Efforts are being made to have the RLAF open small forward supply points at Vientiane and Luang Prabang, so that at least a small number of aircraft "bolt-on" spare parts can be made available. The RLAF is also being provided lateral support from other MAP and USAF supply accounts at Udorn, Thailand, as RLAF aircraft and equipment are being used by USAF personnel operating covertly in Laos.*

*The reference here is to WATERPUMP instructors at Udorn flying combat sorties on weekends with their Lao T-28 student pilots. See CHECO Report, The Royal Laotian Air Force 1954-1970, p. 80. The reference may also allude to the fact that USAF Forward Air Controllers (FACs) were flying in Laos. See CHECO Report, USAF Support of Airstrikes in Support of Indigenous Lao Ground Forces. This report covers the USAF "Butterfly" and "Raven" FAC program.

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Maintenance was a continuing problem with aircraft assigned to Laos. The Air America-operated UH-34 helicopters experienced rotor blade problems due to their high use rate in support of the Laotian Government. The O-1s and U-17s used for introductory pilot training and by FACs within Laos continued to have persistent NORS problems since they only received supply support through RLAF channels. In addition to the normal maintenance problems, an incident occurred in 1967 where:^{100/}

. . . a T-28 was recently declared NORS G by RLAF for bad spirits. Lao pilots refused to fly the aircraft on combat missions, although clearance was obtained for a one-time flight to Udorn. Here Buddhist monks were able to exorcise the bad spirits. The cost was \$7.62 covering the cost of candles and herbs for the ceremony and Salem cigarettes, tooth paste and soap for the monks. This was considered a small price to pay for continued utilization of a \$181,000 aircraft.

There was, however, a bright spot in the maintenance picture: the NORS rate on the T-28s overhauled at Udorn continued to be zero.

To enhance RLAF capabilities, a requirement was established to equip the T-28 aircraft with tactical aids for navigation (TACAN) and 21 of the T-28s had been fitted with the AN/ARN-21 TACAN by January of 1968.^{101/} ARC 44 and ARC 45 radios were programmed to equip the O-1 FAC aircraft, which were used to control both RLAF and USAF strikes in Laos.^{102/}

Personnel changes in 1967 included improvements in organization and training. In an effort to achieve better utilization of personnel, the RLAF underwent a reorganization with American help.* As an immediate

*Although U.S. advisory personnel (Project 404) had been introduced to Laos the previous year, their number continued to be limited by the American Ambassador who wished them to maintain a low profile in view of certain stipulations of the 1962 Accords.

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result, 1500 personnel were authorized for the RLAF, with some 1250 being actually assigned by July 1967.^{103/} Third-country training at Udorn continued. USAF instructors trained T-28 pilots, mechanics, and supply personnel, while USA instructors conducted the UH-34 training. The graduates in FY 67 were:^{104/}

<u>T-28 Pilots</u>	<u>T-28 Mechanics</u>	<u>UH-34 Pilots</u>	<u>UH-34 Mechanics</u>	<u>Supply</u>
15	110	4	12	36

(Some RLAF personnel continued to be trained in the CONUS, but accurate figures on total numbers were unavailable. It was determined that comparable training could be given at Udorn at a greatly reduced cost.)

The RLAF initially had no capability for in-country training, so such a training capability was being developed. For example, an English language school was begun in 1965 at Savannakhet. Pre-flight training in O-1s to prepare students for T-28 pilot training at Udorn was also conducted at Savannakhet in conjunction with this language school. A C-47 ground school prepared qualified pilots for C-47 transition, and was soon established as a qualified transition school. Although operated by the RLAF, students were evaluated by a USAF Base Flight facility in Thailand.^{105/}

THAI-AM, the successor to Thai Airways, was awarded the IRAN and phase inspection contracts for the MASF-supported Laotian C-47s, and action was initiated through CINCPAC to transfer eight O-1F aircraft from USAF assets to the Laos MASF program. These aircraft replaced the last eight aircraft programmed from FY 68-70. The aircraft flew covert FAC

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missions in Laos, and transferral to MASF enabled DEPCH to support and maintain them through other than USAF channels.^{106/}

The status of the RLAF, and the MASF effort needed to support it were reflected in the following 31 December 1967 Aircraft Inventory and Utilization Report:^{107/}

Item Description	Total Quantity Programmed MAP/MASF	Quantity Received To 31 Dec	Total Active* 31 Dec	Total Hours Flown 2nd Quarter FY 68**
C-47	34	29	17	2,186
T-28B/D/C	187	131	46	5,484
O-1A/E	15	10	7	593
U-6A	3	3	3	180
U-17A	11	8	4	405
UH-34D***	66	52	35	10,015
U-4	1	1	1	-----

*This is the number of attrited aircraft deducted from total quantity received.

**Estimated for in-country operations since RLAF had no established accounting system.

***Twenty five of these helicopters were operated by Air America out of Udorn and were under DOD control. Hours flown - 8726. Some 27 of the RLAF T-28s were also based at Udorn.

In addition to aircraft, construction was a significant item in the aid package. Among the construction funds programmed were some \$492,000 to make Pakse into a Forward Operating Base. In Vientiane, the construction of a two-story ARMA/AIRA building was contemplated for the expanded ARMA/AIRA functions and personnel in Project 404. Improvements forecast for FY 68 at Savannakhet totaled \$1,016,600.^{108/}

(For details of the FY 67 MAP see p. 161.)

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Political and Military Events - 1968

The first months of 1968 saw an intensification of activity throughout Laos. As a direct result of the Tet offensive in South Vietnam (February 1968), USAF and RLAF air strikes increased in the Ho Chi Minh Trail area of southern Laos. The annual communist dry-season offensive in Laos also became the most intensive in several years, and PL/NVA troops seized several strategic areas from the Royal Laotian Government. Government losses in the northeast were particularly serious, but pressure continued to be applied to FAR/FAN positions in other areas. Equipment losses, particularly of 105mm howitzers, far exceeded programmed replacements, but in-theater and CONUS emergency requisitions under MASF prevented the situation from deteriorating completely.

At the end of 1968 the communist dry-season campaign was in full swing in MR II, where PL/NVA units attempted to decimate Vang Pao's guerrilla units, and in the Bolovens Plateau area of southern Laos, where NVA troops attacked FAR positions around Thateng. NVA infiltration into Laos increased and the Laotian panhandle continued to be a major sanctuary and supply route for NVA forces in South Vietnam.^{109/}

Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, who was also Defense Minister, issued decrees instituting an ambitious reorganization of the Lao Defense Forces. One of the streamlining measures called for a standard 666 man Table of Equipment infantry battalion, regardless of whether it was a FAR, FAN, or Battalion Voluntaire. This greatly facilitated MASF support, particularly to the Volunteer Battalions, whose 40 units and 16,000 men augmented the FAR in maintaining internal order and in counterinsurgency operations.

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These units were to be equipped under MASF with M18A1 57mm recoilless rifles, M-79 grenade launchers, water trailers, and a variety of communications equipment.^{110/}

Another consolidation involved the abolition of the Tactical Headquarters for North and South Laos and the several Group Mobile Headquarters. (Each of these Group Mobile Headquarters had several subordinate battalions which, however, rarely functioned as units.) As a result of the reorganization, the military commanders of the five MRs began to exercise the necessary coordination of troops and report directly to Army headquarters in Vientiane.

At the Defense Ministry level, Phouma's control was strengthened by the integration of the FAR General Staff into the Ministry structure. While there had been much discussion about integrating the FAN into the FAR, the FAN survived again; Laos remained the only country in the world whose government found it necessary to maintain two general staffs and two separate armies (FAR and FAN). Apparently, Phouma considered retention of the FAN politically justifiable, since he was leader of the Neutralist faction. FAN units in MR IV were transferred to FAR control, however, and FAN officers were finally granted royal commissions. Both FAR and FAN battalions were supported under FY 1969 MASF, and were to be shipped similarly to the Battalion Voluntaire mentioned above.

The unexpended balances of FY 67 and prior MA Programs were transferred to the military services for implementation under the new MASF framework.^{111/}

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MASF For the RLAF - 1968

In 1968 key MASF actions for the RLAF concerned helicopters and T-28s. Seven additional UH-34 helicopters had been programmed under FY 68 Air Force MASF, with two of these to be bought from the ineffective ICC and the rest to become available from USN excess. In addition, the realignment of Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) helicopter programs from the UH-34 to the UH-1H resulted in some 12 UH-34s becoming available for Laos to meet future attrition requirements. These were stored in the CONUS until required.^{112/}

Priority airlift delivered eight T-28D aircraft in March and four T-28D aircraft in April 1968. These were urgently required as replacements and to meet increased RLAF operational requirements. Altogether, 67 T-28Ds were programmed under the new Air Force MASF Program; these were in addition to the 77 which had been funded and delivered under MAP.^{113/}

Logistics and supply problems continued to plague the RLAF, although American advisors had begun to tackle the problem. A small supply point had been opened at Wattay Airport, but this did little to augment the single RLAF supply point at Savannakhet since it primarily stocked spare generator parts for the AIRA-operated AOC. The Chief of the Air Force Division at DEPCH stated:^{114/}

The RLAF continues to rely heavily on lateral support of spare parts from the DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI T-28 and Air America MAP Supply Accounts (DLAR and DLAP) at Udorn. This support continues to be given as USAF personnel are covertly operating RLAF Laos MAP aircraft.

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He continued:^{115/}

The RLAF logistics system lacks overall coordination, planning and programming. Inputs of aircraft for maintenance at Savannakhet and Udorn (Air America) are often not coordinated and arrive at the maintenance facilities without prior notification. The RLAF Chief of Supply at Savannakhet is hampered in much the same way by a complete lack of requirement data from other RLAF units, including the other sections of the Air Materiel Command to which he belongs. The USAF Warehouse Specialist assigned covertly to the Savannakhet Base Supply is now being used by the AIRA as a "Circuit Rider" for the AIRA's supply problems and, in this capacity, has little time to assist the RLAF.

The lack of sufficient in-country U.S. advisors slowed the planning which was intended to enable subsidiary supply points at Pakse, Wattay, and Luang Prabang (as well as the main supply point at Savannakhet) to provide frequently-used T-28 spares. These supply points were to be stocked initially from DEPCH and Air America Supply Accounts, with eventual follow-on support from Savannakhet. In the interim, the RLAF continued its heavy reliance on the DLAR and DLAP accounts.

In an attempt to improve supply management RO/USAID, the in-country logistics agency, finally received RLAF approval to screen RLAF stocks and determine excesses to RLAF requirements. These excesses were to be returned to USAF stocks. By early 1969 some \$400,000 worth of spare T-28 parts had been returned to T-28 supply at Udorn.^{116/} This demonstrated once again that MASF aid could be effectively managed in-country by RO/USAID when that organization took vigorous action. Unfortunately, this occurred all too infrequently. DEPCH, as the CINCPAC single-manager for MASF Programs to Laos, generally sat on the sidelines and did not control

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the materiel once it had reached Laos. The American Ambassador to Laos effectively controlled the American portion of the war in Laos, and he had declined to grant DEPCH personnel the in-country clearance necessary to effectively manage end-use of MASF-provided materiel. When convenient for the in-country organizations, however, DEPCH personnel could be quickly cleared. In late 1968, for example, the aircraft maintenance officer assigned to the DEPCH AFLO at Udorn was placed on covert TDY to Vientiane. He was requested by the American Embassy to assist RO/USAID and AIRA during the absence of the RO's aviation representative. The Chief of the Air Force Division within DEPCH admitted that the move, while placing a strain on the DEPCH AFLO, had proven beneficial to the overall DEPCH mission.^{117/}

At Udorn the T-28 Supply went NORS-free for six days on 3 August 1968, the first time this had occurred in three years. The excellent performance of the account was credited to the very able Weapons System Liaison Officer (WSLO) assigned to the account. UH-34 NORS problems decreased markedly after the arrival of the UH-34 Weapons System Support Liaison Officer (WSSLO) in June, and the RLAF (DLAK account) NORS improved slightly under the increased surveillance of RO/USAID.^{118/} However, it was noted that: "RLAF, at present, is incapable of manning (and maintaining) all equipment assigned to MAP Laos. DOD control is maintained over equipment which cannot be operated by RLAF. Contractor-supplied maintenance and crews supplement RLAF capability to meet mission requirements."^{119/}

While T-28 and UH-34 training and maintenance continued to be performed at Udorn, the C-47 maintenance contract had gone to the newly-named

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Thai-Am in Bangkok. What had begun as a political sop to the sensitive Thais turned into a viable relationship. The Chief of the Air Force Division of DEPCH (DCH-AF) commented:^{120/}

The FY 69 C-47 contract with Thai-Am, which allows more flexibility, is proving very effective. Aircraft are leaving the facility in better condition than heretofore. RLAF maintenance capability does not appear to improve to any degree. Without the assistance of contract maintenance, RLAF aircraft would certainly deteriorate at a rapid rate. With the introduction of the requested C-47 Military Training Team, some improvement should be realized.

During the fall DCH-AF sought information on new uses for the C-47s. On 10 September 1968 he initiated action to obtain information pertaining to the installation of a psychological warfare capability on MAP Laos aircraft. DCH-AF was also interested in knowing whether studies had ever been made on C-47 multi-mission compatibility, specifically in respect to a .50 caliber side-firing, flare-drop, and psychological warfare capability. DCH-AF indicated his continuing desire to obtain programming and funding approval for a C-47 psychological warfare capability for MAP Laos.^{121/}

To support new C-47 programs, new training programs had to be established. Although the RLAF C-47 Ground and Transition School set up at Savannakhet the previous year continued to provide basic indoctrination (and had extended its curriculum to include U-6 and U-17 transition training as well as UH-34 co-pilot to pilot upgrade training), it was not equipped to offer the necessary advanced C-47 training required for the psywar capability. To provide the necessary up-grade training for Laotian

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C-47 pilots and maintenance personnel, the American Embassy (AmEmb) Vientiane requested the AmEmb Bangkok to obtain approval from the Royal Thai Government for the introduction of a MAP Laos C-47 Military Training Team into Thailand. On 3 December 1968 COMUSMACTHAI indicated that the Thai Supreme Command had approved the introduction of the team, and had proposed Phitsanulok Airfield as a site. DEPCH had coordinated this program with all concerned and interested parties, and submitted the program for formal CSAF approval. Programming action had already been taken to modify four RLAF C-47s for the side-firing and flare-drop capability in order that these modified C-47s (actually AC-47s) be equipped to provide the necessary support for base and area defense. One gunship would be stationed at each of the major RLAF bases - Vientiane, Luang Prabang, Pakse, and Savannakhet. According to DCH-AF, gunship support was necessary to prevent the recurrence of incidents such as the two successful ground attacks on Luang Prabang in 1967.^{122/}

Late in 1968 the AmEmb Vientiane established an urgent requirement for five RT-28D aircraft configured for photographic reconnaissance to support the MAP Laos requirements. Unfortunately, the last of the 14 RT-28Ds transferred to MAP Laos from the VNAF in 1964 had crashed in May, leaving only one additional RT-28D in the MAP Laos inventory. This aircraft was put into the proper configuration, and became operational in November 1968. Conversion of more aircraft had to await parts availability. A DEPCH request to CINCPAC for five RT-28D aircraft for MAP Laos was rejected since this modification was not available to MAP.

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In conjunction with the RT-28D program, AMEMB Vientiane also requested portable aerial film processing and printing equipment suitable for field use. Since it was for RLAF use, it had to be simple to use and to maintain. DEPCH incorporated this request into the FY 70 programming action.^{123/}

AmEmb Vientiane expressed its opinion on other matters also. DEPCH had arranged for the Sacramento Air Materiel Area to transfer ten dual T-28 egress systems from a USAF contract to MAP Laos. Additionally, 23 single egress kits became available under a MAP follow-on contract. Delivery for both systems was to run from February through April 1969. This modification would have resulted in three T-28 configurations: those with front, rear, and dual seat egress systems. AmEmb Vientiane found this arrangement unacceptable since it would impair T-28 flexibility and have an adverse impact on RLAF crew morale. AmEmb Vientiane desired dual egress systems in all RLAF T-28 aircraft, and DEPCH attempted to obtain JCS approval to install the dual system on all MAP Laos T-28D aircraft.^{124/}

Increasing combat mission requirements for FACs required attention to the procurement of additional O-1s. The delivery of eight O-1F aircraft from PACAF assets at no cost to MAP/MASF began early in 1968, and seven of these aircraft had been received by October of that year. These were in lieu of the O-1As which had been programmed for FY 68-70 but were no longer available. Unfortunately, by early 1969 the O-1 attrition rate had increased due to the rise of FAC combat mission requirements. Three O-1F aircraft were lost in November 1968, incurring one fatality. Nonetheless, DCH-AF noted: "FAC aircraft are being operated by USAF pilots and results are proving effective..." DEPCH undertook to procure

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additional aircraft and contractual maintenance support.^{125/}

Acquisition of other aircraft for MAP Laos included seven T-28D aircraft transferred from the 56th Special Operations Wing (SOW) (the parent unit of the erstwhile Det. 6, 1 ACW, which had in the course of time been redesignated Det. 1, 56 ACW, and, finally, Det. 1, 56 SOW). Detachment 1, 56 SOW, the USAF training facility at Udorn, had accepted three aircraft, but these were incomplete and required extensive reconditioning by Air America and re-equipping from MAP Laos funds. DEPCH advised the 56 SOW that the remaining aircraft were to come equipped as specified under USAF directives.^{126/}

Much of the architecture and engineering (A&E) programmed in previous years began to take form as funding was approved and became available. Among the facility improvements completed or in progress in 1968 were the following:^{127/}

Vientiane - Wattay Airfield. . . . Construction of a 200 bed military hospital was almost complete, and construction of the additional ARMA/AIRA building to support Project 404 personnel was awaiting land acquisition.

Luang Prabang. . . . Among improvements scheduled were a new T-28 parking apron and a revetted ammunition storage area.

Savannakhet. . . . Facility improvements scheduled included a parking apron with taxiways for C-47 aircraft, a C-47 maintenance hangar, and revetted ammunition storage areas.

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Pakse. . . . Improvements designed to develop Pakse into a FOB included a parking apron and connected taxiways, an AOC, revetted ammunition storage areas, and a small maintenance facility.

Runway lights, approved under the FY 67 Program, were received and preassembled at Savannakhet. Lights were installed at Luang Prabang, Savannakhet and Pakse to allow for sustained operations from these locations. Wattay/Vientiane was already equipped with lights.

Signs of progress became evident in training, also. The RLAF C-47 Transition and Technical Training Schools at Savannakhet aided in providing basic technical training, and in screening candidates for further training in the U.S. and in third countries. The English Language School at Savannakhet tried valiantly to prepare students for technical training in that language, but was often frustrated by the low quality of Lao students assigned to it and the RLAF's indiscriminate use of assigned students in the performance of other tasks. DCH-AF noted that "little, if any improvement has been shown in the quality of students received at Det. 1, 56 ACW Udorn. In-country training has improved... but will not be self-sufficient in the foreseeable future."^{128/}

Detachment 1, 56 ACW (later SOW) continued its outstanding job of providing T-28 pilot and support training. A U.S. Army UH-34 helicopter program performed the same training service at Udorn for that aircraft. By mid-1968 the overall pilot strength of the RLAF numbered 104, broken down by aircraft as follows: C-47 (35, including co-pilots); UH-34 (23,

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including co-pilots); T-28 (40); and other (6).^{129/} The Journal of Military Assistance, in commenting on the RLAF training program, stated that:^{130/}

there have been certain signs of progress. In large part this can be attributed to the guidance and training by the U.S. advisors, and the younger (RLAF) officers show promise for future leadership -- the lack of which has been a major deficiency in the RLAF. In summary, although there is considerable room for improvement, "bright spots" are, by the same token, becoming noticeable, and the RLAF is due considerable credit in light of the fact it is operating under actual combat conditions.

* * * * *

In view of the vital role played by T-28s in Laotian combat operations, it is noteworthy that Laotian graduates of the six-month, 200 flying hour T-28 course are fully qualified, combat ready T-28 pilots; moreover, their counterpart graduates of the five-month, 150 flying hour UH-34 course are considered to be equally proficient. Much of this progress is attributed to the continuing advice and efforts of the U.S. advisors.

CONUS training for selected RLAF officers and enlisted personnel also continued. Among the officer specialties with students in training were: Undergraduate T-28 Pilot, Aircraft Maintenance Officer, Communications Officer, Aircraft Traffic Control Officer, Pilot/Instructor T-28, Instrument Pilot/C-47, and Personnel Officer. Enlisted training in CONUS included: Munitions Specialist, Aircraft Propeller Repairman, Aircraft Pseudraulic Repairman, Aircraft Mechanic, Airframe Repairman, Weather Observer, and Instrument Repairman.^{131/}

The reorganization of the RLAF continued, and RLAF personnel authorization rose to 1700, with 1554 assigned in July 1968. However, resources

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of personnel with the necessary aptitude and educational levels to absorb the required RLAF technical training remained limited.^{132/}

The status of the RLAF, and the MAP/MASF effort needed to support it, was reflected in the 31 December 1968 Aircraft Inventory and Utilization Report:^{133/}

Item Description	Total Quantity Programmed MAP/MASF	Quantity Received To 31 Dec	Total Active 31 Dec*	Total Hours Flown 2nd Qtr FY 69**
C-47A/D	38	34	19	1,639
T-28B/C/D	214	170	74	8,452
O-1A/E/F***	28	21	15	3,283
U-6A	4	3	3	93
U-16A/B	13	9	4	328
UH-34D****	73	54	34	10,016
U-4	1	1	1	29

*Attrited aircraft deducted from total quantity received.

**Estimated for in-country operations since RLAF had no established accounting system.

***O-1 aircraft flown by USAF FACs for AIRA accounted for 2146 hours. O-1 aircraft flown by RLAF accounted for 1137 hours.

****Twenty-two UH-34Ds were DOD controlled and operated by Air America. Hours flown: 7754. Twelve UH-34Ds were controlled and operated by the RLAF. Hours flown: 2262.

(For details of the FY 68 MAP see p. 164.)

Political and Military Events - 1969

PL/NVA pressure intensified during the latter stages of the 1968/69 dry season. By the early summer of 1969, PL/NVA units had routed the FAN from Muong Soui, the last strategic position held by the neutralist forces west of the Plaine des Jarres. These enemy successes were achieved in the Plaine des Jarres area in the north in spite of massive B-52 strikes beginning in February, and in the vicinity of Muong Phine

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in the south. Fortunately, FAR and Vang Pao's guerrilla forces made significant inroads into Pathet Lao-held areas by late summer of 1969. ^{134/}

NVN strength in Laos was estimated at some 48,000 troops in 1969. This figure was exclusive of the 10,000 or so NVA troops which traversed the Ho Chi Minh Trail monthly, and the 50,000 allied PL forces. This increased North Vietnamese aggressiveness in Laos also posed problems for neighboring states, with Thailand being particularly concerned. Consequently, the build-up of American forces in Thailand to prosecute the wars in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia mushroomed to larger proportions.

The NVA role in Laos had changed significantly from 1964, when a few NVA units acted as advisors to Pathet Lao troops, to 1968, when NVA units formed the backbone of most offensive operations while the PL units constituted the support element. There remained little doubt that PL forces were unable to launch any major offensives without direct support from Hanoi and its allies. On the other hand, the situation for FAR/FAN forces was similar for they were unable to take any major initiatives without U.S. MAP/MASF aid. ^{135/}

Laos remained unique in that it had three legally constituted armies under the terms of the 1962 Accords: the Pathet Lao, FAR, and FAN. The FAR Commander in Chief and his General Staff exercised loose command and control over the five MRs, each of which had its own General Staff and functioned as a tactical headquarters controlling all military assets within its territory. The RLAF and the small River Flotilla were organizationally elements of the FAR.

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The FAN was theoretically responsible to the FAR General Staff; however, it actually responded directly to Prime Minister Phouma in his position as the leader of the Neutralist faction of the "Tripartite Government." The FAN had a relatively minor strength of some 7,000 in comparison to the FAR ground force of 54,000. The FAN had undergone several reorganizations and was facing another reorganization in 1969. However, the de facto integration of the FAN into the FAR (long urged by U.S. Army advisors) seemed to be progressing satisfactorily.

Vang Pao's CAS-supported Meo guerrilla forces, which were friendly to the Vientiane Government, continued to operate, as did two dissident neutralist forces which were not directly responsive to Souvanna Phouma.* Indeed, both of these forces--the Khammouane Forces and the Deuane Dissident Neutralists--had sided with the PL when hostilities erupted on the PDJ in 1963. The combined strength of these dissident forces was 3,900. The Khammouane Forces numbered some 1325 troops and were located in Phong Saly Province, and the Deuane Dissident Neutralists numbered about 2575, and were located on the PDJ. While the Khammouane Forces were comprised of some seven infantry battalions, the Deuane Dissident Neutralists constituted the greater threat with seven infantry battalions, one antiaircraft artillery (AAA) battalion, one field artillery battalion, one armored battalion, and one engineer battalion.^{136/}

*Mention should also be made here of the regular Thai Army units, which were employed at Long Tieng (the MR II headquarters of Vang Pao) in 1969. When their presence became politically sensitive in regard to the 1962 Accord provisions, the regular Thai Army units were replaced by Thai Army "volunteers" supported by the United States.

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Enemy and dissident neutralist forces had been using armored units successfully for some time, and the lack of an equally capable FAR force had demoralized the Royal Laotian Army (RLA). As a result, the U.S. Army contingent in DEPCHE programmed thirty-seven armored cars (twelve XM 706 and twenty-five XM 706E2) at an estimated cost of \$1.41 million for FY 1970 MASF aid. These armored cars had to come from new production since no armored car assets were then under U.S. Army control.^{137/}

Another much-needed boost in FAR morale came about when a small shipment of M-16 rifles arrived in late 1968 to replace the M-2 carbines, M-1 rifles, and Browning Automatic Rifles (BAR) previously furnished to friendly forces. This weapon conversion pressed ahead in 1969 when an additional 4000 M-16s arrived and were distributed. An additional 16,000 of these weapons were programmed for future delivery under FY 70 MAP/MASF. Training with the new weapon was given initially by USA advisors, and then continued by the now-qualified FAR cadre using the M-16 training booklet which had been translated into Lao. Anticipated large-scale problems in the care and cleaning of the weapon failed to materialize, with the credit being due largely to U.S. Army attache supervision.^{138/}

On the diplomatic front, Phouma continued to seek world-wide support for his charges of North Vietnamese aggression. Occasionally, he would be aided in this by a number of "majority reports" (India and Canada vs Poland) of the ICC which cited North Vietnam for violation of the 1962 Accords. The ICC had become increasingly ineffective and each of the three ICC members had gradually reduced its staff. Indeed, Canada had

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announced plans to withdraw almost all of its personnel from Laos. The U.S., although aware of the ICC's ineffectiveness, favored its continued existence on the premise that a future peace settlement in Laos might call for a revitalized ICC. The U.S. attempted to persuade Canada to keep a larger contingent present. Curiously enough, the ICC in Laos was one of the international organizations that was eligible for MAP aid, and U.S. aid in the form of helicopters and associated maintenance services was provided.^{139/}

MASF For the RLAF - 1969

For the RLAF, the most significant event of 1969 was its completed reorganization into four Composite Squadrons, each augmented by a U.S. Air Operations Center. The 101st Composite Squadron, based at Luang Prabang, was used primarily to support operations in MR I, while the 102nd Composite Squadron from Wattay (Vientiane) supported operations in both MR V and MR II. The 103rd Composite Squadron, based at Savannakhet, supported operations in MR III; and the 104th Composite Squadron at Pakse supported operations in MR IV. In addition, the RLAF was now controlled from a Combined Operations Center (COC) located in Vientiane.

The new arrangement permitted rapid response to both tactical/logistical requirements and the control/use of associated airlift. The U.S. In-Country Team provided the major central control function for both operations and logistics. Members of this team advised the RLAF Commander and assisted him in single management of operations and logistics. Other USAF personnel augmented the RLAF at the squadron level and advised on operations functions. Each RLAF Air Base Commander was responsible for

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all tactical requirements levied on his unit by the COC in Vientiane. This responsibility included coordination with the Army (FAR/FAN) MR Commanders to insure tactical operational support, the assurance of adequate operational capability of crews and aircraft assigned, maintenance support for flight line and organizational functions, and stockage of POL and ordnance sufficient for support of operations. ^{140/}

Another major reorganization project was still in progress, involving the RLAF supply structure. In conjunction with the Composite Squadron concept, the RLAF supply depot at Savannakhet was transferred to Wattay AB at Vientiane and reduced in scope to in-country stockage of C-47 and U-4 parts. All other aircraft (T-28, O-1, U-17, UH-34, and U-6) would now be supported from the supply accounts maintained at Udorn RTAFB, Thailand, and by T-28 Supply (DLAR) and Air America (DLAP) which had, for all practical purposes, provided this support all along. The main RLAF in-country operating locations (OLs) would each have a contingent of RLAF supply personnel and would maintain bench stocks of high consumption items to support daily operations. It was hoped that the reorganization and the move of the supply center to Vientiane would encourage more direct supervision by the RLAF staff and result in more emphasis on a reliable in-country RLAF supply self-sufficiency. All serviceable in-country excesses were returned to stock at Udorn. ^{141/}

In commenting upon these various facets of RLAF reorganization, many of which were U.S. inspired, the Journal of Military Assistance said: ^{142/}

Considering the RLAF's limitations in manpower and equipment, it has developed into an effective force, able to fly nearly 2,000 day-time T-28 sorties a month in support of tactical operations.

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However, this rate can only be maintained via much U.S. logistic support. Moreover, not only aircraft maintenance, but also training will continue to be carried on in other countries for the foreseeable future. Laos itself lacks the facilities, and those it does have are too vulnerable to attack, but the main drawback is the continuing shortage of trained and trainable personnel. Nonetheless, the support capabilities of the RLAF provide the FAR with one vital advantage over Pathet Lao/North Vietnamese forces.

Tactical T-28 combat sorties increased during 1969 to over 2000 per month. DCH-AF attributed this to several factors, among them the more effective organization of RLAF and FAR resources and the increased operational requirements in Laos resulting from the bombing halt over North Vietnam. On the latter point, he went on to explain that the "cessation of bombing of North Vietnam has resulted in increased use of logistic avenues within Laos." The increase of Pathet Lao and NVA activity in Laos following the bombing halt caused DCH-AF to add:^{143/}

Due to the dual role of the MASF Laos program (developing RLAF capability and supporting U.S. national objectives without overt violation of the Geneva Accords), the present aircraft requirements may be considered temporary for the period in which combat operations continue and U.S. national objectives require such support.

Accordingly, DEPCH urged a Unit Equipment (UE) change to the previously programmed RLAF support. Specifically, DEPCH requested an increase of the T/RT-28B/C/D from 53 to 77, an increase of the UH-34 from 33 to 38, and a decrease of the 32 O-1/U-6/U-17 aircraft and their replacement by 31 U-17/T-41 aircraft. DCH-AF added:^{144/}

...The UE change from O-1 FAC/Training aircraft was made because CSAF has advised that there are not enough O-1 aircraft in the USAF

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inventory or from projected availability to support VNAF, Laos and Thailand requirements and recommended that Laos program U-17/T-41s for FAC/Training requirements. The MAP Laos UE change was submitted to SECDEF in CINCPAC Secret message DTG 152055Z March 1969.

By the same token, actual deliveries of programmed O-1 aircraft had begun previously and DCH-AF noted an improvement in the FAC program. Three O-1F aircraft were received in January 1969 from PACAF assets, and three O-1As were received in March 1969 from U.S. Army assets in CONUS. These deliveries more than offset the loss of one O-1E in January and one O-1F in March. The O-1 aircraft fleet was restored and maintained at the required level by the Air America facility at Udorn. In addition, "the introduction of covert USAF O-1 aircraft mechanics and Air America contract maintenance personnel into Laos has alleviated many of the maintenance problems previously experienced."^{145/}

The answer to DEPCH's request for the UE change came just prior to the end of the fiscal year. JCS, while approving the RLAF reorganization and the requested UE change on the UH-34 aircraft, rejected the T-28 UE increase because of insufficient assets to support the increase without diverting aircraft from current approved requirements. No mention was made of the request for FAC/Liaison/Training aircraft by the JCS. An immediate reclama was initiated by AmEmb Vientiane, AIRA, and DEPCH. In a lengthy explanation, DCH-AF noted the necessity for the additional T-28 aircraft and the need for additional personnel at Det. 1, 56 SOW, to support the presently assigned T-28 fleet in its combat, training, and reconnaissance missions.^{146/}

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Regarding the O-1 FAC/Liaison/Training aircraft requested in the UE change, CSAF first suggested that T-41 and U-17 aircraft be substituted, since O-1s were scarce. CSAF then advised that current scheduling of O-2 and OV-10 aircraft into the USAF inventory would accelerate the release of a limited number of O-1s from PACOM assets into Laos MASF. Accordingly, USAF recommended deletion of DEPCH FY 68 and FY 70 Programs for U-17Bs for the RLAF and the substitution of O-1 aircraft (with U-17Bs being programmed in FY 71-75). Additionally, FY 69 programming of T-41 aircraft to alleviate the O-1 shortage was reprogrammed for FY 71 because of the projected O-1 availability. However, DCH-AF cautioned that O-1 delivery had "not been sufficient to meet MAP Laos and USAF in-country O-1/U-17/T-41/FAC/Liaison/Training requirements."^{147/} In his October 1969 Report, DCH-AF added that "the alleged O-1 availability did not become a reality during this quarter. In addition, three U-17 aircraft... will not be delivered to Bangkok until November 1969. The lack of O-1s and the failure to meet programmed delivery dates of U-17 aircraft has seriously degraded MAP Laos FAC support during this period."^{148/}

Late in 1969, however, CSAF advised DEPCH that six T-28 aircraft would be airlifted to arrive by 31 December 1969, and that an additional 16 aircraft would be airlifted to arrive not later than 31 January 1970.*

*These were most probably the 22 aircraft that had been procured under the USAF MASF Program to meet Laotian attrition requirements. They had been on loan to the VNAF to support its pilot training requirements. They were airlifted to Udorn for reassembly and armament.

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More good news came in November 1969 when the DEPCH request for additional T-28 maintenance manning at Udorn was approved. By the end of November, 50 technicians (USAF and civilian) were in place at Det. 1, 56 SOW, for 179 days TDY. The DEPCH request for a 185-man PCS augmentation for Det. 1 also received CINCPACAF and CSAF approval, and the only remaining stumbling block was the Thailand personnel ceiling. AmEmb Bangkok and MACTHAI took the problem under advisement. DCH-AF reiterated that "if immediate relief is not obtained and the 185 personnel made available to Detachment 1, it will be necessary to request an extension of the SMAMA Maintenance Assistance Team. Detachment 1 cannot sustain the MAP Laos T-28 requirements without this additional manning."^{149/}

Considerable message traffic was also generated by DCH-AF in an attempt to fill an AIRA Vientiane identified requirement for three U-10 aircraft for Project 404 operational use. Due to the non-availability of O-1/U-17 aircraft, DCH-AF proposed in early December 1969 to accept the three U-10s as interim substitutes at no cost to be added to the MASF Laos aircraft UE. CSAF approved the proposal, but later advised that action had been taken to deliver four O-1 aircraft to MAP Laos. DEPCH now faced the problem of whether to retain the U-10s or not, since the arrival of the O-1s early in 1970 would bring the authorized O-1/U-17 UE to its limit (including the three U-10s) with no additional O-1/U-17s programmed prior to FY 1/1972.^{150/}

Additional problems, this time of a financial nature, plagued DEPCH at year's end. Total funding had not been received by 30 December 1969 and the majority of dollar line funds were exhausted. Unless total

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funding was received, extensive requirements would have to be submitted for immediate funding under Continuing Resolution Authority procedures.^{151/}

Problems also continued to plague the installation of the single and dual T-28 egress systems, and the date for beginning the conversion was slipped to June 1969. DEPCH continued to support the AmEmb Vientiane position that dual egress systems be installed in all T-28 aircraft. In May, JCS advised CINCPAC that it had reconsidered the request to equip all T-28s with the dual system, and now approved that approach. Consequently, the JCS instructed PACAF to assign sufficient priority to the project to insure its consideration for funding. Accordingly, DCH-AF programmed sufficient additional dual egress systems to completely modify all on-hand and programmed MAP Laos T-28 aircraft. By October 1969, twenty dual systems had been received with three-fourths of that number installed. As an interim measure, twenty-three single egress systems were to be installed during the same month. DCH-AF commented: "Receipt of the additional authorized dual systems is questionable in that CSAF has notified DCH-AF that Southeast Asia Operational Requirements action must be initiated through Seventh Air Force to insure adequate funding."^{152/}

On another front, actions initiated by DCH-AF in June 1968 seemed to have reached fruition when eight excess VNAF C-47s and six of eight Class V modification kits for the SUU-11A minigun were assigned to MAP Laos at no cost. Thai-Am was tasked with accomplishing the required modification, but the project was plagued by misfortune from the beginning. DCH-AF assessed the situation thus: "Through no fault of Thai-Am

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or APRFE none of the gunships ever reached an operational status during this reporting period. Basically, the kits received from VNAF were a pile of junk."^{153/} Consequently, CINCPAC proposed and the Country Team concurred in a one-for-one exchange of the eight RLAF (ex-VNAF) C/AC-47s for eight USAF MXU-470-equipped AC-47s. CSAF also approved the DCH-AF proposal to keep the C/AC-47s on hand as advance attrition aircraft at no cost to the MASF Program. The ex-VNAF aircraft were to be reconfigured back to the C-47 configuration and replaced by the ex-USAAC AC-47s, the last of which was to be in place by January 1970.^{154/}

At the end of 1969 two additional operating locations had been added in Laos. The RLAF now flew not only from the four permanent bases as detailed previously, but also from Ban Houei Sai and Long Tieng. (The latter was the MR II headquarters of the Meo guerrilla leader, Major General Vang Pao.) A seventh OL was in the planning stage.^{155/}

The FY 70 MASF Laos Air Force Program, as approved by CINCPAC, was \$83,198,406. This constituted an increase of slightly more than \$22 million over the FY 69 Program. The increase was attributed almost entirely to the ever-increasing tactical combat sortie requirements.^{156/}

The training program conducted at Udorn by Det. 1, 56 SOW, expanded with the arrival of the C-47 MTT in March 1969. The MTT had flown four MAP Laos C-47s from Don Muang to Udorn, and on 8 March 1969 six pilots, six flight mechanics, and six ground maintenance personnel of the RLAF entered training at Det. 1, 56 SOW. DCH-AF noted that "this group appears to be the 'cream of the crop' and should greatly enhance RLAF C-47 capability upon return to Laos. At this time it appears that one

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or two of each category will make excellent instructors." ^{157/} DCH-AF reported enthusiastically in July: "The C-47 MTT...is doing an outstanding job. The USAF Special Operations Forces personnel making up the first team are extremely well qualified and it is anticipated that the first group of RLAF graduates will be fully qualified as IPs, Pilots, Flight Mechanics and Crew Chiefs." ^{158/} The purpose of the MTT was not only to upgrade RLAF C-47 pilots and crews, but to expand RLAF operational capability. Thus, DCH-AF stated: ^{159/}


In addition to normal upgrading, the crews have or will have received training in all aspects of C-47 COIN operations and procedures, including an actual check-out in AC-47 Gunship operations. USAF approval for a follow-on C-47 MTT has been obtained (second class). No problems have been encountered with 7/13 Air Force operational control of the team which is assigned to Detachment 1, 56th Special Operations Wing. Materiel support of the program has been well within the DCH-AF capability. Actual training has been accomplished utilizing four MAP Laos C-47s. It is anticipated that USAF will loan an AC-47 gunship to MAP Laos to insure the current class gunship training.

By year's end, training was progressing well. The second class graduated on 8 December, and the third class began on 10 December. RLAF personnel retained from the first class as IPs and instructors did an outstanding job. USAF had provided, on loan, an AC-47 gunship to insure that RLAF crews would receive the proper training. Unfortunately, operational requirements precluded any RLAF instructor personnel remaining from the second class. An attempt by DEPCH to convert the TDY C-47 MTT to a permanent MASF Laos Training Program incorporated into an expanded Det. 1 faltered because of the restricted Thailand headroom ceiling for PCS

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AC-47 MTT at Udorn RTAFB

FIGURE 5

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personnel. The fourth TDY MTT was then programmed and approved by CINCPAC. The American Ambassador to Laos estimated that the RLAF would be able to initiate a self-sufficient C/AC-47 training program in January 1972.^{160/}

T-28 and UH-34 training continued to be given at Udorn. UH-34 pilots and mechanics were trained by an Army CWO and two Army enlisted personnel assigned to DCH-AF; RLAF supply personnel continued to be trained by DEPCH T-28 Supply at Udorn. By January 1970 two RLAF UH-34 pilots assigned to the Army MTT were upgraded to Instructor Pilots, and began conducting the majority of the flight training. Two RLAF ground school instructors were also qualified, and conducted classes.^{161/}

The late 1969 class of 16 RLAF T-28 student pilots was scheduled for graduation in early March 1970. AmEmb Vientiane advised DEPCH in November 1969 that planned increases in T-28 aircraft indicated that two classes of 30 student pilots each would be the minimum required to man the aircraft (60 pilots annually). AmEmb Vientiane further advised in December that increases in class size were contingent upon additional personnel and aircraft being assigned to Det. 1. After studying the proposal, Det. 1 agreed that the annual output of RLAF T-28 pilots could be increased by conducting four 12 to 14-week classes of 15 students each per year if additional aircraft, instructors, and maintenance personnel were assigned. (No instructor pilots could be made available from RLAF resources, as every pilot was needed for operational missions.)^{162/}

An interesting sidelight to the T-28 training had occurred at mid-year when a total of six Meo student pilots graduated at Det. 1 to join the

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only qualified RLAF pilot of Meo ethnic extraction on active duty at that time. (At least four other RLAF pilots of Meo extraction had died previously in the line of duty.) Plans called for them to be stationed at Vientiane, where they could be supervised by the one qualified Meo pilot. Here they would operate in support of the ground forces of Meo Major General Vang Pao, Commander of MR II and leader of the CAS-sponsored irregular Special Guerrilla Units (SGUs).^{163/} How had Vang Pao infiltrated the RLAF? A recent DCH-AF stated: "They (the Meo pilots) were given preliminary training by CAS, I think, and then superimposed on an RLAF quota to Det. 1."^{164/}

Although third-country and in-country training continued to improve, the RLAF was not and would not be self-sufficient in training in the foreseeable future. An urgent FAC requirement necessitated the diversion of training aircraft to operations; the result was a shortage of training aircraft at the RLAF Preflight Training School at Savannakhet, which caused that school to lapse into practical nonexistence. In commenting on the general state of training affairs, DCH-AF said: "Little, if any improvement has been noted in the quality of students received at Det. 1, 56 SOW, at Udorn from the RLAF Preflight Training School at Savannakhet. This is also a reflection of the drain on the personnel resources of Laos. The English language capability of the current T-28 pilot class is minimum acceptable."^{165/} In retrospect, there was some improvement because the first students to arrive in 1965 spoke no English at all so "minimum acceptable" was actually progress, although the DCH-AF did not look at it that way at the time.

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In the latter part of 1969 AmEmb Vientiane advised DEPCH that total RLAF personnel authorization had risen to 2557. The increase of 857 individuals over previously published figures was the result of a manpower survey. A Unit Document Listing (UDL) was in preparation to give the RLAF a central personnel system. 166/

Status of the RLAF, and the MAP/MASF effort needed to support it, was reflected in the following 31 December 1969 Aircraft Inventory and Utilization Report: 167/

<u>Item Description</u>	<u>Total Quantity Programmed MAP/MASF</u>	<u>Quantity Received To 31 Dec</u>	<u>Total Active 31 Dec*</u>	<u>Total Hours Flown 2nd Qtr FY 70**</u>
AC/C-47A/D	50	46	29	2,390
RT/T-28B/C/D***	223	173	57	9,414
O-1A/E/F/G****	37	33	20	3,915
U-6A	3	3	1	20
U-17A/B*****	13	13	8	1,039
UH-34D*****	80	66	42	13,025
U-4	1	1	1	10
U-10	3	3	3	0

*Attrited aircraft deducted from total quantity received.

**Estimated for in-country operations since RLAF had no established accounting system.

***T-28 FAC hours flown were 482. Other T-28 hours flown - 8932.

****O-1 FAC hours flown were 3164. RLAF hours flown - 751.

*****U-17 FAC hours flown were 654. RLAF hours flown - 385.

*****28 UH-34s were DOD controlled and flown by Air America (4 UH-34Gs not utilized; undergoing Class V modification). Hours flown - 10359. Fourteen UH-34s controlled by RLAF hours flown - 2666.

(For details of the FY 69 program see p. 166.)

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Controversy Surrounds the U.S. Role in Laos

In the United States, the period of the late 1960s was one of great unrest, particularly among certain elements of the student population. The lengthy war in South Vietnam, with its attendant requirements on the human and material resources of the United States, had deeply divided public opinion; one segment endorsed the intervention policy while the other claimed to abhor the U.S. role in Southeast Asia.

As a result of the pressure of public opinion, a Congressional inquiry was initiated into the U.S. role in Southeast Asia. Restrictions against other and similar involvements resulted from the inquiry. One of the first of these was a prohibition against the commitment of United States ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand without the consent of Congress. This restriction was incorporated into the FY 1970 Defense Appropriations Bill. The prohibition, initially adopted by the Senate and then publicly endorsed by the new Nixon administration, was included in a compromise bill that provided \$69.8 billion for the Defense Department--an amount some \$5.5 billion less than requested by the Administration. The bill not only represented the heaviest cut in a defense budget requested by a U.S. President since the end of the Korean War, but also contained a new assertion of Congressional prerogatives over foreign and military policies. Under the amendment, none of the funds in the Defense Appropriations Bill "shall be used to finance the introduction of American ground combat troops into Laos or Thailand."^{168/}

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Late in 1969 the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, chaired by Stuart Symington, investigated the U.S. role in, and the scope of aid to, the Kingdom of Laos. Among those who testified were the Ambassador to Laos, G. McMurtrie Godley, and two of his predecessors, Messrs. Sullivan and Unger. The following exchange between Senator Fulbright and former Ambassador Sullivan (who had turned the post over to Ambassador Godley in June 1969) provides an insight into the sensitivity of the situation. Senator Fulbright had just asked Mr. Sullivan if it were not true that Souvanna Phouma received some technological and grant aid from the Soviets, who actively aided his North Vietnamese opponents. Mr. Sullivan had admitted the truth of this statement. The investigation continued: ^{169/}

Sen. Fulbright: Doesn't this ever strike you as sort of an absurdity. They (the Soviets and NVA) are pretending they are not there, and we are pretending that we are not there. What does it all lead to? We give the impression, not only to foreign people, but to many of our own people that we are mad. Why isn't it better to go and say what we are doing and give a reason for it, and say the reason you give, which I think is the only possible reason - the support of the war in Vietnam - that we have just gone in and are doing what we think is assisting the war in Vietnam. That makes some sense. I do not quite see the persuasiveness of your reasons.

Mr. Sullivan: Well, my answers may not be persuasive, but I go back and state our concern has been, and still is, to try to establish those conditions which would permit the 1962 neutrality agreements to apply; and in doing that I think it was incumbent upon us to maintain that initial understanding we have had with the Soviets...

Senator Symington, in addressing Mr. Sullivan somewhat later, concluded: ^{170/}

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Mr. Secretary, you say in view of the Geneva Accords the existence of an overt military organization in Laos was impossible. You should have added one word, "therefore." It is obvious why there was created an organization known as Deputy JUSMAG Thailand as an integral part of the JUSMAG headquarters . . .

Political and Military Events - 1970

During late 1969 and early 1970 Hanoi introduced an estimated 13,000 new troops along with more sophisticated weaponry into Laos. (However, 130mm guns and T-54 tanks did not appear until late 1971.) According to President Nixon, some 67,000 NVA troops were believed to be in Laos in 1970.^{171/}

Souvanna Phouma, in one of his frequent attempts at reconciliation with the Pathet Lao, proposed the neutralization of the PDJ, but his efforts were rewarded by a Communist-launched offensive which recaptured the PDJ and territory beyond.*^{172/} In response to the unprecedented level of combat, the FY 1970 MASF for ammunition for RLG forces was increased by \$30.9 million - \$13.8 million for the Air Force MASF and \$17.1 million for Army MASF.^{173/}

The 1962 Accords had called for a unified national Army composed of 10,000 troops each from the Pathet Lao, the Forces Armees Royale, and Forces Armees Neutralist. Manning levels for the three major Laotian armies were estimated to be 51,300 for FAR, 6,000 for the FAN, 48,000 for the Pathet Lao, and 67,000 for the NVA. The facade of neutrality and

*At the battle for Long Tieng in MR II (17 March - 1 April 1970), one Lao pilot flew an incredible 19 missions in one day when USAF air was unavailable due to visibility of less than one mile.

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tripartism continued to be preserved for political convenience, but each faction went its separate way.^{174/} Leadership of the units did not turn out as planned either. For example, on 20 May 1970, Phouma turned his position as Minister of Defense (he was also Prime Minister and Foreign Minister) over to Sisouk Champassak. Sisouk undertook a reform and overhaul of the Defense Ministry, beginning with a reorganization of the FAR General Staff in August 1970.

Although the United States heavily subsidized, advised, and modernized the FAR, FAN, and the CAS-supported guerrilla forces, French grant aid to Laos continued to be high. Some \$7 to \$8 million were spent by France in Laos annually, although most of their aid was directed toward the cultural and education field. Nevertheless, the French continued to maintain a small French Military Mission also. The United Kingdom (which was Co-Chairman of the Geneva Convention along with the Soviet Union) also maintained a small aid program for Laos. Other nations, notably West Germany and Japan, financed non-military internal improvements, such as on waterways. Assistance from Thai and South Vietnamese neighbors was viewed with mixed emotions by most Laotians because of the territorial imperialism demonstrated by these nations in the past. The Royal Laotian Government continued to appreciate Thai assistance, but at the same time remained wary of Thai involvement. The common NVA threat, nevertheless, resulted in the development of closer cooperation in the interest of mutual security. Thailand provided some third-country training to the Laotian Armed Forces, and countenanced the large-scale American presence on Thai Air Force Bases at which Laotians were being

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trained. Insofar as the Vietnamese were concerned, the Lao were not comfortable with Vietnamese of any political persuasion, but relations with the South Vietnamese appeared cordial. Since the ouster of Prince Sihanouk in Cambodia (in March 1970), relations between the Phouma Government and Cambodia seemed to improve.^{175/}

President Nixon's Key Biscayne Statement on Laos

Renewed Congressional inquiry into the U.S. role in Southeast Asia caused President Nixon to recapitulate the involvement in Laos, and to state his policy in the matter. The Presidential statement came on 6 March 1970 from the Key Biscayne White House. The President began by calling upon the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to restore the terms of the 1962 Geneva Accords in Laos. He cited the flagrant violation of the Accords by the presence of 67,000 North Vietnamese troops within the country, and commented that "the indigenous Laotian Communists, the Pathet Lao, are playing an insignificant role."^{176/} He went on to say that both the USSR and North Vietnam had originally sanctioned the Phouma Government, but that NVN was now seeking to destroy it. His distinction between U.S. aid to Laos and the North Vietnamese aid to the Pathet Lao rested on his knowledge that the North Vietnamese^{177/}

...are not advisers or technicians or attaches. They are line units of the North Vietnamese Army conducting open aggression against a neighbor that poses no threat to Hanoi.... In addition, since 1964, over 500,000 North Vietnamese troops have crossed the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos to invade South Vietnam. This infiltration route provides the great bulk of men and supplies for the war in South Vietnam....

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Mr. Nixon pointed to the swift U.S. compliance with the Accords in 1962 when 666 Americans withdrew from Laos, while only some 40 NVA troops passed through the ICC checkpoint. The President cited the continuing invasion of Laos by NVA troops, and noted that President Kennedy had ordered 5,000 U.S. Marines to Thailand as a precautionary move in May 1962 as "the invasion of Laos continued." The withdrawal of the Pathet Lao from the Tripartite government in April, 1963, led to a full-scale resumption of the fighting, which in turn increased U.S. interest in and U.S. aid to Laos. The President said: "Souvanna has called upon three American administrations to assist his government in preserving Laotian neutrality and integrity."^{178/} He also noted that increased U.S. aid to Laos, in the form of supplies and munitions, was in line with the 1962 Accords under the provision that the Laotian Government was permitted to seek help in its self-defense;^{179/} and it was the government of Souvanna Phouma which the U.S. recognized as the legitimate government of Laos, and which the U.S. would support. The President pointed out that:^{180/}

...in May 1964, as North Vietnamese presence increased, the United States, at Royal Lao Government request, began flying certain interdiction missions against the invaders who were violating Lao neutrality...thus when this administration came into office we faced a chronically serious situation in Laos. There had been six years of seasonal communist attacks, and growing U.S. involvement at the request of the Royal Laotian Government. The North Vietnamese had steadily increased their infiltration through Laos into South Vietnam, and their troop presence in Laos itself. Any facade of native Pathet Lao independence had been stripped away. In January 1969, we thus

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had a military assistance program reaching back over six years, and air operations dating over four years.

In addition to mentioning U.S. desires to aid the legitimate government of Laos and to protect Thailand's borders, the President offered a most cogent reason for American aid to Laos when he said: ^{181/}

...We are trying above all to save American and allied lives in South Vietnam which are threatened. By the continual infiltration of North Vietnamese troops and supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, Hanoi has infiltrated over 100,000 men through Laos since this administration took office, and over 500,000 all together. Our air strikes have destroyed weapons and supplies over the past four years which would have taken thousands of American lives...We are also supporting the independence and neutrality of Laos as set forth in the 1962 Geneva Agreements. Our assistance has always been at the request of the legitimate government of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma which the North Vietnamese helped establish...

The President would not divulge details of U.S. aid to Laos, but made the following declarations: ^{182/}

- the United States has no ground forces in Laos.
- no American stationed in Laos has ever been killed in ground combat operations.
- the U.S. flies reconnaissance and combat support missions for Lao forces when requested by the Royal Laotian Government. Interdiction of enemy materiel occurs over areas held or contested by Communist forces, and such flights occur only when requested by the RLG. The level of air response and U.S. aid has increased only as the number of NVA troops in Laos and their level of aggression has increased.

In response to inquiries about the number of U.S. personnel in Laos the President stated: ^{183/}

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The total number of Americans directly employed by the U.S. Government in Laos is 616. In addition, there are 424 Americans employed on contract to the government or to government contractors. Of these 1040 Americans, the total number, military and civilian, engaged in a military advisory role or military training capacity numbers 320. Logistics personnel number 323.

Although the President had made his policy clear, a skeptical and aroused Congress was to take a close look at expenditures in support of Southeast Asia MA Programs. DEPC and the RLAF were to experience tightened fiscal controls and restraints very early in the new year.

MAP/MASF Aid to the RLAF - 1970

New budget constraints and financial difficulties ushered in the New Year. Requisitioning had virtually ceased during the first calendar quarter of 1970, due to non-receipt of the total funding of the FY 70 Dollar Line Program Requirements. Continuing Resolution Authority (CRA) was requested to sustain day-to-day requirements, but was granted for only \$500,000 - with the stipulation that it be used to cover only aircraft spares. (In actuality, the amount was sufficient for only 30 days of aircraft spares.) Fortunately, total funding of all MASF Laos Dollar Lines was received during the second calendar quarter (the last fiscal quarter) of 1970, and normal requisitioning was resumed.^{184/}

The renewed Congressional interest in military assistance to Southeast Asia, however, caused CINCPAC to more carefully administer the aid to Laos. Stressing CSAF's concern that anticipated tightening of budgetary constraints (with their attendant, tighter management controls) dictated that increased attention be paid to the MAP/MASF Flying Hour

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Program, CINCPAC imposed tighter controls over that program. To accomplish this, CINCPAC now required a quarterly report (based on the previous four quarters' experience) which either confirmed or recommended changes to the currently authorized flying hours. DEPCH investigation had shown that most quarters had actually been underflown, and DCH-AF took action to adjust the CINCPAC Flying Hour Authorization. Thus, they would give a more realistic comparison of program requirements versus actual experience in the future. DCH-AF warned that he would "be extremely hard-pressed to predict our flying requirements any closer than a 10 percent deviation, due to the fact that our actual flying requirements are directly predicated on enemy activity."^{185/}

The continuing acceleration of enemy offensive activity caused the total FY 71 Air Force MASF program to be set at \$132.3 million, of which \$59.5 million was placed in Shortfall.* Most of this amount was for ammunition, but aircraft and aircraft-support Shortfall was also significant. The FY 70 ceiling had to be raised from \$96 million to \$123.4 million in March of 1970 to fund additional aircraft, a rapidly rising combat sortie rate, high equipment attrition rates, and increased ammunition expenditure. By October 1970, DEPCH had received the programmed CRA funding for the FY 71 Dollar Lines, and had requested and received some additional CRA funding to support additional UH-34 helicopters and an increased AC-47 sortie rate. DEPCH's desired MASF ceiling increases

*Shortfall - the deficit amount by which the estimated budget fell short of providing all necessary materials and services.

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were subjected to close scrutiny by CINCPAC, and the FY 72 Air Force MASF program was approved at a slightly lower level, as follows:^{186/}

(In millions of dollars)

<u>Category</u>	<u>Approved</u>	<u>Shortfall</u>	<u>Total</u>
Materiel/ Services	39.5	1.8	41.3
Ammunition	33.2	38.8	72.0
Training	<u>.6</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>.6</u>
TOTAL	73.3	40.6	113.9

In order to reduce the ceiling increases as much as possible, DEPCH began to recompute munitions requirements. In December 1970, at the OGDEN Mission Support for SEA meeting, the MASF Laos ammunition requirements were reset at 2500 sorties per month for CY 71, vice 3000. By early 1971, DEPCH warned that the FY 71 funds were rapidly being depleted by the increasing combat activity, and that the programmed FY 72 funds might be insufficient. A further reduction in ammunition costs resulted from a re-evaluation of the average ammunition required per sortie. RLAf pilots were often known to expend ammunition merely to collect the brass from the shell/bullet casings. These they sold on the market to provide themselves, their commander, or their unit with extra cash. In January 71, AIRA provided CSAF more realistic sortie rate requirements for CY 71 and CY 72; the emphasis had shifted from arbitrary sortie rates toward actual mission requirements, increased mission control (with greater utilization of FACs) and more accurate Bomb Damage Assessment (BDA). The improvement was attributed by DCH-AF to "AIRA's analysis of requirements, his personal influence with the FAR/RLAF and the guidance

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he has provided."^{187/}

Increased combat activity brought about a requirement for an additional operating location and resulted in greater losses and damage. Muong Soui was again added to the existing six bases in the spring of 1970. (It had been used during the first half of 1969.) Later, when it fell, temporary sites were used.

IRANs and drop-in maintenance on RLAF C/AC-47 aircraft continued to be performed by Thai-Am in Bangkok under a DEPCH contract. (DCH-AF reported that the Mobile Maintenance Team had not been used during the first quarter of CY 70.)^{188/} To preclude excessive down time on the AC-47s, some maintenance was also performed by Continental Air Service at Vientiane.^{189/}

Enlargement of the T-28 inventory to 77 (with a UE of 86) by early 1970 brought increased maintenance requirements as well as increased battle damage problems. The Air America facility at Udorn performed major crash battle damage repair as well as IRAN and Phase Inspections - all of which were beyond Det. 1's capability.^{190/}

The installation of the single and dual T-28 egress systems continued, although DEPCH continued to support the AmEmb Vientiane position of an all-dual-equipped fleet. SEAOR funding for the additional egress system was approved by 7AF and forwarded to CSAF for approval and funding.^{191/} Fortunately, seven additional T-28D aircraft programmed as attrition replacements under the USAF FY 70 MASF Program came with Yankee Ejection Systems installed. These aircraft, which came from USAF excess, were reconditioned prior to delivery.^{192/}

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Delivery to Laos of at least some of fifty T-28B aircraft from U.S. Navy resources was also planned. These aircraft were first to be modified to the T-28D-5 configuration, and Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC) placed a freeze on all T-28D materials in order to support the conversion schedule. The first of an initial shipment of seven aircraft was to be in-country not later than December 1970.^{193/}

Other aircraft transactions involved four O-1 aircraft received from the 504th TASG at the very end of 1969. DCH-AF stated that the aircraft were "in a deplorable condition. [They] could not be utilized to support the Raven FAC program until an IRAN was performed...by Air America."^{194/} The four aircraft were placed in service during the fourth quarter of FY 70. Four additional O-1 aircraft were programmed as attrition replacements for Laos under the FY 70 USAF MASF Program. These aircraft were excess to PACAF requirements and were furnished at no cost to the MASF Program. They were scheduled for delivery in "as-is" condition by the end of September 1970.^{195/}

Three AC-47s, equipped with the MXU-470A weapon system, were received at no cost from USAF excess in June of 1970.^{196/} The recently-acquired RLAF AC-47 capability continued to be in demand by all Lao military region commanders. C-47 MTT training at Det. 1 continued to prepare pilots and maintenance personnel to meet the increased demands. The third C-47 class graduated at Udorn on 6 March 1970, and the fourth class started in May. Unfortunately, the DEPCH request for a permanent C-47 MTT was disapproved; however, TDY augmentation continued to be approved. Subsequently, the fourth class graduated on 2 October 1970,

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and the fifth on 7 January 1971. By January 1971 the C-47 MTT consisted of only six USAF personnel, a reduction of 15 since its inception in February 1968. Training was now conducted by an all-Lao faculty, with USAF personnel providing management guidance and quality control, standardization, and evaluation.

A total of ten AC-47 aircraft were in the MAP inventory and were all operational as of January 1971.* The maintenance picture for these aircraft and associated equipment was generally favorable. IRAN and Phase Inspections continued to be performed by Thai-Am in Bangkok, but on a more limited basis. All AC-47 and approximately one-third of the C-47 phase inspections were now accomplished in-country, and plans called for a full capability by the end of CY 1971, with Thai-Am then acting only as a quality control agency. All MXU-470 gun repair was transferred from the Thai-Am contractor to an in-country location on 15 December 1970.^{197/}

Other aircraft actions involved the U-10 and T-41. The three U-10 aircraft used by MASF Laos as interim substitutes for O-1/U-17 aircraft were transferred to MAP Thailand, and all MASF Laos UH-34G helicopters were converted to "D" models by June 1970.^{198/} The only other significant aircraft program for CY 1970 was the funding under the MASF FY 71 Program of six T-41D aircraft. These aircraft had to be produced in CONUS, and were slated for delivery in-country by the close of FY 71. This marked the introduction of this type of aircraft into the RLAF inventory.^{199/}

*The flying hour authorization per month for the C-47 aircraft was established at 35 hours, that for the AC-47s at 65 hours.

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An interesting development pertaining to aircraft and MAP/MASF support took place in the first quarter of FY 71. A Khmer MAP supply account (DCAP) was established under the DCH Air Force Liaison Officer at Udorn RTAFB for follow-on spares support for T-28 aircraft assigned to the Khmer Republic. A bi-weekly Khmer Air Force (KAF) C-47 resupply shuttle was implemented between Udorn and Phnom Penh to transport the needed parts. By the second quarter of FY 71 four KAF T-28 (Project Peace Chess) IRANs had also been completed by Air America at Udorn. Although the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC), with offices at Tan Son Nhut and Phnom Penh, continued to perform most of the MAP aid to the Khmer Republic, DEPCH was involved in the servicing of KAF T-28s.^{200/}

The increased aircraft UE necessitated a consolidation of the Udorn T-28 Supply Account (DLAR) with the Air America Supply Account (DLAP), and this was accomplished by January 1971. DCH-AFLO initiated a program to mechanize the merged DLAP account, but after a preliminary study a CINCPACAF team recommended retention of the manual system.^{201/}

In the personnel area, by 1 July 1970 Det. 1's fifty-man TDY Depot Maintenance Assistance Team and eight-man T-28 Ejection Team were replaced when USAF pipeline personnel, newly added to Det. 1's and the 432nd Combat Support Group's Unit Detail Listing (UDL), arrived on a one-year PCS assignment.^{202/}

A UDL* for the RLAF was also drawn up by a CINCPAC manpower representative, but it did not include the Neutralist and Meo personnel since they were not paid or promoted by the RLAF. This revised UDL,

*The UDL was at that time known as the Unit Manning Document (UMD).

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which identified 238 officers and 1595 enlisted personnel, was awaiting approval in January 1971. A machine-run listing of RLAF personnel had also been accomplished; it identified individuals by name, rank, serial number, AFSC, and schools attended. DCH-AF asserted that "this management tool has eliminated the 'professional' school attendee, and has provided an instrument for personnel selection and assignment."^{203/}

Training, in Thailand, CONUS, and Laos, continued to present problems. Several courses during the first and second quarters of FY 71 had to be cancelled because of insufficient numbers of qualified students. To alleviate this problem, the new AIRA released some selected, well-educated FAR officers for input into T-28 pilot training. With this breakthrough, training plans called for an 80 pilot/year production to attain the authorized strength of 129 combat-ready pilots. One of the immediate consequences of this action was the cancellation of the volunteer Thai "Firefly" T-28 pilot augmentation program on 5 October 1970.^{204/} For the long term, it was also hoped that the infusion of the FAR officers into the RLAF would improve command and management.

In June 1970 the Journal of Military Assistance candidly assessed the RLAF and the MASF Program supporting it, stating:^{205/}

The...RLAF is comprised of four composite squadrons, all of which are assessed a C-1 combat capability rating. The ability of these units to perform their mission is, however, completely dependent upon the assistance provided by the U.S. either directly or indirectly, and if this materiel and personnel aid were to be terminated, the units would soon become non-operational. With this U.S. support, the RLAF has one of the highest sortie rates of any free world Air Force; U.S.

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observers report that the dedication and valor of the fighter pilots approaches the unbelievable, with some having flown more than 1,000 actual combat missions.. The only element that provides flying support to the RLAF is a pool of twenty Thai pilots who, on a daily basis, obtain T-28s from a USAF Detachment at Udorn and fly to Vientiane where the aircraft are loaded with ordnance, and targets are assigned by the Lao Military Region Commander... In summary, if Laos were faced with only minor insurgency, the RLAF could assume responsibility...but [it] obviously cannot cope with the current massive aggression by North Vietnamese forces, and must continue to receive USAF support to contain the enemy...

The increased mission requirements called not only for additional aircraft and training, but also for either the expansion and modernization of existing facilities or the creation of new OLs and Forward Operating Locations (FOLs). The DEPOCH program included:^{206/}

Vientiane/Wattay - the main airfield in Laos, and adequate for sustained operations. The airport was equipped with an Air Operations Center (AOC) supporting air operations staged out of Vientiane, a Joint Operations Center (JOC) to coordinate RLAF/FAR operations, and a Combined Operations Center (COC) to coordinate all air activity in Laos. Modernization programs included additional maintenance facilities, a parking apron and protective aircraft revetments.

Ban Houei Sai - capable of handling only limited air operations. A temporary AOC is established during periods of sustained operations. Runway useful only during daylight and good weather. An all-weather capability was programmed.

Savannakhet - site of the major RLAF maintenance facility and an AOC. Resurfacing of the runway became the priority item.

Luang Prabang - the main T-28 base in MR I. It is equipped with an AOC. Very vulnerable to

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enemy attacks because of its location. Repair of aircraft revetments, improvement of the parking ramp, runway rehabilitation and hangar construction were immediate priorities.

Pakse - the main RLAF base for operations in southern Laos. Equipped with an AOC. The base also served commercial air operations. Taxiway and runway rehabilitation were priority items.

There seemed to be some confusion regarding the MAP Laos aircraft UEs, and DCH-AF presented the following FY 71 authorized UE: ^{207/}

<u>Aircraft</u>	<u>FY 71</u>
RT-28	5
T-28 Tactical	69
T-28 Training	12
AC-47	8
C-47	16
O-1/U-17 FAC	18
O-1/U-17 Utility	7
O-1/U-17 Training	6
UH-34 RLAF	16
UH-34 Air America	27

The status of the RLAF, and the MAP/MASF effort needed to support it, was reflected in the following 31 December 1970 Aircraft Inventory and Utilization Report: ^{208/}

<u>Item Description</u>	<u>Total Quantity Programmed MAP/MASF</u>	<u>Quantity Received To 31 Dec</u>	<u>Total Active 31 Dec*</u>	<u>Total Hours Flown 2nd Qtr FY 71**</u>
AC/C-47A/D***	53	53	34	3,163
T-28B/C/D****	230	196	63	7,270
O-1A/E/F*****	45	42	25	4,800
U-6A	3	3	1	82
U-17A/B*****	18	13	6	1,014
UH-34D*****	92	77	47	12,175
U-4	1	1	1	40
T-41	6	0	0	0

*Attrited aircraft deducted from total quantity received.

**Estimated for in-country operations since RLAF had no established accounting system.

***AC-47 hours RLAF: 1174; C-47 hours RLAF: 1989

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****T-28 FAC hours: 538 Other: 6732

*****O-1 FAC hours: 4514; O-1 RLAF hours: 286

*****U-17 FAC hours: 796; U-17 RLAF hours: 218

***** 17 UH-34s controlled and operated by RLAF. Hours flown: 2724;
30 UH-34Ds DOD controlled, flown by Air America. Hours flown: 9451

(For details of the FY 70 MAP/MASF see p. 168.)

Organizational Changes for DEPCH

A CINCPAC-directed Manpower Study of DEPCH was performed during the latter part of 1970.* Several interesting recommendations, later to be directive in nature, came out of the study. Of particular consequence to the USAF portion of DEPCH was the recommended deletion of the Air Force Division in a functional realignment of the whole DEPCH organizational structure. A recommended, sizeable reduction in the DEPCH UDL (from 272 military and civilians to 215 military and civilians) was to come partially out of previously authorized Air Force slots.^{209/} The DCH-AF reacted to the proposed change by reporting:^{210/}

The CINCPAC Manpower Team recommended JMP for DEPCH deletes the Air Force Division and realigns the organization along functional lines. The recommended reorganization is workable; however, deletion and downgrading of key USAF manpower positions (Udorn O-5/0046 to O-4/4416 etc...) is deemed untenable. These changes were recommended despite our reclama.... Additional reclama will be undertaken in an attempt to retain materiel expertise essential to successful mission accomplishment.

*The study was authorized at the end of 1968.

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Subsequent manpower realignments, while affecting the total number of personnel assigned, did not appreciably alter the effectiveness of DEPCH. This remained true until the move of DEPCH from Bangkok to Udorn, but this will be discussed in the next chapter.

Under the Air Force Division concept, DCH-AF's duties were described thus:^{211/}

1. Advises and makes recommendations to the DEPCH and the RLAF on all matters pertaining to policy on organization, equipping, training, and employment of all Air Force assets pertaining to the host country MAP.
2. Commands Det. 9, 1131st Special Activities Squadron (SAS).
3. Provides staff surveillance of all maintenance, operations and training functions at Udorn (Det. 1, 56 SOW/Air America). This function was performed by the Air Force Liaison Detachment at Udorn (3 officers, 8 enlisted men).
4. Performs all other Air Force Division logistical and operations functions necessary to support the mission of DEPCH.
5. Monitors RLAF maintenance support and daily flying activity.

Summarizing his role, one DCH-AF stated:^{212/}

...we feel that the Air Force Division should remain intact in order to accomplish the many Air Force peculiar requirements and to preclude the necessity of maintaining an almost continuous Ad Hoc type committee for resolution of Air Force requirements. We also feel that any reorganization which would eliminate the Air Force Division would not save manpower but would, in all probability, require additional personnel in the accomplishment of Air Force requirements, many of which are unique to a Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG).

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The elimination of the Air Force Division, the manpower cuts, and the recommended organizational changes were but a few of the items covered in the detailed CINCPAC study. More important than these specific recommended changes were some of the "considerations" gathered by the CINCPAC team through interviews, a review of the Terms of Reference (TOR), operational audits, and work samplings. These "considerations" would lead to far-reaching changes in the TOR and in the location and direction of the DEPCH organization in 1971. Among the many "considerations" indicative of a need for change were:213/

1. ...DEPCH is not a MAAG in the traditional sense. Since DEPCH has little or no advisory role and cannot perform end-item usage assurance, it acts as a jobber or middle man to a great extent. DEPCH processes the requirements established by RO/USAID into a Military Assistance Program (MAP), requisitions accordingly, and once the material arrives in Thailand, manages its transportation so requirements are filled by contractual arrangements.
2. ...Integrating all aviation training into a single composite unit at Udorn should improve the quality of flying and leadership training...

The CINCPAC study concluded by stating:214/

Considering that the above constraints result in a severely fragmented MAP operation, and the added unusual and "sometimes bureaucratic" constraints imposed, DEPCH appears on balance to be effectively managed on all levels.


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DEPCH PRIOR TO DELETION OF THE AIR FORCE DIVISION



Assigned strength of DEPCH as of 12 Feb 71 included 28 Army Officers, 10 Air Force Officers; 48 Army Enlisted Men, 25 Air Force Enlisted Men; 5 U.S. Civilians, and 174 Local Workers. The 5 Civilians and 174 Local Workers were paid by the Navy. Total DEPCH assigned strength was 290.

* headed the Air Force Division (O-6)

** located at Udorn RTAFB

SOURCE: DEPCH JOINT MANPOWER PROGRAM, 1 JULY 1970 ; CINCPAC PEG REPORT 13 May 1971.

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FIGURE 6

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CHAPTER V

REVISION AND RESPONSE 1971-1972

Political and Military Events - 1971

The following characterization of the war in Laos came from an intelligence expert with more than five years experience in South-east Asia - a man who had flown in Vietnam, been a FAC in Laos, worked on the AIRA staff in Vientiane and, at the time of these observations, was serving on the HQ 7/13AF Intelligence staff. ^{215/}

Well, I think that the situation in both 1971 and up to the present time has not appreciably changed from what it has been over the last ten years . . . that during the dry season the enemy goes on the offensive and takes vast amounts of terrain, and in the wet season the friendlies go on the offensive and try to take back as much as they can, but never quite succeeding. And each year the enemy takes a little bit more, and we retake a little bit less. . . .

There is little to add to this evaluation, except to note that the PL/NVA made further inroads into Laos in 1971 than at any previous time. Normally, during the wet season, government troops attempt to drive the PL/NVA from the PDJ and other areas taken from government control during the dry season. In 1971, the absence of the expected rains during the wet season gave the enemy additional time to entrench in the areas it held and denied the FAR/FAN and irregular forces the logistics advantage they had enjoyed during previous years. The unusually dry "wet season" allowed the enemy to bring in additional supplies along its LOCs, particularly the route from North Vietnam through Sam Neua Province. As a result,

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the enemy was not forced, as he had been in past years, to retreat due to lack of supplies. Consequently, at the end of 1971 the PL/NVA held more territory in northern (Barrel Roll) and southern (Steel Tiger) Laos than at any time prior to the 1962 cease-fire.

During 1971 a combat readiness evaluation of the 63 FAR/FAN battalions in the five Lao Military Regions showed marginal capability. Conducted by U.S. Army Field Representatives, the evaluation examined such factors as overall strength, leadership, officer/NCO strength, organization, combat equipment, tactical proficiency, and training. As a result of this evaluation, nineteen FAR/FAN battalions rated combat ready, eighteen were regarded as marginally combat ready, and twenty-six were graded as not combat ready.* The most frequent causes for the "non-combat ready" status findings were poor leadership or undermanning. A certain amount of subjectivity pervaded the ratings, perhaps, since each evaluation was based on the field observation of units by a single U.S. officer covering a large geographical area.^{216/}

A U.S. Navy evaluation of the Lao River Flotilla (LRF), a part of the FAR, was more positive. Basically, the team concluded that the LRF was adequate for the function it had to fulfill - that of patrolling the Mekong River and other waterways to interdict enemy supplies. While the Navy team recommended the addition of four small

*By April 1971 there were also some 12 battalions of U.S.-funded Thai "volunteers" (Project LGC) in Laos. They were supplied through DEPCH and RO/USAID channels, but were controlled principally by CAS.

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river craft to the LRF's inventory, it rejected any plans for adding sophisticated equipment.^{217/}

The overall political situation remained as it had been in previous years.

MAP/MASF Aid to the RLAF - 1971

The RLAF continued to be the great success story of U.S. MAP/MASF aid to Laos, but increased activity and the hardened enemy stance encountered during 1971 required that more attention be given to combat aircraft. Additional deliveries to replace aircraft lost during the intensified combat operations became a primary goal for DEPCH. The RTAF loaned ten T-28s as immediate attrition replacements. Of these aircraft, eight were routed to Det. 1 and two to the Air America facility (both on Udorn RTAFB) for extensive maintenance after the acceptance inspections revealed the poor condition of the aircraft. The average repair cost per borrowed RTAF aircraft turned out to be \$12,900, a figure which did not include four engine changes. The RTAF aircraft were badly needed, however, to replace the eleven RLAF T-28s lost during the third quarter of FY 1971.^{218/}

"Project Peace Prop" was instituted to produce the T-28-D-10 aircraft required to meet U.S. SEA commitments. Laos was scheduled to receive seven T-28s under the FY 70 MASF program, and thirty-six under the FY 71 program. An add-on to Project Peace Prop expanded from fifty to seventy-two the number of T-28s being produced. These Peace Prop aircraft were refurbished at a Fairchild Hiller facility

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in St. Augustine, Florida.^{219/} Two of the promised T-28-D-10 Peace Prop aircraft arrived at Udorn in late June 1971, but they were an inadequate replacement for the six T-28s lost during the last quarter of FY 71. As FY 71 ended, the MASF Laos T-28 inventory stood at 59 aircraft.^{220/}

Due to further combat losses and the repayment of T-28s to the RTAF, the net growth of the RLAF was disappointing during the latter half of CY 71: only 72 T-28s were active by December, 1971.^{221/} However, nine additional MASF Laos Peace Props were allocated for delivery in April 1972 and January 1973.^{222/}


The O-1F status changed significantly in January 1971, when USAF concurred with CINCPAC's recommendation to provide seventeen O-1Fs from USAF assets in exchange for twelve RLAF O-1E/Gs to be transferred to the VNAF. Sixteen of the seventeen aircraft had been transferred to MAP Laos by April. (The seventeenth had crashed en route.) Further complicating the exchanges were five O-1As which were transferred from the RLAF to the RTAF. By this time, however, the RLAF had O-1A, O-1D, and O-1F aircraft; consequently, DEPCH requested an AFR 57-1 Class V Combat Required Operational Capability (ROC) to modify all RLAF O-1A and O-1D* aircraft to the O-1F configuration. In a message from the DEPCH to 7AF, the rationale for the request was stated:^{223/}

*Nine O-1As and seven O-1Ds. Seventeen O-1Fs were on-hand. The seven O-1Ds had been drawn from U.S. Army excess in CONUS, and were delivered during early FY 72.

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0-1 FAC Aircraft Over Laos

FIGURE 87

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...a mixed fleet of O-1A, O-1D and O-1F models will be unsatisfactory and difficult to support ...a standard fleet will best serve U.S./Laos interests, i.e., simplified spare parts support, pilot training, maintenance training and aircraft maintenance support. This program will allow the RLAF to much more rapidly assume a greater role for support, operations and maintenance...the modification will be accomplished by Air Am under existing contract. Total cost including materiel will be funded by Laos MASF program.

In addition to the requested Combat ROC modification of the O-1 aircraft to the O-1F model, all existing U-17A aircraft on the MASF Laos UE had been converted to U-17B models by October 1971. The five additional aircraft scheduled for delivery during FY 72 would all be U-17B models with standardized engine/instrumentation packages.^{224/}

Several interesting developments occurred during 1971 with regard to the RLAF C/AC-47 capability. The DEPCH contract with Thai-Am for C-47 IRAN and Phase Inspections was reduced by some \$200,000 (from the FY 71 contract of \$374,500) as the RLAF continued to increase its maintenance capability by accomplishing all AC-47 Phase Inspections in-country.^{225/} In his January 1972 report, the Assistant Deputy Chief (who was the senior Air Force representative on the DEPCH staff under a reorganized internal staff structure which had eliminated the old Air Force Division) proudly reported that:^{226/}

A significant milestone in training efforts occurred in December 1971 when the C/AC-47 MTT at Udorn was terminated. Future training efforts will be conducted in-country at Savannakhet by an all-Lao (RLAF) instructor cadre, which has been qualified by MTT.

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A new chapter in the RLAF C-47 capability opened in mid-1971 with the introduction of UC-47 flareships to the RLAF inventory. The requirement had been established for eight flareship aircraft, and by July one aircraft was in operation, with several additional aircraft modified and crewed by January 1972. ^{227/}

Ambassador Godley, following a review of the C-47 role, requested DEPCH to obtain authorization to raise the C-47 UE from sixteen to twenty. The Ambassador cited the new in-country C-47 training and the flareship capability as justification for the additional aircraft. On the latter point, he emphasized that aircraft: ^{228/}

currently assigned to RLAF cannot be made available or drawn upon due to priority missions in direct support of the conflict. Four C-47 aircraft within the existing cargo fleet have been configured for flare ship utilization and redesignated UC-47 "Starlight" aircraft. To develop this vital combat capability within RLAF for support of night illumination requirements over Laos it was necessary to restrict the use of these aircraft to flare-drop use only. While dual utilization is possible at some time in the future, the initial training and introduction phase will require total commitment of these aircraft to the Starlight mission.

An increasing workload also affected the RLAF/Air America UH-34D helicopter force which experienced an upsurge in use due to intensified combat. By January 1972, there were 54 UH-34Ds in the MASF Laos inventory. Thirty-eight of these helicopters were operational, with 17 being used by the RLAF in-country (one by the UH-34D MTT at Udorn) and 21 by Air America under contract. The remaining 16 were in storage as attrition replacements. ^{229/} UH-1D helicopters, in both medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and gunship (SLICK)

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versions, temporarily entered RLAF service with the primary aim of supporting the Thai volunteer battalions. Part and parcel of Thai Government acquiescence to the volunteer project was the American promise of fast evacuation of wounded Thai volunteer personnel. While the Secretary of Defense had directed the loan of the UH-1Ds to the RLAF, he was equally firm in directing their return from the RLAF on 1 June. 230/

Other aircraft activity involving third-country nationals centered around the continued DEPCH aid to the Khmer Air Force. As previously mentioned, Project "Peace Chess" IRANs, CBD repairs, and Phase Inspections for KAF C-47s and T-28s were performed either by Thai-Am or Air America under existing contracts with DEPCH. Several KAF aircraft that had completed repairs were then fitted with gun pods, bomb racks, and armament systems by armament personnel at Det. 1, 56 SOW, Udorn RTAFB. T-28 pilot and maintenance training for the KAF was also occasionally provided by Det. 1. 231/

Rounding out DEPCH aircraft transactions in 1971 were the deliveries of the programmed T-41s. Two of these aircraft arrived at Udorn on 15 and 20 March 1971, respectively, with the final four arriving at Udorn on 26 June. These aircraft were to be used at Savannakhet for pilot training, thereby releasing four O-1s for FAC missions. 232/

Although the RLAF was providing much of its own training at this juncture, the increased combat conditions during 1971 made it difficult for the RLAF to support the third-country and CONUS training effort. The RLAF simply could not spare the people from its

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limited resources to attend schools. However, the training at Udorn and in CONUS continued to the extent possible under the unfavorable tactical situation. Commenting on the situation, the Assistant Deputy Chief said:^{233/}

While the RLAF is still a long way from self-sufficiency in conducting their own training in-country, they have contributed increasingly to the USAF effort at Udorn. At the present time there are four T-28 IPs, two UH-34 IPs, four AC-47 IPs, two UH-34 enlisted instructors, and sixteen C-47 enlisted instructors. We have programmed seven T-28 enlisted instructors in the FY 72 program...The Udorn training facility ...will continue to develop a viable RLAF cadre with emphasis on middle management personnel capable of sustaining greater in-country self-sufficiency as the tactical situation becomes more permissive.

Although the RLAF personnel survey and the establishment of a UDL had eliminated some of the perennial students from the training program, criteria for selection to attend training remained, at best, flexible. As the Assistant Deputy Chief put it:^{234/}

No feasible formal aptitude test or proficiency test is available for use in student selection by the RLAF. Selections are based primarily on the potential shown during basic training, matching of education, experience, background, etc., an oral examination and recommendations of commanders. The Air Attache and the Requirements Office USAID do have considerable influence in selection of students for flight training and some of the more advanced courses. Undoubtedly, a few selections are made based on family and/or political connections.

In praising the new computerized UDL, he went on to say:

Introduction of automatic data processing has appreciably reduced the malassignment of personnel in the Royal Lao Air Force. All

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personnel identified as having been school trained, either in CONUS or Third-Country, have a punch card. The resulting machine run enabled quick identification of those persons not assigned in the fields for which they have been trained. It also resulted in a reduced number of training spaces requested in CONUS.

Due to the inability of the Royal Lao Government to pay for a training program, the primary source of training funds was from the U.S. MASF program. As U.S. funds became harder to obtain because of Congressional limitations, several abuses of the MASF monies came to a halt. Chief among these was the payment of "ghost soldiers" in the FAR. A comprehensive personnel strength survey of the FAR (including the RLAF) in 1971 resulted in the removal of over 3000 "ghost soldiers" from the payroll. These "ghosts" were either fictitious or deceased personnel for whom someone in the FAR collected pay.^{235/}

The in-country training programs were strengthened and enhanced by an increased emphasis on English language training at the Vientiane and Savannakhet schools. Savannakhet also boasted the new T-41 preliminary pilot training program begun in April 1971. Within three months, six T-41 Instructor Pilots and twenty pilot trainees had successfully completed the course. An RLAF O-1 FAC training program began in-country on 1 December 1971, and the C-47 MTT at Udorn was terminated that same month when C-47 training moved to Savannakhet. Planning continued toward the goal of moving the UH-34 training in-country in FY 73. Det. 1, with DEPCH approval, submitted a plan

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through Air Force channels for creating a replacement training unit at Udorn. The unit would be Lao manned and managed under the supervision of highly-trained maintenance, operations, and training advisors. DEPOCH had submitted the same plan to the Ambassador in Vientiane through AIRA, and awaited the outcome of their evaluation at year's end.^{236/}

Naturally, these force preparations - from acquisition of new aircraft to RLAF training - were all indicative of the increased combat activity in 1971.* Between July 1970 and December 1971, T-28 sorties doubled and AC-47 missions more than tripled.^{237/}

Increased combat sorties meant increased expenditures for munitions. Consequently, the FY 72 Air Force Program, originally programmed at \$78.5 million, rose to \$110.8 million with the addition of \$29.9 million shortfall for increased munitions requirements and \$2.4 million shortfall for materiel and services.^{238/} Also as a result of increased sortie levels, more extensive facilities were required; thus, many facilities were upgraded or completed. For example, the parking apron, cantonment area, and ammunition area were completed at Luang Prabang. At Pakse, the C-47 parking area was completed, and the runway, apron, and hangar repair program was 62 percent completed. At Savannakhet, a major design project was under way. It included such diverse structures as flight crew

*At that time, total government force levels were about 60,000 men while enemy forces totaled almost 97,000. For a breakdown of these figures see p. 173.

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facilities, a control tower, and a revetted ammunition storage area. Finally, at Wattay/Vientiane, the dispensary and security towers were completed.^{239/} Perhaps the greatest improvement at Wattay was the installation of a TRN-17 TACAN set by the 1st Mobile Communications Group (MC Gp) late in May 1971. The TACAN unit, which was on loan from the 1st MC Gp, was first maintained by the 1974 Communications Squadron, but Air America soon assumed the responsibility under a DEPCH/RO contract. Ambassador Godley and the DEPCH desired the unit to have a more permanent status, and USAF approval for a long-term loan came by October.^{240/}

Status of the RLAF, and the MAP/MASF effort needed to support it, was reflected in the following 3 February 1972 Aircraft Inventory and Utilization Report:^{241/}

<u>Item Description</u>	<u>Total Quantity Programmed MAP/MASF</u>	<u>Quantity Received To 3 Feb</u>	<u>Total Active 3 Feb*</u>	<u>Total Hours Flown 2nd Qtr FY 72**</u>
AC-47D	12	12	10	1,503
C-47A/D	41	41	23	1,985
T-28B/C/D	239	242	72	11,245
O-1A/E/F	54	62	17	6,364
U-6A	3	3	1	99
U-17A/B	19	14	6	1,302
UH-34D	92	92	38***	10,899
T-41	6	6	6	1,150
U-4****	1	1	1	300

*Attrited aircraft deducted from total quantity received.

**Estimated for in-country operations, since RLAF has no established accounting system.

***Sixteen UH-34Ds were in non-flyable storage as advanced attrits.

****King's aircraft operated/maintained under USAID contract. MASF-supported through a cost-sharing arrangement.

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Seventeen RT/T-28 aircraft were based at Udorn for training and supporting the RLAF.

Twenty-two UH-34D helicopters were based at Udorn. Twenty-one were operated by Air America in support of MASF Laos, one was used by the UH-34D MTT to train RLAF pilots.

Twenty-three O-1/U-17 aircraft were flown by USAF personnel in support of FAC operations in Laos. One O-1 aircraft was utilized for FAC training at Udorn.

Three C-47 aircraft were utilized prior to December 1971 by the MTT at Udorn RTAFB to upgrade RLAF flight crews and maintenance personnel. Four C-47s were in flyable storage at Thai-Am, Bangkok.

Forty-eight T-28 student pilots and two UH-34 student pilots were undergoing training at Det. 1, Udorn. Eleven RLAF instructor pilots (3 each UH-34; 8 each T-28) were included in this total.

Combat capability rating of the RLAF had to be conditionally applied as follows:

C-1: these units were currently engaged in combat operations, and were therefore considered to be operationally ready. However, the capability of these units to perform their mission was dependent on assistance from correct facilities, third country personnel and U.S. advisory personnel operating in Laos covertly, as well as overtly.

C-4: when considered independent of U.S. and third country financial, personnel and advisory assistance (a condition which did not exist) in keeping with the Geneva Accords of 1962; the units must be considered not operationally ready.

(For details of the FY 71 MAP/MASF see p. 170.)

CINCPAC Report Recommends DEPCCH Revision

"DEPCCH is still taking action to reclama personnel reductions recently made to our FY 72 Joint Manpower Program (JMP). The situation since the last V-12 Report has not changed significantly."^{242/}

Made by the DCH-AF in early 1971, these statements reflected the

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results of the CINCPAC Manpower Survey of November 1970. The Survey recommended an across-the-board reduction of DEPCH personnel, including the elimination of the Air Force Division in Bangkok and the Air Force Liaison Office at Udorn. The duties of the Air Force Division and the AFL0 were to be assumed by a new Plans and Training Division and by the Logistics Division.^{243/} (Figure 8 shows the organizational schematic of military assistance to Laos as recommended by the 1970 CINCPAC manpower study.)

The FY 71 CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group (PEG) Report on the effectiveness of DEPCH was conducted 9-12 February 1971. Its conclusions and recommendations were influenced by previous PEG Reports, the Manpower Survey, and, undoubtedly, by the renewed Congressional interest in Laos. Although critical of some aspects of DEPCH's methods of operations, the report concluded that:^{244/}

DEPCHIEF was considered to be effective. This determination was made despite the fact that DEPCH manpower resources were not being utilized for the full accomplishment of the mission and functional responsibilities delineated in the Term of Reference of DEPCHIEF. Their dedicated efforts to overcome and cope with the peculiar circumstances of a "MAAG in exile," in view of the restrictions imposed by the 1962 Geneva Agreement, were evident and noteworthy.

The MAP was effective. Despite the restrictions imposed by the 1962 Geneva Agreement, the U.S. has prevented the subjugation of Laos and has assisted that nation in maintaining its policy of neutrality. It is possible, however, that U.S. objectives could be met less expensively if planning and programming for, including the management of the utilization and maintenance of, U.S. provided military assets were centralized under the over-all cognizance of a single, senior military representative from the DOD situated in-country.

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The last item, concerning a senior DOD representative, was explained further in the "Recommendations" section of the report:^{245/}

The proposal submitted by COMUSMACTHAI which, among others, provided for an O-7 to act as Defense Attache in-country appeared to be an effective means for improving the management and coordination of the Laos MASF program.

The DEPCH comment to the above was: "Concur." An even stronger DEPCH position was evident later in the PEG Report:^{246/}

...The DEPCHIEF believed that the quality of military advice being given to the U.S. Ambassador, Laos and the Royal Laotian Armed Forces could be improved if all the military competence and resources available to CINCPAC were channeled to the attaches through a senior military advisor, or DEPCHIEF...

It must be recalled that 1971 saw great Congressional interest in the U.S. involvement in Southeast Asia, particularly the monetary expenditures needed to support the Administration's policy. Laos, already scrutinized by the Symington Committee in 1969, received further attention as a result of the Moose-Lowenstein Report in 1971. The final result of the Congressional inquiry into U.S. aid to Laos was the so-called Symington Ceiling of late 1971, which set a dollar limit on aid to Laos. (It will be discussed in a subsequent section of this report.) As a consequence of the renewed Congressional interest, the recommendations made by DEPCH and CINCPAC for improving the cost-effectiveness of MASF aid to Laos received serious consideration at the highest levels of the government. DOD was especially anxious for an effective single-manager to coordinate the diverse elements of the MASF program, particularly since DOD

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


FIGURE 8

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was paying for the steadily increasing aid effort to Laos. Particularly irritating to DOD was that much of the cost overrun could be attributed to the forces managed by the State Department, i.e., the CAS Meo guerrilla forces and Thai volunteers. As one DEPCH programs officer put it: "We are supplying forces over which we have no control. We can influence them only indirectly. Those managed by the State Department we have no influence or control over. Initially, when DOD assumed support for those forces they had carte blanche. Anything they wanted, they got - and DEPCH was the last to find out about it."^{247/}

Several valid criticisms of the DEPCH structure in the 1971 PEG Report pointed out organizational weaknesses which had led to only a limited management of the ever-expanding MASF Laos program. Among the more notable observations made in the report were the following:

DEPCH PLANS AREA - ...the problem which affected the plans area...was partly due to the geographical separation of DEPCHIEF from the Mission he supported; but more particularly, it was attributable to other "built-in" limitations which precluded the exercise of adequate management and control by DEPCHIEF over certain aspects of the MASF program.... Unless positive action were to be taken at the CINCPAC and DOD levels to develop alternatives acceptable to the State Department that would modify existing arrangements affecting the degree of planning and management control to be exercised by DEPCHIEF, prospects for improvement would be illusory. DEPCHIEF...would continue as a rubberstamping middleman and would be precluded from maximum utilization of the expertise on his staff to assist the U.S. Mission in Laos in planning for a realistic military assistance program for Laos.^{248/}

...The military assistance advisory effort, although improved by the augmentation of Project 404, was still inadequate. Additionally, the determination of MASF program requirements has continued to be the purview

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of...RO/USAID and the military attaches in Laos under the direct supervision of the U.S. Ambassador, with only minimal control being exercised by the DEPCHIEF. 249/

DEPCH TRAINING AREA - As in prior evaluations, the major problem which affected the training area was the lack of an effective management agency to coordinate ARMA, AIRA, RO/USAID, DEPCHIEF and FAR/FAN actions in the development of an in-country training plan...250/

...DEPCHIEF, OUSARMA, OUSAIRA and RO/USAID are all independent co-equal agencies that must necessarily achieve results through cooperation without an over-all military coordinator. For as long as this condition exists, unity of effort will be fractionalized and progress will be painfully slow...251/

DEPCH LOGISTICS AREA - ...the flow of munitions and materiel from entry ports in Thailand to Pepper-grinder storage facilities, then onward to transfer points for entry into Laos, was considered to be responsive to RO/USAID requirements...DEPCHIEF's limited influence over logistical activity in Laos precluded adequate surveillance over the use of MAP-furnished equipment. Additionally, because of the current restrictions imposed on DEPCHIEF in-country accessibility, planning for and determination of requirements was ineffective and had resulted in gross changes to the FY 71 program.252/

As a result of a request by CINCPAC, COMUSMACTHAI had provided comments and recommendations relative to the management of the MASF program for Laos, including a proposed reorganization of DEPCHIEF. These comments recognized the need for a single in-country DOD manager, but also provided as an alternative the assignment of the logistical functions to USARSUPTHAI (U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand) and the assignment of the out-of-country training functions to COMUSMACTHAI. Under this proposal DEPCHIEF would remain the plans and programs coordinator, and would act as liaison between the Embassy in Laos and the supporting agencies. Further this proposal called for the relocation of the DEPCHIEF staff at Udorn...253/


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DEPCH ORGANIZATIONAL CHART FY 1972



* As of 12 Feb 71, 27 Officers, 53 Enlisted Personnel and 4 Civilians (U.S.) / 3 Civilians (Locals) were assigned to the ARMA; 8 Officers, 50 Enlisted Personnel and 1 Civilian (U.S.) were assigned to the ARA. This total of 146 assigned 404 personnel rose slightly to 173 by January 1972. The U.S. Navy funded the U.S. civilians and local workers.

SOURCE: DEPCH JOINT MANPOWER PROGRAM (Revised) 1 July 1970; CINCPAC PEG REPORT 13 May 1971; DEPCH BRIEFING January 1972.

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FIGURE 9

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CINCPAC thinking went beyond an eventual move of DEPCH to Udorn RTAFB, since CINCPAC OPLAN 5064 provided for the reintroduction of a MAAG into Laos if requested by the Laotian government. The staff of the U.S. Mission in Laos, however, did not envision implementation of such a plan because, as they saw it,^{254/}

...the NVA/PL objectives in Laos are tied directly to the NVA operations in South Vietnam. Therefore, any settlement in Vietnam would still require the NVA/PL to hold, or at least maintain control and have free access of, the eastern portion of the Lao panhandle. Under these circumstances, the situation would be the same as that which existed at the time of the Geneva Accords in 1962. It was felt that, during the negotiation of a settlement in South Vietnam, the removal of the U.S. elements supporting the Royal Laotian Government Armed Forces, including Air America operations, will be one of the bargaining points. Therefore, any plan which envisions the reintroduction of U.S. advisory elements in Laos was considered to be illusory.

One of the results of the PEG Report was the convening of a committee in Washington D.C. which concluded that DEPCH's effectiveness was at an all-time low. This judgment resulted in the June 1971 meeting of CINCPAC and AmEmb Vientiane personnel in Bangkok to draw up a new charter for DEPCH which would be acceptable to both groups.*^{255/}

A New DEPCH Charter and the Move to Udorn

The conference between CINCPAC and AmEmb Vientiane personnel took place in Bangkok on 24-25 June, 1971, to define a new charter and establish new Terms of Reference for DEPCH. DOD, as the principal U.S. financier of the war in Laos - including the State Department/CAS portion thereof - insisted on better management, coordination, and control of the increasing MASF expenditures. The DOD/CINCPAC

*DEPCH personnel were not included in this meeting.

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position was that (1) DEPCH should be moved from Bangkok to Udorn RTAFB to be closer to the area of his concern, (2) DEPCH should be charged with greater responsibilities, primarily that of military advisor to the American Ambassador to Laos, (3) DEPCH should have a single logistics pipeline for Army-procured materiel and Air Force munitions managed by United States Army Support Command, Thailand (USARSUPTHAI), (4) tour length at Udorn would be one year and unaccompanied (except for 28 key spaces identified as necessary for continuity, which would be two-year accompanied tours), and (5) an O-7 be assigned as DEPCH.^{256/}

AmEmb Vientiane took immediate issue with some of these points, particularly the possible assignment of an O-7 who would serve as DEPCH and as principal military advisor to the Ambassador. AmEmb Vientiane objections and alternative proposals are summarized below:^{257/}

- CINCPAC's desire to set up a Military Assistance Coordinator (MACLAOS) at Udorn, while commendable in trying to achieve better coordination and support for U.S. military activities in Laos, might tend to degrade the Embassy effort. As the alternative plan put it: "...we believe it is equally important to avoid changes in the structure of the Military Assistance Program which would degrade the authority of the U.S. Ambassador in Vientiane to control in-country operations ... the present system of command and control of in-country operations, directed by the U.S. Ambassador through the Country Team works satisfactorily in the unique politico/military environment of Laos."

In reference to the name change of DEPCH to MACLAOS, the Embassy objected that:^{258/}

"...any changes in the structure or nomenclature of U.S. assistance to Laos are susceptible to misrepresentations by adversaries and misunderstandings by friends..."

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The senior Air Force Representative clarified the latter point in an interview by adding:^{259/}

...calling it MACLAOS was unacceptable from the State Department view because it had the connotation of another MACV. They were afraid that the Thais would not readily accept it, so they settled on the name DEPCH/Udorn as a short title...

At the same time, the Embassy noted:

- AMEMBASSY Vientiane agreed to the relocation of a strengthened DEPCH organization to Udorn.^{260/}
- the DEPCH would act as the principal logistics coordinator for the Ambassador, and would serve as a member of the Country Team. DEPCH would manage the Laos MASF program under CINCPAC. RO/USAID functions would remain unchanged, but all MASF matters would be submitted through DEPCH. DEPCH would coordinate U.S. logistic support of indigenous military operations in Laos with the U.S. Mission in Vientiane, 7/13AF, COMUSMACTHAI, and other agencies as required.^{261/}

The question of an O-7 as DEPCH was not addressed in the Embassy reclama, but it was evident from the tone (which indicated minimal changes to the DEPCH structure) that this was not looked upon with favor by the Ambassador and the Country Team.

Controversy over the DEPCH role continued after the conference. A 12 July 1971 message from CINCPAC to JCS revealed a further divergence of the CINCPAC and Embassy views. Whereas the Embassy depicted DEPCH's new role as that of principal logistics coordinator for U.S. support of indigenous military operations in Laos, CINCPAC defined DEPCH's new role as that of "principal Military Advisor to the Ambassador to Laos to coordinate U.S. support of indigenous military operations in Laos."^{262/}

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In other respects, CINCPAC agreed to the modifications requested in the Embassy's alternative proposal. The organization would move to Udorn RTAFB before the end of 1971, but would not be called MACLAOS (it was tentatively called DEPCH/Udorn), and DEPCH would manage the MASF Laos program under CINCPAC, with all MASF matters to be funneled through DEPCH.^{263/} AmEmb Vientiane had been supported in its alternative proposal by AmEmb Bangkok, which was not surprising since the United States Ambassador to Thailand, Leonard Unger, had himself been Ambassador to Laos in the 1960s.^{264/}

While many of the divergent views were reconciled in the period from the June conference to the DEPCH move in November, some - such as the assignment of an O-7 as DEPCH in 1972 - had to be resolved later at the Secretary of State (SECSTATE) and Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) levels.

The long-discussed move to Udorn RTAFB was completed during 1971. In July, the Assistant Deputy Chief reported that: "DEPCHIEF has been directed by CINCPAC to move to Udorn RTAFB NLT 1 January 1972."^{265/} On 1 September 1971, the DEPCH Command Section relocated to Udorn RTAFB, and on 15 November 1971 the entire DEPCH organization became operational at Udorn after a complete unit relocation from Bangkok.^{266/} Commenting on the move, the Assistant Deputy Chief stated: "Basically, we were non-productive (in Bangkok). There was really no reason for us to be in Bangkok. Socially it was desirable, but from a practical point of view we should have been in Vientiane."^{267/} At least Udorn was closer to Vientiane than Bangkok had been.

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The Symington Ceiling

As mentioned above, the result of Congressional interest in Laos was the Symington Ceiling. On 17 November 1971, the Symington Amendment, Section 505 of the Military Procurement Authorization Act, came into force. The rules for compliance with the ceiling of no more than \$350,000,000 of MASF aid to Laos in FY 72 were established in December 1971. The first report of expenditures was due from DEPCH in January 1972, and costs for the first half of FY 72 had to be estimated from available records. The many reports required in the administration of this Act resulted in a significant, additional workload for the reduced DEPCH staff.^{268/}

Individuals involved in the various programs with Laos found the Symington Ceiling probably desirable in theory, but difficult to administer in actuality. The Assistant Deputy Chief in 1971 stated that the^{269/}

hottest thing is the Symington Ceiling of \$350 million a year. The thing is, that it has no relationship to our program; or to the money that we have. Symington applies only when the item "goes across the river" into Laos.

A former Chief Programs Officer at DEPCH clarified the meaning of the \$350 million ceiling for FY 72 when he said:^{270/}

Speaking strictly in a material sense, yes the ceiling is \$350 million for materiel transported to Laos - except for our Air Force product which is chargeable (under Symington) as soon as we turn it over to the contractor here. We have an inventory of some \$10 million here at Udorn, which could be reclaimed by DOD; but it is chargeable as soon as the contractor accepts it. Services, such as training conducted in Thailand, are charged even though they don't "cross the river."

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Ammunition and major items of equipment stocked here in Thailand are not reflected, but DOD still has title to all that equipment. The DOD is subsidizing State quite heavily. . . . These are things that weren't taken into account when the Symington sub-ceilings were established. Another handicap is that we don't know exactly what the DOD portion of this \$350 million is. We've asked, and never received a satisfactory answer. They've told us that CIA could spend 75 million and State could spend 50. CIA has said that 75 million is not adequate anymore, and that they need - let's say - 82 million. Their contention is that this reduces the military portion of the 350 million, so they're spending toward the 82 figure.

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Disregarding the added workload on DEPCH, the Chief Programs Officer added:

As a taxpayer I'm inclined to agree with Mr. Symington, although I think we are serving a purpose by being in Laos. . . . The most frustrating thing to me personally is that no one . . . will accept the fact of life that we can't control expenditures. It's well and good to sit at higher headquarters and say that you are charged with seeing that DOD does not spend more than its share of the \$350 million ceiling, but in fact all of the authority to call in supplies rests with the Ambassador.

The Assistant Deputy Chief also noted positive aspects of the Symington Ceiling: 272/

It's the greatest thing that's ever happened to us. Number one, it's focused the attention where it belongs - management of resources. It's forcing resource boards together. People are more cost conscious and cost-effective. It wasn't until the General showed up that people began to cooperate. I'm sure that within a few months we'll be able to live within the Symington limit, but right now we're not. It's caused better bomb damage assessment, it's caused a reduction in the sortie level and in the amount of ammunition per sortie.

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Political and Military Events Through FY 72

One distinct difference appeared in the usual wet-season/dry-season pattern of the war in Laos in 1972, and a USAF expert on Laos characterized the difference as follows: ^{273/}

The only real change that I have seen is . . . that with the possibility of peace growing closer and certainly on the minds of many people, some of the direction has changed to the extent that it appears that the Royal Lao Government . . . has made up its mind that there is going to be a peace shortly, and have said that they must take and hold terrain. . . . We've got to hold the PDJ. We've got to get Saravane and some of these other significant places. So take them at all cost, and hold as long as you can until the peace comes and then we will have it. . . . I think we have seen, at the same time, that the North Vietnamese have had an attitude also that this was going to be the last year, and that they must take and hold terrain if at all possible. The only differences I have seen in these two opposing forces is that on both sides the leaders have said to take and hold terrain. . . . But down at the soldier level the NVA . . . have said OK, we agree . . . and they have fought doubly hard this year, where it appears that among the friendly forces in Laos the average soldier has said "this is the end of the war, and I will be damned if I'm going to get killed the last year - let them have the terrain, regardless of what the Prime Minister or the King said". . . . Both sides this year have started many operations very diligently to take terrain. The Lao Government is just taking Paksong and Saravane in the south, and attempting to take the PDJ in the north. But, otherwise, the war has been exactly the same as it has always been.

Souvanna Phouma and Souphanouvong, along with their representatives, met several times during 1972. There was little doubt that the sudden willingness to resume negotiations was tied to the Paris talks between Washington's Henry Kissinger and Hanoi's Le Duc Tho. It was clear that no settlement concerning Laos could be reached by the two half-brothers

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until Hanoi and Washington established clear-cut guidelines for an eventual cease-fire. Although the cease-fire failed to materialize prior to the end of 1972, the future of Laos remained tied to any agreement the Americans and the North Vietnamese might reach, and prospects for an imminent cease-fire were favorable.

MAP/MASF Aid to the RLAF Through FY 72

The number of RLAF Operating Locations (OLs) changed from seven to five early in 1972 when two of the forward operating locations (FOLs) came under enemy attack; but by mid-1972 all of the original seven OLs were back in operation.^{274/} Construction continued on most sites, but the revetted ammunition storage area being built at Pakse was destroyed by enemy action on 12 March 1972. DEPCH developed a new project to replace it.^{275/}

Fiscal responsibility highlighted the last half of FY 72. The Symington Ceiling called for extensive accounting procedures, and the Assistant Deputy Chief noted that "extraordinary efforts will be required to stay within the FY 72 ceiling, and still accomplish all our objectives."^{276/} Some of these efforts included the CSAF-directed consolidation of all DEPCH air contracts. By 1 July 1972 the flying and maintenance services performed by Continental Air Services, Inc. (CASI) of Vientiane and by Air America were consolidated under a single DOD (Air Force) account. The Air America contract totaled \$41.3 million, and the CASI contract was worth \$10.7 million. The Thai-Am contract for C-47 IRAN was decreased to only \$15,000, as C/AC-47 maintenance was shifted to the RLAF. Those maintenance requirements for the C/AC-47s which were beyond RLAF capability were now

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handled by CASI in Vientiane. Thai-Am, however, assumed Khmer T-28 Phase
Inspections from Det. 1 in return.^{277/}

In keeping with the spirit of fiscal responsibility, money was also saved by decreasing the number of combat sorties. A message to DEPCH through CINCPAC indicated that "fiscal guidance provides for only 3,000 tactical air and 200 gunship sorties per month."^{278/} At the time this message was written, it was assumed that USAF sorties could make up any differences required by combat conditions, but this was before the 1972 NVA Spring Offensive began in South Vietnam. The RLAF, nevertheless, managed to stay close to the guidelines: combat sorties for the period January-March 1972 were 10,916 T-28 sorties and 704 AC-47 sorties.^{279/}

DEPCH also contacted the vice president of Air America and the Commander, Det. 1, 56 SOW, and requested their cooperation in minimizing or eliminating requirements which were not mission-essential. The DEPCH goal was to reduce the inventory by \$1 million by 1 July 1972.^{280/}

An element of fiscal responsibility was also to be added to the State Department/CAS guerrilla operations. Both Project LGC (the Thai "volunteers") and Project ZAE (Vang Pao's Meo guerrillas) were to be financed through DEPCH after 1 July 1972. While no direct Air Force funds went to Project ZAE, some \$4 million in USAF funds were programmed in FY 72 for LGC gunship support, and over \$5 million was programmed for eight UH-1M helicopters and supporting crews in FY 73. It must be recalled, however, that the MASF Laos program was tri-service funded. The U.S. Army funded FAR/FAN activities, USAF provided for the RLAF, and the U.S. Navy provided the money for DEPCH's housekeeping, administrative, and TDY expenses.

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Until FY 71 the Navy also paid for the Project 404 augmentation, but subsequently this expense was distributed among the services using it. DEPCH itself was a joint Army-Air Force organization headed by an Army colonel. After the elimination of the Air Force Division in July 1971, the senior Air Force colonel at DEPCH became the Assistant DEPCH. DEPCH went from the Weapons System Manager concept to the Commodity Manager Concept, and this presented problems when Army personnel had to learn proper Air Force requisitioning procedures for RLAF materiel. The old Air Force Division was absorbed by a joint Logistics Division, and by 1 July 1972 many of the initial problems had been eased or eliminated. Another organizational change came on 1 July when the senior Air Force colonel was designated the Vice Commander, DEPCH, and all items pertaining to air and the RLAF went through him.^{281/}

Fiscal matters also played a role in aircraft procurement. A total of forty-nine T-28-D-10 Peace Prop aircraft were received during FY 72, of which ten were turned over to the RTAF as repayment for previously loaned T-28s. Only five T-28 aircraft were scheduled for delivery until August 1973 (one rebuilt, one Peace Prop, three Peace Trunk). With the rate of expected RLAF losses at two per month, the Assistant DEPCH estimated that the RLAF T-28 inventory would only be 59 aircraft by the end of FY 73. A follow-on program called Peace Post allocated 28 T-28s to MASF Laos, but delivery was estimated at sixteen months after an unawarded contract had finally been let. Project Peace Trunk, the releasing of some RTAF T-28 assets, offered the only immediate relief for increased attrition.^{282/}

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DEPCH also had to address himself to eventual follow-on aircraft types to supplant the ever-diminishing T-28 inventory. The AmEmb Vientiane position basically reflected that of DEPCH when the embassy stated that: ^{283/}

Recommend maximum effort be made to maintain present RLAF T-28 UE until FY 76. All sources of T-28 assets should be explored to achieve this end. Any candidate for replacement aircraft for T-28 would require a massive retraining effort, and would necessitate serious reduction of people now engaged in combat operations . . . do not consider A-37 or F-5 aircraft suitable replacements . . . the only USAF inventory aircraft that meets the criteria at the present time is the A-7. It would greatly increase the RLAF's close support capability and enable them to strike interdiction targets in a high threat environment. . . . The Lao version of the A-7 need only be manual capable to preclude the high costs of the avionics package. . . . The OV-10 would be an excellent aircraft for the FAC operation, and has also been requested by the Requirements Office as a follow-on aircraft for the O-1 fleet. . . .

Meanwhile, CSAF had approved the standard O-1 avionics package for the RLAF fleet, and DEPCH had arranged for exchange and transfer programs with the RTAF to give the RLAF a standard O-1 capability. Accordingly, three RLAF U-17 aircraft were transferred to the Royal Thai Army in exchange for three O-1Ds. The RTAF transferred five O-1Ds to DEPCH for a future payback of five O-1As. The DEPCH attempt to convert all Laos O-1 aircraft to the O-1F standard also continued. ^{284/} Other aircraft actions, either contemplated or accomplished, included the DEPCH proposal to convert the RLAF/Air America UH-34 fleet to UH-1H aircraft. Meanwhile, Project Whitehorse, the UH-1 gunship program mentioned previously, was

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continued indefinitely, as was Operation Heavy Lift,* which was to have used CH-54 helicopters to move heavy equipment from one front to the other as the changing combat situation required.^{285/}

The expansion of the RLAF Starlight flareship capability progressed slowly due to the limited availability of RLAF aircrews. In other conversion projects, all Yankee Egress systems for Peace Prop T-28 aircraft had been installed except for sixteen single egress systems. Conversion kits for the remaining aircraft were scheduled to arrive in November 1972.^{286/}

The RLAF training effort, although by no means self-supporting, advanced toward that goal with the last UH-34 pilot class graduating at Udorn on 28 June 1972. Thereafter, classes were conducted in-country. Approval of a DEPCH proposal to "Laotianize" Det. 1, 56 SOW to the degree possible resulted in the assignment of 130 Laotian personnel as permanent party at Det. 1 during FY 73. This move should definitely accelerate Laos self-sufficiency in T-28 training.^{287/} (The RLAF Aircraft Inventory and Utilization Table, Tactical Unit Status Table, and Training and Personnel Status Table are reproduced from the original 30 June 1972 V-12 Report on pages 179 through 182.)

An O-7 Becomes DEPCH

A former DCH-AF and Assistant Deputy Chief characterized the war in Laos thus:^{288/}

*Heavy Lift, originally on a TDY basis, was to receive eight CH-47C aircraft. Air America would utilize the aircraft for heavy-lift and troop movements in support of MASF/Laos. This was to be accomplished by November 1972. Source: V-12 Rpt, 25 July 72, p. 5.

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. . . It's not a military war, it's a State Department war. . . . In essence, you have several wars - AIRA, ARMA, and CAS operating independently; and USAID operates in their support. The DEPCH function has been strictly logistical support.

This, in essence, was the situation prior to the Bangkok meeting of 1971 which expanded DEPCH's Terms of Reference. DOD, as the principal financier of the "several wars" in Laos, wanted better coordination of the MASF effort; and - as a former DCH-AF said - "The DOD position was that they didn't want to buy off and become a scapegoat for something the State Department has been running for a few years."^{289/} The differing interpretations of DEPCH's role under the new TOR - as principal logistics or as principal military advisor to the Ambassador - continued to cloud the issues, with AmEmb Vientiane/SECSTATE maintaining the former and CINCPAC/SECDEF maintaining the latter. Ambassador Godley, in particular, resisted the possible assignment of an O-7 as DEPCH. A November 1971 message from Major General Searles, Deputy Commander, 7/13AF, to General Lavelle, Commander, 7AF, stated:^{290/}

Godley made it clear to [Admiral] Moorer* that he preferred retention of an Army full Colonel as DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI, and that he did not want a General Officer in this position. Moorer indicated that if Godley was happy with the situation, he would let it stand as is.

A USAF intelligence expert on Laos with experience in Vientiane added:^{291/}

. . . There were suggestions that maybe we should bring in a General grade officer. . . . I remember one specific suggestion that came out of CINCPAC. . . .

*Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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They suggested moving a General [to Vientiane] who would work directly for CINCPAC, but would assist the Ambassador. Of course, all of this was greatly resisted. The Ambassador liked his organization as it was, and enjoyed having an ARMA and an AIRA. . . . He did not want any outside influence, particularly a senior officer, who was not directly responsible to the Ambassador. . . . I think, as most people know, that most of the para-military operations throughout Laos were based around CAS control of the irregular forces. CAS has a great deal of influence with the Ambassador. . . . It is popularly thought that CAS more or less runs the country with the approval of the Ambassador. So, under these circumstances . . . CAS did not want a General Officer coming in there trying to assert his influence, and perhaps even telling CAS what was wrong with their organization and how it should be run in a conventional military manner. . . .

The controversy over the assignment of an O-7 and over DEPC's new role continued throughout the fall of 1971. Then, a meeting held at Udorn laid the groundwork for future DOD actions. The USAF intelligence expert on Laos, quoted above, recalled* that there was:

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. . . a staff meeting sometime in the fall of 71--I don't recall the exact date--held here at Hq 7/13. . . . General Westmoreland came out from JCS . . . for a conference which included the Ambassador, the Chief of CAS, AIRA, ARMA, General Searles, [and] General Westmoreland and some of his staff. The conference went on all day. I did not sit in on the meeting, and was not privy to all the discussions, but it all boiled around what was going on in Laos, and what we can do to make it better, and what is DEPC going to do, etc. I had heard from various sources prior to this time that there was a move afoot within Laos that CAS wanted out. . . . They had been running the irregular war there for many years . . . they were in great debt as far as they money--always going over their budget every year. . . . They were consistently losing the war--getting a lot of bad publicity out of it--and they had a tiger by the tail and would have liked to get out of the situation and turn it over to somebody else. This was a well-known rumor going around. There was also a rumor going around that the Army

*The reader should note the speculative nature of the quote, and that much of the information presented therein is at best second-hand.

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wanted the job, and they wanted to take over and run the Lao war as they had done in South Vietnam. . . . I think the Army had aspirations along these lines in Laos, too. . . . General Westmoreland . . . felt what we needed was [to] "Get those civilians out of running the war and move the Army in, and we can organize and run it like we always have done throughout history." . . . I think from General Westmoreland's visit a decision probably was made--and I am speculating here quite broadly--to get DEPCH up here as close to Laos without having to penetrate Laos, and get an experienced infantry officer of the General grade involved in DEPCH so he could start asserting some military influence on the country team. . . .

Although the assignment of an Army O-7 as DEPCH did not occur until early 1972, many moves were in progress. Major General Searles noted in an October 1971 message to General McNabb: ^{293/}

. . . concur with PACAF preliminary thinking . . . that USAF should recommend Army retain DEPCH billet as an O-6. . . . This interim function of logistic advisor and manager to Godley does not warrant the assignment of a General officer. For the moment, Ambassador Godley acts as MACLOAS, and it is proposed that DEPCHIEF, Udorn serve as his J-4. . . . Both Ambassadors Godley and Unger are opposed to assigning a General officer to DEPCHIEF, Udorn position. There seems to be little reason to oppose them at this time.

In speculating that an Air Force General officer might become DEPCH, or that the DEPCH function could be assigned to Deputy Commander 7/13AF as an additional duty, General Searles commented that: ". . . The Army might use it as justification for another COMUSMACTHAI takeover attempt on a quid pro quo basis, i.e., if USAF heads DEPCHIEF, Udorn, Army should head MACTHAI." ^{294/} However, General Searles also pointed out that "many assumptions would have to be verified before the Army could use the DEPCHIEF, Udorn position as a stepping stone to a COMUSMACTHAI takeover. . . ." ^{295/}

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Among these assumptions were: "... that U.S. support of the indigenous war in Laos would continue... after the war in Vietnam is concluded; that this effort would ultimately transcend in importance the role of COMUSMACTHAI and possibly COMUSMACV, and that DEPCHIEF, Udorn would achieve or approach the status of a unified subordinate command. . . ."^{296/}

Discussions concerning this problem continued at the highest levels. An addendum to an interview with Major General Hughes* clarified the assignment of a General Officer. The assignment of an Army O-7 as DEPCH came about:^{297/}

... per Secretary of Defense decision. . . . Again, there is nothing in writing, but indications are that the decision resulted from a conversation between the Chairman of the JCS, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State. Secretary of State pushed to have the O-7 in that job. I believe the Chairman to the JCS was prompted to make his decision or recommendation by General Westmoreland's visit . . . and his [Westmoreland's] earlier recommendation in 1971. The decision was fought initially by Ambassadors Godley and Unger, but . . . it received indorsement at the highest levels in Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State.

On 11 February 1972, Brigadier General John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, arrived at Udorn to become the DEPCH. The USAF intelligence expert quoted earlier:^{298/}

... I understand from talking with General Vessey that his notification and assignment to DEPCH was something of a matter of hours or days. He had a logistical job at Sattahip here in Thailand, and all of a sudden he was called and told he was the new DEPCH. . . .

*At the time of this writing, General Hughes was Deputy Commander, 7/13 AF.

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He continued:

. . . everybody was a little bit afraid that a General grade officer would . . . come to Udorn and jump into Laos and try to take over the organization. As it turned out, I think Gen. Vessey surprised most everybody. In my opinion an extremely competent military officer and a pretty good diplomat as well, he has a good military background, and he's not a politician or desk soldier: he's a field soldier. Ever since he's been here, he has been out in the field constantly, judging the situation, seeing what is happening, and seeing what he can do to help the situation. I think some of the fears of CAS have come to roost. He has moved in and looked at the situation . . . and tried to put in what he thought was a better way of doing it . . . which may not always be consistent with the way CAS has done things. My personal evaluation is that he hasn't been too successful in toppling "the King" at this point from what I have observed. He has more or less realized that he is doing the best he can to contribute - but realizing that he will probably never truly be the senior military advisor to the Ambassador, and certainly not to the extent of trying to manipulate or help run the war up there.

The question of DEPOCH's precise role remained unresolved at the time of this writing, but General Vessey's personal leadership qualities were unquestioned. As a result of his dedication and expertise, the Ambassador and Country Team have come to rely heavily upon his judgment, and he is admired by those who work with and for him--Army and Air Force alike. This estimation of Gen. Vessey has been borne out by many interviews. Perhaps Major General Hughes' comments summarized General Vessey's role and accomplishments best. He said:

General Vessey's charter appoints him as the principal military advisor to the Ambassador. Initially, this position was probably not recognized either by the Ambassador or the other Country Team members. However,

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
over the period of General Vessey's assignment, this attitude has gradually changed. I have been told that in recent correspondence from the Ambassador to Washington, that the Ambassador did officially recognize and accept the DEPCHIEF as the principal military advisor. It has also come to my attention that Washington, DEPCHIEF, and the Ambassador have recently made proposals on the force structure for the U.S. military in Laos once a cease-fire has been signed. All three positions are similar, and show a U.S. Army Brigadier General as the Defense Attache, with AIRA, ARMA, and the DEPCHIEF organization all under his jurisdiction.

Although the DEPCHIEF has now apparently been recognized as the principal military officer for Laos, I am not sure that this pertains to--or has been accepted by--CAS in relation to the irregular force. I feel it is quite unlikely that CAS would subordinate its position to the U.S. military. I think it more likely that the position filled by General Vessey would be one of senior military advisor on U.S. military functions, but that CAS would still be on an equal plane with its irregular forces. General Vessey would be free to make suggestions on the irregular activities to both the Ambassador and CAS. The Ambassador would listen to the plans of CAS and suggestions of General Vessey, and then make the final decision on course of operation.

Commenting on the relationship between 7/13AF and DEPCH, General Hughes said: "There is no direct relationship between 7/13AF and the DEPCHIEF organization. My own personal relationship with General Vessey . . . is extremely cordial. . . . General Vessey and I have a very good working relationship, also, . . . and I plan on keeping it that way."^{300/}

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* Senior Air Force
Representative (O-6)

Proposed 1 Jul 72 DEPCH Organization

FIGURE 10

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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

A DEPCH Update for Book VII (Free World Forces) of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (1974-1981) states that the military objectives behind MAP/MASF aid to Laos are to: ^{301/}

Prevent the North Vietnamese/Communist Chinese from dominating Laos, defeat insurgency in areas that are, or may come, under the control of the Royal Laotian Government, and disrupt the flow of communist forces and materiel through Laos into South Vietnam.

The Update goes on to describe the capabilities and limitations of the RLG Armed Forces:

The Royal Lao Forces consist of Forces Armees Royales . . . and Forces Armees Neutralistes. . . . The FAR includes the Royal Laotian Air Force . . . and the FAR River Flotilla. The Royal Lao Forces can generally meet the . . . Pathet Lao on equal or better terms, but cannot stand up to the determined attacks of the better disciplined, more highly motivated North Vietnamese. North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao Forces in Laos have the capability to overrun most of Laos. Limiting factors of the Royal Lao Forces are a general malaise and low morale caused by inadequate pay, allowances and rations, lack of leadership and motivation, factionalism, weakness in the logistical system, poor maintenance, inadequate training, and marginal intelligence capability.

The Royal Laotian Air Force . . . suffers limiting factors similar to those of the ground forces; e.g., lack of ability, knowledge, leadership and the discipline needed to properly control and utilize aircraft, materiel and personnel. . . . The Royal Laotian Air Force depends heavily upon the United States and Thailand for support in terms of operational planning, training, logistics and maintenance. A counter-air capability is nonexistent and unnecessary at present. Reconnaissance is poor without U.S.

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Air Force assistance. Airlift, though improving, still requires outside assistance to meet existing requirements. . . .

While the foregoing did not seem indicative of a success story in regard to the RLAF, it must be recalled that MAP/MASF aid to the RLAF created an Air Force where none had existed previously. In the short span of some ten years, the RLAF had become a viable and even formidable force in the context of its environment; that this force still relied to a great extent on United States aid, and particularly United States Air Force aid, was understandable when one considered the economic and educational backwardness of Laos. That this force was created during and nurtured through ten years of constant combat conditions--and that it overcame the situation--was the single greatest tribute one could pay it. The mere existence of an RLAF was high praise indeed for the dedication and professionalism of the Laotian airmen who served in it, and of the American airmen who advised and trained it.

At the time of this writing, the Royal Laotian Air Force was still essential in the continuing struggle to contain the external ground threat in Laos. Consequently, a force structure projected that some 3,500 men would be serving in the RLAF by FY 78 (up from 2,012 in FY 72).^{302/}

An AIRA memorandum on "Advanced Planning for RLAF Self-Sufficiency Program"^{303/} declared that:

. . . The original and primary goal . . . has always been for the RLAF to achieve self-sufficiency. As we approach FY 73 it is now possible to shift a large measure of responsibility to the RLAF while reducing the active participation of USAF and USAID (RO) without sacrificing mission effectiveness.

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Among the projects included in the continuing quest for self-sufficiency were improvements in the RLAF FAC program, the assumption of AIRA communications facilities by the RLAF for 24 hour operation, OJT to phase RLAF intelligence officers in with the AIRA efforts, continuing improvement in the RLAF supply system through assumption of RO/USAID functions, and the assumption by an RLAF officer of the COC/RLAF/AIRA liaison duties preparatory to full RLAF assumption of the COC. ^{304/}

In conclusion, there was little doubt that the U.S. MAP/MASF effort in Laos had been successful in helping to keep the country from falling into communist hands. U.S. policy continued to be the restoration of the 1962 Accords, with the attendant neutrality for Laos guaranteed by the world powers. How would Laos be affected by the Vietnam cease-fire so close at hand at the time of this writing? The answer is speculative to a certain extent, but two USAF intelligence experts knowledgeable in Laotian affairs agree on a rather pessimistic result. As one of them succinctly put it: ^{305/}

. . . the only thing I see for the future of Laos is a cease-fire, a coalition government, removal of all the Americans, removal of the bombing by removal of all air from Southeast Asia - and then the war starting all over again.

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APPENDIX I

MAP/LAAF FY 1959

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Including the value of excess stock)		
Categories	Program Dollars (Thousands)	Progress Dollars (Thousands)
Total Assistance	2,412	1,477
	=====	=====
Materiel	2,375	1,440
Aircraft	1,736	1,203
Guided Missiles	-	-
Vehicles	255	101
Ammunition	-	-
Comm & Electronics	45	45
Training Equipment	1	1
Other Materiel	338	90
Services	37	37
Training	-	-
Repair & Rehab	37	37

AIRCRAFT PROGRAM				
Type Model & Series	Pro- grammed	Shipped	Delivered	30 Jun Inventory
TOTAL MAP	21	14	14	14
C-47	8	6	6	6
L-20	7	2	2	2
L-19	6	6	6	6
PROGRAMMED UNDER "REDISTRIBUTABLE PROCEDURES"				
Total	2	2	2	1
L-20	2	2	2	1

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MAP EQUIPPED TACTICAL SQUADRONS

Unit Designation	T/M/S	Air- Craft	Crews	Combat Ready
Composite Sq (Vientiane)				
Trans Flt	C-47	6)		
Liaison & Tng Flt	L-19	6)	18 a)	No
Obs. & Rcn Flt	L-20	3)		

a) Eighteen fully qualified pilots.

SOURCE: Journal of Mutual Security, Sep 59, P 148.

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APPENDIX II

MAP/LAOS FY 60

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Thousands of Dollars) 30 June 1960

Categories (Including Spares)	Total Map		Army		Navy		Air Force	
	Program	Progress	Program	Progress	Program	Progress	Program	Progress
ASSISTANCE CHARGE- ABLE TO MA APPROP- RIATIONS	58,235	58,242	54,648	48,630	4,508	1,820	3,711	2,857
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES	55,956	50,493	51,439	46,751	1,001	925	3,516	2,817
Aircraft	2,320	2,217	-	-	-	-	2,320	2,217
SERVICES	12,279	7,756	3,209	1,879	3,507	965	195	40
TOTAL EXCESS	12,958	12,826	12,926	12,811	-	-	32	15

NOTE: The Program is as reflected in the Supply Performance Record (DD-346) as of 30 June 1960 with adjustments made by ISA/ODMA/Comptroller. These data do not, however, include all of the approved and funded FY 1960 Program.

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MA AIRCRAFT PROGRAM

<u>TYPE MODEL & Series</u>	<u>PROGRAMMED</u>	<u>DELIVERED</u>	<u>INVENTORY</u>
Total Air Force	<u>22</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>19</u>
C-47	9	9	8
L-19	6	6	6
L-20	7	7	5

PROGRAMMED UNDER "REDISTRIBUTABLE PROCEDURES"

Total Air Force	<u>2</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
L-20	2 a)	2	1
ON LOAN FROM MAPPON			
Total	<u>6</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>4</u>
SH-19	6	4	4

a) Redistribution from FEF.

MAP EQUIPPED TACTICAL SQUADRONS

<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>T/M/S</u>	<u>AIR CRAFT</u>	<u>CREWS</u>	<u>COMBAT READY</u>
Composite Sq (Vientiane)	C-47	8	10	Yes
	L-19	6	6	Yes
	L-20	6	6	Yes

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Sep 60, pp. 157-158.

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APPENDIX III

MAP/LAOS FY 1961

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Thousands of Dollars)

Categories (Including Spares)	Total Map Program Progress	Army Program Progress	Navy Program Progress	Air Force Program Progress
TOTAL (Excludes Credit Financing and Excess Stocks	106,940 =====	80,524 =====	71,406 =====	4,779 =====
EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES	87,584 =====	73,262 =====	67,051 =====	932 =====
Aircraft	9,261 =====	-	-	-
SERVICES	19,356 =====	7,262 =====	4,355 =====	1,566 =====

Credit Financing
Under MAP

-	-	-	-	-
---	---	---	---	---

Excess Stocks
(Acquisit Cost)

23,028	21,032	16,252	16,148	46	6,730	4,884
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MA AIRCRAFT PROGRAM

TYPE, MODEL & SERIES	PRO- GRAMED	DELIVERED	INVENTORY
Total Air Force	<u>72</u>	<u>57</u>	<u>37</u>
C-47	13	13	9
SH-19	4	4	-
HUS-1	24	23	17
L-20	7	7	3
L-19	10	10	8
T-28	14	-	-
Redistributable	<u>18</u>	<u>18</u>	<u>2</u>
L-20	2 a)	2	-
T-6	16 b)	16	9

a) Recovered from Indochina

b) Recovered from Thailand

MAP "EQUIPPED" TACTICAL SQUADRONS

UNIT DESIGNATION LOCATION	T/M/S	AIR- CRAFT	CREWS	COMBAT READY
Composite Sq	(C-47	9	5)	Yes
(Savannakhet)	(L-20	3	2)	Yes
	(L-19	8	2)	Yes
	(T-6	9	5)	Yes

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Sep 61, pp. 144-145

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APPENDIX IV

MAP/LAOS FY 1962

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Thousands of Dollars)

Categories (Including Spares)	Total Map		Army		Navy		Air Force	
	Program	Progress	Program	Progress	Program	Progress	Program	Progress
Total (Excludes Credit Financing & Excess Stocks)	163,926	127,414	118,731	96,453	6,097	3,968	29,288	17,183
Equipment	123,147	99,822	103,479	85,719	932	932	18,736	13,171
Aircraft	13,941	10,501	1	1	-	-	13,940	10,500
Services	40,779	27,592	15,252	10,734	5,165	3,036	10,552	4,012
Excess Stocks (Acquisition Cost)	29,058	26,170	21,478	19,413	46	46	7,534	6,711

NOTE: Preliminary data for Army and Air Force.

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MA AIRCRAFT PROGRAM

TYPE MODEL & SERIES	PROGRAMMED	DELIVERED	INVENTORY	AVG MONTHLY UTILIZATION FY 62
Total Air Force	<u>82</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>38</u>	
C-47	15 a)	13	7	39
UH-34 (HUS-1)	31	25 b)	18	116
HH-19 (SH-19)	4	4	-	
U-6A (L-20)	7	7	3 c)	31
O-1A (L-19)	11	10	4	9
T-28	14	10 d)	-	
T-6	-	-	6 e)	20

NOTE: All of the above aircraft are MAP-supported.

- a) Delivery of the last two C-47s is being held in abeyance.
- b) These aircraft being operated by Air America under contract.
- c) Included two L-20s recovered from Indochina assets and provided to Laos under redistributable procedures.
- d) These aircraft are, in fact, delivered to Thailand, but shown as delivered to Laos for accounting purposes.
- e) These six T-6s are the remainder of eighteen T-6s recovered from Thailand and redistributed to Laos.

"MAP EQUIPPED" TACTICAL SQUADRONS

UNIT DESIGNATION ----- LOCATION	TYPE MODEL & SERIES	AIRCRAFT	CREWS	COMBAT READY
Composite Sq (Savannakhet)	(C-47 U-6A O-1A T-6	7 3 4 6	15) 6) 6) 21)	Yes Yes Yes Yes

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Sep 62, p. 145.

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APPENDIX V

MAP/LAOS FY 1963

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Thousands of Dollars)

Categories (Including Spares)	Total Map		Army		Navy		Air Force	
	Program	Progress	Program	Progress	Program	Progress	Program	Progress
Total MAP Grant (Excludes Excess and Credit Fin- ancing)	172,441	153,476	115,390	104,120	5,271	4,242	32,866	32,423
Defense Articles	124,477	108,869	99,031	89,735	932	932	23,882	17,570
Aircraft	18,752	13,899	-	-	-	-	18,752	13,899
Defense Services	47,964	44,607	16,359	14,385	4,339	4,017	15,984	14,923
Excess Defense Articles	25,738	23,619	20,758	20,462	46	46	4,934	3,111

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MAP AIRCRAFT

TYPE MODEL & SERIES	PROGRAMMED	DELIVERED	MAP INVENTORY	FY 63 AVG. MO. UTILIZATION OF MAP SUPPORTED AIRCRAFT
Total Air Force	<u>93</u>	<u>67</u>	<u>36</u>	
C-47	16	15	7	Unk
UH-34	36	31	17 a)	Unk
HH-19	4	4	-	Unk
U-6	13 b)	7	2	Unk
O-1	10	10	5	Unk
T-28	14 c)	-	-	Unk
T-6	- d)	-	5	Unk

NOTE NO 1: All "MAP Inventory" aircraft are MAP-supported.

- a) These aircraft are being operated by Air America under contract.
b) Two additional U-6A aircraft, recovered from Indochina, have been redistributed to Laos.
c) Eight of these T-28s were deleted from the Laos program and the six T-28s remaining in the program had been delivered, subsequent to the cut-off date of this table: these changes will be reflected in future reports.
d) Eighteen T-6s, recovered from Thailand, were redistributed to Laos.

"MAP EQUIPPED" TACTICAL UNITS

UNIT DESIGNATION ----- LOCATION	TYPE MODEL & SERIES	AIRCRAFT	CREWS	OPERATIONALLY READY
Composite Sq (Savannakhet)	C-47	7	7	Unk
	O-1	5	7	Unk
	U-6	2	5	Unk
	T-6	5	9	Unk
	Alouette	2	3	Unk

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Sep 63, p. 178.

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APPENDIX VI

MAP/LAOS FY 1964

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
(Thousands of Dollars)

Categories (Including Spares)	Total Map Program Progress	Army Program Progress	Navy Program Progress	Air Force Program Progress
Total MAP Grant (Excludes "Excess and Credits")	191,440	125,604	111,562	5,052
Aircraft	16,647	15,423	-	-
Excess Stocks	27,834	22,808	21,762	46
				46
				4,980
				4,930

NOTE: Preliminary data.

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MAP AIRCRAFT

TYPE MODEL & SERIES	PROGRAMMED	DELIVERED	MAP INVENTORY
Total Air Force MAP	<u>86</u>	<u>79</u>	<u>29</u>
C-47	25	20	14
UH-34	24	24 a)	2
CH-34	3	3	-
HH-19	4	4	-
U-17	5	3	2
U-6	7	7	3
O-1	10	10	3
T-28	8	8	5

NOTE NO. 1: Above data as of 30 September 1964.

NOTE NO. 2: All "MAP Inventory" aircraft are MAP-supported.

NOTE NO. 3: See "MAP Developments" in the narrative above for programming action subsequent to the cut-off date of this table.

a) Three UH-34 helicopters, recovered from Laos, were redistributed to Vietnam.

"MAP EQUIPPED" TACTICAL UNITS

UNIT DESIGNATION ----- LOCATION	TYPE MODEL & SERIES	AIR- CRAFT	CREWS	OPERA- TIONALLY READY
Royal Laotian Air Force				
Composite Sq	C-47	13	17)	C-2
	O-1	3	14)	
	U-6	2	14)	
	U-17	2	3)	
	UH-34	2	3)	
	U-9	1	-)	
	Alouette	2	-)	
	T-28	5	18)	
Neutralist Air Force (Vientiane)	C-47	1	Unk)	unk
	U-6	1	Unk)	

NOTE NO. 1: DATA is as of the end of 1st quarter FY 1965

NOTE NO. 2: Pilots only are listed in the "crews" column

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Sep 64, p.164

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APPENDIX VII

MAP/LAOS FY 1965

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Thousands of Dollars)

Categories (Including Spares)	Total Map		Army		Navy		Air Force	
	Program	Progress	Program	Progress	Program	Progress	Program	Progress
Total MAP Grant	238,514	209,383	142,276	130,260	9,042	5,055	68,177	55,825
(Excludes "Excess")								
Aircraft	25,076	18,639	37	-	2,942	-	22,097	18,639
EXCESS STOCKS	27,834	26,738	22,808	21,762	46	46	4,980	4,930

NOTE: Delivery data are preliminary and incomplete.

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MAP AIRCRAFT

TYPE MODEL & SERIES	PROGRAMMED	DELIVERED	MAP INVENTORY	MAP. SUPPORTED UTILIZATION (FY 65 Mo. Avg)
Total Air Force MAP	<u>124</u>	<u>120</u>	<u>83</u>	
C-47	25	25	16)	Unk
T-28	43 a)	42	38)	Unk
UH-34	25	24 b)	18)	Unk
CH-34	3	3	-)	Unk
HH-19	4	4	-)	Unk
U-17	7	5	2)	Unk
U-6	7	7	3)	Unk
O-1	10	10	6)	Unk
Total Navy MAP	<u>2</u>	-	-	
UH-34	9	-	-	
Total Army MAP	<u>2</u>	-	-	
O-1	2	-	-	

NOTE: Since aircraft in the Southeast Asian theatre of operations are being shifted as needed to meet operational contingencies, the above "MAP Inventory" cannot be regarded as definitive.

a) Thirty-two additional T/RT-28s recovered from Vietnam were redistributed to Laos.

b) Three UH-34s were recovered from Laos and redistributed to Vietnam.

MAP TACTICAL UNITS

UNIT DESIGNATION	TYPE MODEL & SERIES	AIRCRAFT	CREWS	OPERATIONAL READINESS
Composite Sq (Savannakhet)	C-47	16	30	Unk
	T-28	4	26	Unk
	U-17	2	} 41	Unk
	U-6	3		Unk
	O-1	6		Unk

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Jun 65, P 159.

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APPENDIX VIII

MAP/LAOS FY 1966

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Thousands of Dollars)

Categories (Including Spaces)	Total Map Program Progress	Army Program Progress	Navy Program Progress	Air Force Program Progress
Total Grant Aid (Excludes "Excess")	361,943 275,069	190,438 156,735	24,491 6,803	123,655 88,312
Aircraft	60,608 28,531	37	19 16,789	- 43,782 28,512

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GRANT AID AIRCRAFT

TYPE MODEL & SERIES	FUNDED PROGRAM	CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERIES	MAP INVENTORY	MAP SUPPORTED UTILIZATION (FY 67 Mo. AVG.)
Total Air Force MAP	<u>189</u>	<u>144</u>	<u>98</u>	
C-47	27	27	17	28
T-28	106 a)	61	49	27
UH-34	24	24 b)	17	128
CH-34	3	3	-	
HH-19	4	4	-	
U-17	8	8	4	25
U-6	7	7	3	22
O1	10	10	8	21
Total Navy MAP	<u>43</u>	<u>12</u>	<u>9</u>	
UH-34	43	12 c)	9 d)	128
Total Army MAP	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	
O-1	2	1	1	21

NOTE: All "MAP Inventory" aircraft are MAP-supported.

a) Thirty-two additional T-28s recovered from Vietnam (thirty) and Thailand (two) were redistributed to Laos.

b) Three UH-34s were recovered from Laos and redistributed to Vietnam.

c) Deliveries reflected in this column are those as appear in the DD-ISA(Q) 1054 Reports.

d) Three UH-34s arrived prior to 31 December 1966, but had not yet been picked up in the official delivery report.

MAP TACTICAL UNITS

UNIT DESIGNATION ----- LOCATION	TYPE MODEL & SERIES	AIRCRAFT	CREWS	OPERATIONAL READINESS
Composite Sq (Savannakhet)	C-47	17	11	C-1
	T-28	20	27	C-1
	UH-34	2	4	Unk
	U-6	2	3	C-1

NOTE: Data reflected in table is based upon most recent information available.

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Dec 66, pp. 182-183

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APPENDIX IX

MAP/LAOS FY 1967

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Thousands of Dollars)

Categories (Including Spares)	Total Map Program Progress	Army Program Progress	Navy Program Progress	Air Force Program Progress
Total Grant Aid (Excludes "Excess")	373,109	183,275	27,949	138,526
Aircraft	70,721	154	20,114	50,453
				34,422

NOTE: Preliminary data.

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GRANT AID AIRCRAFT

TYPE MODEL & SERIES	FUNDED PROGRAM	CONSTRUCTIVE DELIVERIES	MAP INVENTORY	MAP-SUPPORTED UTILIZATION (FY 67 MO. AVG.)
Air Force MAP	<u>222</u>	<u>159</u>	<u>101</u>	
C-47	29	27	17	32
T-28	136 a)	76	55	31
UH-34D	24	24 b)	13	120
CH-34C	3	3	-	
HH-19	4	4	-	
U-17A	9	8	4	21
U-6	7	7	3	21
U-4	-	-	(1)	Unk
O-1A	10	10	8	18
Navy MAP	<u>50</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>22</u>	<u>120</u>
UH-34D	50	22	22	120
Army MAP	<u>8</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>1</u>	
O-1E	2	1	1	18
O-1A	6	-	-	

NOTE: All "MAP Inventory" aircraft are MAP supported. (Aircraft in parentheses were not MAP-provided, but are in the MAP inventory by virtue of being supported under MAP Grant Aid).

a) In addition to those aircraft "funded" and delivered under the MAP Laos was provided thirty-two T-28s under the MAP Redistribution Procedures.

b) Of those aircraft received by Laos, three UH-34s were subsequently recovered and redistributed to meet other MAP requirements.

GRANT AID SHIPS & HARBOR CRAFT

TYPE VESSEL	SYMBOL	MAP FUNDED AND DELIVERED	ON HAND INVENTORY
Army MAP		<u>25</u>	
Auxiliaries & Craft			
Med Ldg Craft	LCM	5	Unk
Veh/Pers Ldg Craft	LCVP	5	Unk
Misc		15	na

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MAP TACTICAL UNITS

UNIT DESIGNATION	TYPE			
-----	MODEL &			OPERATIONAL
LOCATION	SERIES	AIRCRAFT	CREWS	READINESS
Composite Sq (Savannakhet)	C-47	17	13	C-4
	T-28	40	29	C-4
	UH-34	5	6	C-4
	U-17A	4	8	C-4
	U-6	3	8	C-4
	U-4	1	1	C-4
	O-1	9	12	C-4

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Sep 67, pp. 162-163.

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APPENDIX X

MAP/LAOS FY 1968

Support of the Laotian Armed Forces, which had been funded under the Military Assistance Program, passed to the U.S. Services effective 30 June 1967 under what is termed the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) Program. The unexpended balances of FY 1967 and prior MA Programs approved and funded for Laos were transferred concurrently to the Services for implementation.

The following is a summary of the MASF Program for Laos. Since these data are provisional, they are subject to further refinement.

MASF PROGRAM STATUS						
(Cumulative Thousands of Dollars)						
	ARMY		NAVY		AIR FORCE	
	PROG	DLVR	PROG	DLVR	PROG	DLVR
Total	<u>45,403</u>	<u>22,297</u>	<u>8,209</u>	<u>3,359</u>	<u>70,446</u>	<u>32,347</u>
Aircraft	91	21	7,075	2,812	25,748	8,196

SOURCE: DD.ISA(Q) 1032 Services Report

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM				
(Funded & Delivered - Cumulative Thousands of Dollars)				
CATEGORIES (Including Spares)	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE
Total Grant Aid (Excludes "Excess")	332,693	167,881	19,206	113,347
Aircraft	47,637	38	11,346	36,253

NOTE: Preliminary data.

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MAP/MASF TACTICAL UNITS

UNIT DESIGNATION	TYPE	ASSIGNED		
	MODEL & SERIES	AIRCRAFT	CREWS	"C"Rating
1st Ftr Wg (Luang Prabang)	T-28	10	14	C-1
	(C-47	9	16	C-1
2nd Ftr Wg (Vientiane)	(UH-34	5	13	C-1
	(U-17A	3	2	C-1
	(U-6	1	- a)	C-1
	(U-4	1	2	C-1
	(T-28	3	6	C-1
	(C-47	7	10	C-1
	(UH-34	4	5	C-1
	(O-1	5	3	C-1
	(U-17A	1	1	C-1
	(U-6	2	2	C-1
	(T-28	12	18	C-1

NOTE: Includes MAP and MASF-provided aircraft.

a) The U-6s are flown by dual-qualified pilots

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Oct 68, pp.103-104

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APPENDIX XI

MAP/LAOS FY 1969

Support of the Laotian A med Forces, which had been funded under the Military Assistance Program, passed to the U.S. Services effective 30 June 1967 under what is termed the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) Program. The unexpended balances of FY 1967 and prior MA Programs approved and funded for Laos were transferred concurrently to the Services for implementation.

The following is a summary of the MASF Program for Laos. Since these data are provisional, they are subject to further refinement.

MASF PROGRAM STATUS (Cumulative Thousands of Dollars)						
	ARMY		NAVY		AIR FORCE	
	PROG	DLVR	PROG	DLVR	PROG	DLVR
Total	70,800	54,537	8,207	3,362	107,044	84,753
Aircraft	73	73	7,075	2,812	28,703	21,929

SOURCE: DD.ISA(Q) 1054 Services Report.

As of 30 June 69

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Funded & Delivered - Cumulative Thousands of Dollars)				
CATEGORIES (Including Spares)	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE
Total Grant Aid (Excludes "Excess")	330,818	167,933	19,098	111,528
Aircraft	46,677	38	11,346	35,293

NOTE: Preliminary data.

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MAP/MASF TACTICAL UNITS

SQUADRON DESIGNATION ----- LOCATION	TYPE MODEL & SERIES	AIRCRAFT	CREWS.	"C" RATING
101st Composite Sq (Luang Prabang)	(C-47	1	2	C-1
	(UH-34	4	4	C-1
	(T-28	9	10	C-1
102nd Composite Sq (Vientiane)	(C-47	6	9	C-1
	(UH-34	4	4	C-1
	(O-1	1	1	C-1
	(U-17	1	1	C-1
	(U-6	1	1	C-1
	(U-4	1	1	C-1
	(T-28	18	28	C-1
103rd Composite Sq (Savannakhet)	(C-47	5	7	C-1
	(UH-34	4	4	C-1
	(O-1	4	5	C-1
	(U-17	1	1	C-1
	(U-6	1	1	C-1
104th Composite Sq (Pakse)	(T-28	12	14	C-1
	(C-47	2	2	C-1
	(UH-34	4	3	C-1
	(T-28	6	6	C-1

NOTE: Includes MAP and MASF-provided aircraft.

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Sep 69, pp. 118-119.**SECRET****CONFIDENTIAL**

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MAP/LAOS FY 1970

The following is a summary of the MASF Program for Laos. Since these data are provisional, they are subject to further refinement.

	ARMY		NAVY		AIR FORCE	
	PROG	DLVR	PROG	DLVR	PROG	DLVR
Total	133,101	118,086	11,478	7,942	179,220	151,747
Aircraft	73	73	7,075	3,750	33,781	29,743

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM				
(Funded & Delivered - Cumulative Thousands of Dollars)				
CATEGORIES (Including Spares)	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE
Total Grant Aid (Excludes "Excess")	330,818	167,933	19,098	111,528
Aircraft	46,677	38	11,346	35,293

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MAP/MASF TACTICAL UNITS				
SQUADRON DESIGNATION	TYPE			
-----	MODEL &			
LOCATION	SERIES	AIRCRAFT	CREWS	"C" RATING
101st Composite Sq (Luang Prabang)	(U-17	2	1	C-1
	(C/AC-47	3	3	C-1
	(UH-34	3	3	C-1
	(T-28	20	20	C-1
102nd Composite Sq (Vientiane)	(C/AC-47	14	9	C-1
	(UH-34	7	7	C-1
	(U-17	2	1	C-1
	(U-6	1	1	C-1
	(U-4	1	1	C-1
	(T-28	20	24	C-1
103rd Composite Sq (Savannakhet)	(C/AC-47	6	6	C-1
	(UH-34	2	2	C-1
	(O-1	5	5	C-1
	(T-28	8	8	C-1
	(U-17	2	2	C-1
104th Composite Sq (Pakse)	(C/AC-47	4	4	C-1
	(UH-34	2	3	C-1
	(T-28	7	7	C-1

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Aug 70, pp. 123-124**SECRET****CONFIDENTIAL**

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APPENDIX XIII

MAP/LAOS FY 1971

Support of the Laotian Armed Forces, which had been funded under the Military Assistance Program, passed to the U.S. Services effective 30 June 1967 under what is termed the Military Assistance Service Funded (MASF) Program. The unexpended balances of FY 1967 and prior MA Programs approved and funded for Laos were transferred concurrently to the Services for implementation.

The following is a summary of the MASF Program for Laos. Since these data are provisional, they are subject to further refinement.

MASF PROGRAM STATUS (Cumulative Thousands of Dollars)						
	ARMY		NAVY		AIR FORCE	
	PROG	DLVR	PROG	DLVR	PROG	DLVR
Total	<u>201,334</u>	<u>171,033</u>	<u>12,802</u>	<u>12,715</u>	<u>283,042</u>	<u>236,781</u>
Aircraft	73	73	7,074	7,074	50,931	36,055

SOURCE: OASD (MA&S) Program & Performance Rpt End 4th Qtr FY 1971.

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (Funded & Delivered - Cumulative Thousands of Dollars)				
CATEGORIES (Including Spares)	TOTAL	ARMY	NAVY	AIR FORCE
Total Grant Aid (Excludes "Excess")	330,789	167,843	19,166	111,521
Aircraft	46,677	38	11,346	35,295

SOURCE: Journal of Military Assistance, Nov 71, p. 116

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APPENDIX XIV

DEPCH LAOS - MAP/MASF PROGRAM+

1962 - 1973

(\$ in Mil.)

<u>1962</u>	<u>1963</u>	<u>1964</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>
\$37.1	\$24.9	\$15.7	\$38.0	\$50.5	\$95.6	\$89.5	\$91.0

<u>1970</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>	<u>1973++</u>
\$124.4	\$184.0	\$251.6*	\$360.0*

*AF FUNDED:

<u>1972</u>	<u>1973</u>
\$99.4	\$127.5

+ For Amounts 1955-1961 see CHECO Report, The Royal Laotian Air Force 1954-1970, Figure 1.

++ Symington Ceiling had been raised in FY73.

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APPENDIX XV

RLAF TRAINING COMPLETED AT DET. 1, 56SOW, UDORN RTAFB
(AS OF 8 JAN 1973)

	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	TOTAL
T-28 UPT	16	19	15	24	14	34	40	60		222
T-28 IP's							6	6		12
T-28 MECH	56	70	120	95	58	54	30	101	20	604
C-47 PILOT					6	11	12	6		35
C-47 IP							7	6		13
C-47 MECH					12	49	68	53		182
C-47 LOADMASTER & GUNNERS					14		20	13		47
H-34 PLT TRNG			4	4	5	16	7	8		44
H-34 IP					3		2	2		7
H-34 MECH								34		34

SOURCE: DEPCH

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APPENDIX XVI

STRENGTH OF OPPOSING FORCES (SEP 1971)

Total Military Personnel Strength

FAR	54,120
Army--51,788	
RIAF--1,950 (164 pilots)	
River Flotilla--382	
FAN	<u>6,572</u>
TOTAL	60,692

Enemy Forces

PATHET LAO	22,910
Khammouane Dissident Neutralists	1,000
Deuane Dissident Neutralists	950
PL with NVA Advisors	13,005
PL/NVA Combined Units	3,000
NVA	<u>55,790</u>
TOTAL	96,655

RIAF Aircraft Strength

Fighter/Bombers--63
Cargo--23
Gunship--10
Helicopter--16
Liaison--9

SOURCE: Report # 6 856 0251 71, 2 Sep 71, Office of United States Army Attache.

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APPENDIX XVII

RLAF SORTIE RATES 1970-1971

The increasing combat activity led to higher RLAF sortie rates. The

Combat sortie rates per month were:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>*T-28</u>	<u>AC-47</u>
July 70	1,928	67
August 70	2,236	68
September 70	2,413	106
October 70	2,793	103
November 70	2,149	120
December 70	1,971	187
January 71	2,513	143
February 71	3,424	202
March 71	3,510	249
April 71	2,741	205
May 71	3,088	281
June 71	2,397	220
July 71	2,123	240
August 71	2,644	221
September 71	3,077	274
October 71	3,702	244
November 71	3,079	265
December 71	<u>3,702</u>	<u>227</u>
TOTAL	49,490	3,422


SOURCE: USAF V-12 Reports, 29 Jul 71, p. 5.; 3 Feb 72 pp. 5-6.

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APPENDIX XVIII



NOTE: AIRCRAFT ASSIGNED THE
FOUR COMPOSITE SQDNS
ARE REPOSITIONED AS
DICTATED BY THE
TACTICAL SITUATION

RLAF FLYING UNITS/ACTIVITIES/
TACTICAL AIR CONTROL SYSTEM

SOURCE: CINCPAC PEG REPORT 13 MAY 1971


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APPENDIX XIX



- 1/ In-country weapons only.
2/ 2 FAN Bns not included due to being ineffective.

BI: Infantry Battalion

Arty: Artillery-105mm Howitzer
155mm Howitzer

N suffix indicates Neutralist (FAN) units;
others are FAR units.

Strength are those reported by FAR/FAN except for figures in (), which are ARMA estimates of personnel present for duty.

FAR/FAN MAJOR UNITS/ACTIVITIES

SOURCE: CINCPAC PEG REPORT

13 MAY 1971


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APPENDIX XX



SOURCE: CINCPAC PEG REPORT 13 MAY 1971


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APPENDIX XXI



RLGAF LOGISTICAL FACILITIES (THAILAND)

SOURCE: CINCPAC PEG REPORT 13 MAY 1971

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APPENDIX XXII

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REPORT
AIRCRAFT INVENTORY AND UTILIZATION TABLE

a/o 30 Jun 72

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ITEM									
DESCRIPTION	QUANTITY	QUANTITY	QUANTITY	TOTAL	TOTAL	ATTRITED	LOSSES	NR HRS	MAP
T/M/S	PROGRAMMED	RECEIVED	POSSESSED	ACTIVE	INACTIVE			FLOWN	SUPPORTED
AC-47D	12	12	10	10	0	2	0	830	YES
C-47A/D	41	41	22	18	4	19	0	2126	YES
T-28B/C/D	239	258(X)	81	78#	3	167	10(T)	14299	YES
O-1A/D/F	75	79*	21	21**	0	36	22	5878	YES
U-6A	3	3	1	1	0	2	0	85	YES
U-17A/B	19	18	7	7	0	8	3##	2009	YES
UH-34D	92	93(V)	49	41	8***	43	1	14302	YES
T-41	6	6	4	4	0	2	0	780	YES
U-4@	1	1	1	1	0	0	0	(N)	YES

REMARKS: # DAILY AVERAGE OF FOUR (4) T-28s IN AIR AMERICA UNDERGOING CRASH BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR.

THREE (3) TRADED TO RTA FOR O-1D ACFT.

@ KING'S AIRCRAFT IS NOW OPERATED AND MAINTAINED UNDER USAID CONTRACT NR 342.

* MASF SUPPORTED THROUGH COST SHARING ARRANGEMENT.

* THREE (3) AIRCRAFT RECEIVED FROM RTAF TRADE: ONE (1) AIRCRAFT MINEX FROM PHILLIPINES.

** DAILY AVERAGE OF TWO (2) O-1's IN AIR AMERICA UNDERGOING CRASH BATTLE DAMAGE REPAIR.

*** EIGHT (8) UH-34D's IN NON-FLYABLE STORAGE AS ADVANCED ATTRITS.

(T) TRANSFERRED TO RTAF (X) INCLUDES TEN (10) TRANSFERRED TO RTAF AND NINE

(9) REBUILT (V) INCLUDES ONE (1) REBUILT)

(N) NOT AVAILIABLE

SOURCE: DEPCH V-12 REPORT, 25 Jul 72

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APPENDIX XXIII

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REPORT
TACTICAL UNIT STATUS TABLE

Royal Laos Air Force a/o 30 Jun 72

UNIT DESIGNATION	LOCATION	T/M/S/	*NUMBER OF ACFT	NUMBER OF CREW	COMBAT CAPAB- ILITY RATING
Composite Squadron 101	Luang Prabang	AC-47	1	3	***
		T-28	12	21	
		UH-34	3	8	
		C-47	3	4	
Composite Squadron 102	Vientiane (Wattay)	T-28	17	25	***
		AC-47	5	12	
		U-6	7	2	
		C-47	8	17	
		UH-34	11	26	
Composite Squadron 103	Savannakhet	T-41	6	12	***
		AC-47	2	4	
		U-6	14	26	
		C-47	4	7	
		UH-34	2	6	
Composite Squadron 104	Pakse	AC-47	2	5	
		C-47	3	5	
		T-28	14	26	
		UH-34	3	8	

*Aircraft are deployed as tactical requirements dictate, not assigned to any specific squadron.

SOURCE: DEPCV V-12 REPORT, 25 Jul 72

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MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REPORT
TACTICAL UNIT STATUS TABLE

Royal Laos Air Force

Remarks:

Twenty-eight (28) O-1/U-17 aircraft are flown by USAF personnel in support of FAC operations in Laos. Two (2) O-1 utilized for FAC training at Wattay Airfield, Laos. Total O-1 inventory is twenty-one (21) aircraft. Total U-17 inventory is seven (7) aircraft.

Three (3) C-47 aircraft are being used by the MTT at Savannakhet, Laos to upgrade RIAF flight crews and maintenance personnel. Four (4) C-47's are in flyable storage at Udorn or Thai-Am, Bangkok. Total C/AC-47 in inventory is thirty-two (32) aircraft.

Six (6) T-28 and two (6) UH-34 RIAF student pilots completed training at Udorn during 4/72. Forty-nine (49) RIAF students are presently in training at Udorn and the UH-34 Tng has moved into Laos effective 1 July 72.

Combat capability rating must be conditionally applied as follows: ***

C-1-These units are currently engaged in combat operations and are therefore considered to be operationally ready. However the capability for these units to perform their mission is dependent on assistance from contract facilities, third country personnel and U.S. advisory personnel operating in Laos covertly as well as overtly.

C-4-If considered independent of U.S. and third country, financial, personnel and advisory assistance (a condition which does not exist) in keeping with the Geneva Accords of 1962, the units must be considered not operationally ready.

SOURCE: DEPCH V-12 REPORT, 25 Jul 72

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APPENDIX XXIV

MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM REPORT
TRAINING AND PERSONNEL STATUS TABLE

Royal Laos Air Force

		a/o 30 Jun 72		
		TOTAL IN-COUNTRY	INDIGENOUSLY TRAINED	
CATEGORIES	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED (NET ASSETS)**	TOTAL THIRD COUNTRY MAP TRAINED DURING FY**	DURING FISCAL YR***
Total Personnel	2275*	2232	154	UNKNOWN
Flying	***	458	34	UNKNOWN
Staff	***	50	19	UNKNOWN
Maintenance	***	891	63	UNKNOWN
Logistics	***	105	0	UNKNOWN
Communications	***	183	3	UNKNOWN
Administrative	***	49	6	UNKNOWN
General Services	***	554	29	UNKNOWN
(Non-technical	***			
Fields Tng, etc)				

*Authorization of personnel from UMD drawn up by CINCPAC Manpower. Neutralist and Mao's are not counted in RIAF overall strength as they are not paid, promoted, etc. by RIAF. Authorization does not include Fighter Squadron Detachment for photo processing and interpretation facility.

AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
Officer 583	Unknown
NCO 1365	Unknown
Enlisted 319	Unknown
Civilian 8	Unknown
Total 2275	2232** (Reported by FAR G-3)

**Best data available this hq. There is a total of 58 personnel who are either Staff, Logistics, Maintenance or Admin and also counted in the Flying Category due to their rated status.

***Information not available.

SOURCE: DEPCV V-12 REPORT, 25 Jul 72

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FOOTNOTES

1. (U) Roger M. Smith, "Laos: Social and Historical Background," in Conflict in Indochina ed by Marvin and Susan Gettleman and Lawrence and Carol Kaplan (New York, 1970), p. 18. (Hereafter the overall edition cited as Conflict in Indochina.)
2. (U) Ibid., pp. 22-27.
3. (U) Conflict in Indochina, p. 76.
4. (U) Ibid. "Text of the 1954 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos," pp. 87-89.
5. (S) Project CHECO, The Royal Laotian Air Force, 1954-1970, p. xiv. (Hereafter cited as Project CHECO, RLAF).
6. (U) Bernard B. Fall, "The Laos Tangle: Undermining Neutrality," Conflict in Indochina, p. 136. (Hereafter cited as Fall, "Laos Tangle.")
7. (U) Ibid., p. 137.
8. (S) Project CHECO, RLAF, pp. xiv-xv.
9. (S) Ibid.
10. (U) Fall, "Laos Tangle," p. 137.
11. (U) Ibid., p. 138
12. (U) Ibid., p. 139.
13. (U) Ibid., pp. 140-141.
14. (S/NF) Journal of Mutual Security, Sep 59, p. 145. (Hereafter cited as JMS.)
15. (S/NF) Ibid., Dec 59, p. 105.
16. (S/NF) Ibid., Mar 59, p. 133.
17. (S/NF) Ibid., May 59, p. 139.
18. (S/NF) Ibid.

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19. (S/NF) Ibid., Jul 59, pp. 108-109.
20. (S/NF) Ibid., Sep 59, pp. 145-146.
21. (S) Project CHECO, RLAF, Figure 1.
22. (S/NF) JMS, May 59, pp. 138-139.
23. (S/NF) Journal of Military Assistance, Mar 60, p. 136. (Hereafter cited as JMA.)
24. (S/NF) Ibid., Mar 60, p. 136.
25. (S/NF) Ibid.
26. (S/NF) Ibid.
27. (U) Fall, "Laos Tangle," p. 147.
28. (S/NF) JMA, Dec 60, p. 140.
29. (S) Ibid., Fall, "Laos Tangle," p. 147.
30. (S/NF) JMA, Dec 60, p. 140; Fall, "Laos Tangle," p. 150.
31. (U) Fall, "Laos Tangle," p. 150.
32. (S/NF) JMA, Mar 60, p. 136.
33. (S/NF) Ibid., Jun 60, pp. 137-138.
34. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 138.
35. (S/NF) Ibid., Mar 60, p. 137.
36. (S/NF) Ibid., Mar 61, p. 168.
37. (S) Project CHECO, RLAF, p. xv.
38. (S/NF) JMA, Jun 61, p. 148.
39. (S) Project CHECO, RLAF, p. xiv.
40. (S/NF) JMA, Jun 61, p. 148.
41. (S/NF) Ibid.

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42. (S/NF) JMA, Dec 61, p. 136.
43. (S/NF) Ibid.
44. (S/NF) Ibid., Sep 61, p. 144.
45. (S/NF) Ibid., May 61, p. 169.
46. (S/NF) Ibid., Mar 62, p. 160.
47. (U) "1962 Geneva Accords on the Neutrality of Laos," Conflict in Indochina, pp. 186-191.
48. (S/NF) JMA, Mar 62, p. 160.
49. (S/NF) Ibid., Dec 62, p. 173.
50. (S/NF) Ibid., pp. 173-174.
51. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 173.
52. (S/NF) Ibid., Mar 62, p. 160.
53. (S/NF) Ibid.
54. (S/NF) Ibid., Dec 62, p. 174.
55. (S) Project CHECO, RLAF, p. xvi.
56. (S/NF) JMA, Sep 62, p. 144.
57. (S) Project CHECO, RLAF, p. xvi.
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59. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 145.
60. (S) Msg, DEPCHJUSMAGTHAI to HQ USAF, 110740Z Aug 67.
61. (S/NF) Hq CINCPAC Performance Evaluation Group Report on the U.S. Military Assistance Service Funded Program, DEPUTY CH JUSMAGTHAI, 13 May 71, p. 1. (Hereafter cited as CINCPAC Rpt.)
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63. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 72.
64. (S/NF) Ibid., pp. 62-63.
65. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 62.
66. (S/NF) Col Peter T. Russell, USA, DEPCHEIF to CINCPAC, 27 Jul 71, p. 7. (Hereafter cited as Russell Report.)
67. (S/NF) CINCPAC Rpt, p. 62.
68. (S/NF) Compiled from JMA, Mar, Jun, Sep 63.
69. (S/NF) JMA, Mar 63, p. 167.
70. (S/NF) Ibid.
71. (S/NF) Compiled from JMA, 1964.
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75. (S/NF) Ibid.
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81. (S/NF) JMA, Dec 66, p. 181.
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83. (S/NF) Ibid.
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87. (C/NF) Ibid., p. 3.
88. (C/NF) Ibid.
89. (C/NF) Ibid., p. 5.
90. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 20 Jan 67.
91. (U) President Richard M. Nixon, "The Situation in Laos: The Case For Escalation," Conflict in Indochina, p. 261. (Hereafter cited as Nixon, "Laos Statement,")
92. (S/NF) JMA, Dec 67, p. 168.
93. (S/NF) JMA, Sep 67, p. 162.
94. (S/NF) JMA, Dec 67, pp. 168-169.
95. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Jul 67, p. 2.
96. (S/NF) JMA, Jun 67, p. 147.
97. (S) Project CHECO, RLAF, p. 45.
98. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Oct 67, p. 5.
99. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 24 Jan 68, p. 1.
100. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Jul 67, pp. 1 and 2.
101. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 24 Jan 68, p. 3.
102. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Oct 67, p. 2.
103. (C/NF) Ibid., p. 3.
104. (C/NF) Ibid., p. 4.
105. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Jul 67, p. 1., V-12 Rpt., 27 Oct 67, p. 5., V-12 Rpt., 24 Jan 68, p. 4.

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122. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 24 Jan 69, pp. 3, 5, 6.
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(C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Apr 69, p. 2.
142. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Apr 69, pp. 3-4.
143. (S/NF) JMA, May 69, p. 112.
144. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Apr 69, p. 3.
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146. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Jul 69, pp. 1-3.
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149. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 30 Jan 70, p. 3.
150. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 4.
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- 155. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 30 Jan 70, p. 1.
- 156. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Jul 69, p. 12.
- 157. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Apr 69, p. 5.
- 158. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Jul 69, p. 5.
- 159. (S/NF) Ibid.
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- 161. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 30 Jan 70, p. 8.
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- 164. (S/NF/AFE0) Interview, Capt. Peter A. W. Liebchen, Project CHECO, with Col. Ray W. Bauman, USAF, Assistant DEPCH (Previously DCH-AF). Udorn RTAFB, 27 Apr 72. (Hereafter cited as Bauman Interview.)
- 165. (C/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Apr 69, p. 5.
- 166. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Oct 69, p. 6.
- 167. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 30 Jan 70.
- 168. (S/NF) JMA, Jan 70, p. 123.
- 169. (U) Symington Committee Hearings, Oct 69. Conflict in Indochina pp. 305-306. (Hereafter cited as Symington Hearings.)
- 170. (U) Ibid., p. 310.
- 171. (U) Nixon, "Laos Statement," pp. 261-263.
- 172. (U) Ibid., p. 264.
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- 183. (U) Ibid., p. 266.
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- 190. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 20 Apr 70, pp. 2, 4.
- 191. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 20 Apr 70, p. 2.
- 192. (S/NF) JMA, Apr 70, p. 124.
- 193. (S/NF) JMA, Aug 70, p. 122.
- 194. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 20 Apr 70, p. 4. V-12 Rpt., 27 Jun 70, p. 3.
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199. (S/NF) JMA, Dec 70, p. 125.
200. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Oct 70, p. 2. V-12 Rpt., 28 Jan 71, p. 2.
201. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Jun 70, p. 2. V-12 Rpt., 27 Oct 70, p. 3.
V-12 Rpt., 28 Jan 71, p. 2.
202. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 20 Apr 70, p. 3. V-12 Rpt., 27 Jun 70, p. 3.
203. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 28 Jan 71, p. 4.
204. (S/NF) Ibid., pp. 4-6.
205. (S/NF) JMA, Apr 70, pp. 125-127.
206. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Oct 70, pp. 3-5.
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212. (S/NF) Ltr., 19 Feb 69, Col. George A. Andrews, USAF (Chief, Air Force Division) to Col. Peter Russell, USA (DEPCH).
213. (S/NF) Management Study, pp. 8-9.
214. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 9.
215. (S/NF/AFEO) Interview, Capt. Peter A. W. Liebchen, Project CHECO, with Lt. Col. John J. Garrity, Jr., Chief of Current Intelligence, Hq 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, 3 Jan 73. (Hereafter cited as Garrity Interview.)
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- 221. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 31 Oct 71, p. 1.
- 222. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 3 Feb 72, p. 1.
- 223. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 29 Apr 71, p. 2. Msg, DEPCH to HQ 7AF, 151030Z Oct 71.
- 224. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 31 Oct 71, p. 5.
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- 237. (S/NF) Report, office of the United States Army Attache, Vientiane Report #6 856 0251 71, 2 Sep 71, 3 pages.
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- 242. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 29 Apr 71, p. 6.
- 243. (S/NF) CINCPAC Report, p. 69.
- 244. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 3.
- 245. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 10.
- 246. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 50.
- 247. (S/NF/AFE0) Interview, Capt. Peter A. W. Liebchen, Project CHECO, with Maj. Ralph Hilton, USAF, Chief Programs Officer DEPCH, Udorn RTAFB, 29 Apr 72. (Hereafter cited as Hilton Interview.)
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- 250. (S/NF) Ibid., pp. 3-4.
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- 253. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 51.
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- 257. (S/NF) Msg., AMEMBASSY Vientiane to CINCPAC, 251300Z Jun 71, p. 3. (Hereafter cited as Embassy Alternative Plan.)
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- 261. (S/NF) Ibid., pp. 5, 13.
- 262. (S/NF) Msg., CINCPAC to JCS, 120855Z Jul 71, p. 2. Note: Underlining is the author's.
- 263. (S/NF) Ibid., pp. 2-3.
- 264. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 2.
- 265. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 29 Jul 71, p. 5.
- 266. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 31 Oct 71, p. 5. V-12 Rpt., 2 Feb 72, p. 6.
- 267. (S/NF/AFEO) Bauman Interview.
- 268. (S/NF/AFEO) Interview, Capt. Peter A. W. Liebchen, Project CHECO, with Col. Joseph Mejaski, USAF, Vice Commander to DEPCH, Udorn RTAFB, 10 Jan 73. (Hereafter cited as Mejaski Interview.)
- 269. (S/NF/AFEO) Bauman Interview.
- 270. (S/NF/AFEO) Hilton Interview.
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- 273. (S/NF/AFEO) Garrity Interview.
- 274. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Apr 72, p. 1. V-12 Rpt., 25 Jul 72, p. 1.
- 275. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Apr 72, p. 2.
- 276. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 6.
- 277. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Apr 72, p. 2. V-12 Rpt., 25 Jul 72, pp. 1, 4, 6.
- 278. (S/NF) Msg., ASD/ISA to CINCPAC, Subject: Programming For FY 72 Sorties, Laos, no dtg.
- 279. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Apr 72, p. 4.
- 280. (S/NF) Ibid., p. 6.
- 281. (S/NF/AFEO) Bauman Interview, Hilton Interview.

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- 283. (S/NF) Msg., AMEMBASSY Vientiane to DEPCH, 290417Z Mar 72.
- 284. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Apr 72, p. 5.
- 285. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 27 Apr 72, p. 5. V-12 Rpt., 25 Jul 72, p. 5.
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- 287. (S/NF) V-12 Rpt., 25 Jul 72, p. 3.
- 288. (S/NF/AFE0) Bauman Interview.
- 289. (S/NF/AFE0) Ibid.
- 290. (S/NF/AFE0) Msg., Maj Gen. Searles to General Lavelle, 081030Z Nov 71.
- 291. (S/NF/AFE0) Garrity Interview.
- 292. (S/NF/AFE0) Ibid.
- 293. (S/NF/AFE0) Msg., Maj Gen. Searles to Gen. McNabb, 050815Z Oct 71, pp. 1, 4.
- 294. (S/NF/AFE0) Ibid., p. 9.
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- 296. (S/NF/AFE0) Ibid.
- 297. (S/NF/AFE0) Interview, Capt. Peter A. W. Liebchen, Project CHECO, with Maj Gen. James Hughes, USAF, Deputy Commander 7/13AF, Udorn RTAFB, 8 Jan 73. Addendum to the interview by Maj. Edd Wheeler, USAF, TDY to DEPCH at the time of the interview. (Hereafter cited as Hughes Interview.)
- 298. (S/NF/AFE0) Garrity Interview.
- 299. (S/NF/AFE0) Hughes Interview.
- 300. (S/NF/AFE0) Ibid.
- 301. (S/NF) Ltr., DEPCH P & T to CINCPAC, 16 Jun 71, pp. 2-3.

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- 302. (S/NF) Ibid., pp. 5, 7.
- 303. (S/NF) Memorandum, AAIRA to RO, 7 Feb 72, p. 1.
- 304. (S/NF) Ibid., pp. 2-3.
- 305. (S/NF/AFE0) Garritty Interview, Majeski Interview.

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GLOSSARY

AAA	Anti-Aircraft Artillery
ACW	Air Commando Wing
AFLC	Air Force Logistics Command
AFLO	Air Force Liaison Office/Officer
AIRA	Air Attache (Vientiane)
AMEMBASSY/AmEmb	American Embassy
AMEMB	American Ambassador
AOC	Air Operations Center
APRFE	Air Procurement Region, Far East
ARMA	Army Attache (Vientiane)
BAR	Browning Automatic Rifle
BDA	Bomb Damage Assessment
CAS	Controlled American Source
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command
CINCPACAF	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces
COC	Combined Operations Center
COIN	Counterinsurgency
COMUSMACTHAI	Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Thailand
CONUS/ConUS	Continental United States
CRA	Continuing Resolution Authority
CSAF	Chief of Staff, USAF
DCH-AF	Deputy Chief, Air Force
DEPCH/DEPCHIEF	Deputy Chief
DEPCHJUSMACTHAI	Deputy Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Thailand
DOD	Department of Defense
FAN	<u>Forces Armees Neutralistes (Laos)</u>
FAR	<u>Forces Armees Royales (Laos)</u>
FMM	French Military Mission
FOB	Forward Operating Base
FOL	Forward Operating Location
ICC	International Control Commission
IP	Instructor Pilot
IRAN	Inspect and Repair As Necessary
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff (U.S.)
JMP	Joint Manpower Program
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group

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KAF	Khmer (Cambodian) Air Force; also CAF
LAAF	Laotian Army Air Force (to 1961)
LAF	Laotian Air Force (to 1962)
LNP	Lao National Police
LOC	Line(s) of Communication
LRF	Lao River Flotilla
MACLAOS	Military Assistance Coordinator, Laos
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAG	Military Advisory Group
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MASF	Military Assistance Service Funded, often referred to as MAP
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MEDTC	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia
MMT	Mobile Maintenance Team
MOB	Main Operating Base
MTT	Mobile Training Team, Military Training Team
NLHZ	Neo Lao Hak Zat (Lao Patriotic Front)
NORS	Not Operationally Ready, Supply
NP	Neutralist Police
NVA	North Vietnamese Army
OL	Operating Location
PACAF	Pacific Air Forces
PACOM	Pacific Command
PDJ	Plaine des Jarres (Plain of Jars, Laos)
PEG	Performance Evaluation Group
PEO	Program Evaluation Office
PL	Pathet Lao
RLA	Royal Laotian Army (FAR)
RLAF	Royal Laotian Air Force (1962 to present)
RLG	Royal Laotian Government
RLGAF	Royal Laotian Government Armed Forces; also Royal Laotian Government Air Force (shortlived Neutralist Air Force, 1963)
ROC	Required Operational Capability
RO/USAID	Requirements Office, U.S. Agency for International Development
SAR	Search and Rescue
SAS	Special Activities Squadron
SEAOR	Southeast Asia Operational Requirement
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECSTATE	Secretary of State
SGU	Special Guerrilla Unit

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SMAMA	Sacramento Air Materiel Area
SOW	Special Operations Wing
TACAIR/Tacair	Tactical Air
TACAN/Tacan	Tactical Air Navigation
TOE	Table of Equipment
TOR	Terms of Reference
UDL	Unit Document Listing
UMD	Unit Manning Document (old term for UDL)
UE	Unit Equipment, Unit Equipped
USARSUPTHAI	U.S. Army Support Command, Thailand
VM	Viet Minh (North Vietnamese)
VNAF	Republic of Vietnam Air Force
WSLO	Weapons System Liaison Officer
WSSLO	Weapons System Support Liaison Officer

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